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Abstract 
 
 
This thesis examines the emergence of contentious forms of political agency during 
the Libyan uprising of 2011. The wave of popular protests known as the ‘Arab 
Spring’ challenged prevailing assumptions about the politics of the region. It was 
argued that, through their unfettered, claims making practices, Arab publics had 
undermined authoritarian structures of power, and become imbued with new, 
empowering self-understandings. Positioning itself within this literature on Middle 
East politics, the thesis sets out to analyse authoritarianism as a mode of domination, 
and to investigate the extent to which moments of radical contestation both transform 
authoritarian regimes and generate new political subjectivities. The analysis is centred 
on the Libyan uprising, which emerged under Qadhafi’s authoritarian Jamahiriya, yet 
witnessed widespread protests, civil activism and an armed conflict from February to 
August 2011.  
 
The thesis integrates multi-institutional politics theory with theories of contentious 
politics in order to conceptualise domination as located in social ‘institutions’ that are 
simultaneously material and symbolic. In turn, it understands agency as a strategic 
and symbolic representational practice that is capable of transforming institutional 
structures. Drawing on interviews with Libyan activists, and on the analysis of social 
movement discourses, the thesis advances three core arguments. Firstly, it argues that 
Qadhafi’s Jamahiriya embedded political agency into its system of domination by 
engendering complicity. Secondly, it argues that in 2011, Libyans undercut the 
Jamahiriya’s monopoly over meaning and practice by generating mobilising 
‘collective action frames’, and by subverting its symbolic and classificatory schemas. 
Lastly, it indicates that representational practices ultimately struggled to transform 
authoritarian domination because they were bound up with the strategic logics of 
collective action, and because they re-inscribed the Jamahiriya’s definitions of power 
and collectivity.  
 
In proffering these arguments, this thesis generates a new body of empirical material 
on an understudied case, and critically applies, challenges and extends theories of 
authoritarianism and contentious politics. 
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1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
This thesis examines the emergence of political agency as a strategic and symbolic 
representational practice during the 2011 Libyan uprising. Drawing on multi-
institutional theories of power and society, it argues that Colonel Muammar al-
Qadhafi’s authoritarian regime, the ‘Jamahiriya’, enmeshed popular political agency 
within its system of domination. In turn, the Libyan uprising shifted these power 
dynamics: it led to the emergence of collective meaning making practices, in which 
Libyans mobilised against, and subverted, the Jamahiriya’s behavioural norms and 
classification schemes. However, I qualify the voluntaristic implications of this 
argument by indicating the ways in which this mode of articulation was constrained 
by the logics of collective action, and by the Jamahiriya’s symbolic ordering of 
reality. The thesis thus presents a critical appraisal of the oft-reiterated claim that, 
during the ‘Arab Spring’, ‘the will of the people [was] expressed without 
intermediary’ (Achcar 2013: 1).1 
This chapter will signal the importance of ‘political agency’ as a concept in 
contemporary social and cultural theory, distinguishing it from more conventional 
terms such as ‘political participation’. Framing a research agenda in terms of ‘agency’ 
is a particularly pertinent undertaking in light of the demonstrations and protests that 
took place in the Arab world from late 2010, and which saw the overthrow of 
																																																								
1 The term ‘Arab Spring’ has been much popularised by Western and Arab media, and has entered the 
research lexicon. The thesis uses it to refer to the mass protests and uprisings that occurred across the 
Arab region from the end of 2010 onwards, but it does so sparingly, in recognition of the fact that it 
remains a contested term (Ahmary and Wedday 2012; Pappé 2014; Monier 2015; Cherkaoui 2016). 
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dictatorships by societies that had been described as ‘powerless’ and demobilized 
(Barakat 1993: 26). It is all the more compelling in a case such as Libya, which 
experienced mass mobilisation despite being characterised as a ‘depoliticized’ society 
under Qadhafi’s authoritarian regime (Vandewalle 2006: 71). This chapter will situate 
the research question of the thesis within the literature on Middle East politics, as it 
has variously conceptualised and studied both political agency and authoritarianism. It 
will go on to outline the theoretical and empirical contributions of the research, and to 
clarify its conceptual and methodological underpinnings. Lastly, it will delineate the 
scope and structure of the remaining chapters.  
 
 
1.1 Why Study Political Agency? Why Authoritarianism? 
 
 
 
The concept of political agency has attracted much scholarly attention within the field 
of political sociology. Divergent assessments of the respective roles of ‘agency’ and 
‘structure’ in shaping political outcomes have ‘haunted social theory from the start’ 
(Elyachar 2014: 453) and have long been debated in studies of contentious politics 
(Giddens 1976, 1981; Wendt 1987; Sewell 1992; McAdam et al 1996; Klandermans 
et al 1998; Goodwin and Jasper 1999, 2004; Whittier 2002; Polletta 1999). More 
recently, scholars have argued that there are significant transformations in ‘political 
actorness’ in today’s public arena (Marchetti 2013: 1). Such transformations include 
new forms of action such as ‘political consumerism’ that are targeted at private 
organisations (Stolle et al 2005; Teorell 2007), new opportunities for political 
engagement enabled by the media (from the television to the internet), and new 
transnational, globalised contexts through which actors can influence the political 
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system (Eschle 2005; Stahler-Shalk et al 2007; Barnett 2013; Davis et al 2013; Arbatli 
and Rosenberg 2017).  
This emergent, theoretical investigation of political agency can be contrasted 
with the predominant mode of analysis in political science, which has traditionally 
avoided expanding the study of ‘what “doing” politics means in the present context’, 
beyond actions anchored in state structures and domestic political institutions 
(Marchetti 2013: 1). Within the comparative political science literature, the agency of 
citizens has been examined through the framework of ‘political participation’, defined 
as activity that is specifically designed to influence the sphere of governmental 
decision-making (Verba and Nie 1972; Huntington and Nelson 1976; Conge 1988). In 
practice, studying political participation has entailed the identification and 
measurement of observable political activities in Western liberal democracies, such as 
voting, campaigning and contacting public officials (Pateman 1970; Barnes and Kaase 
1979; Peterson 1990; Erikson et al 2002). Such activities purportedly sustain 
democratic governance, build civic competence and enable citizen membership and 
investment in political life (Scaff 1975; Putnam 1993, 2000; Munroe 2002; Cooper 
2005). 
There have undoubtedly been attempts within the comparative politics literature 
to expand upon and question this understanding of political participation as civic 
engagement (Schmitter and Karl 1991; Moehler 2008; Berger 2009). One strand of 
literature has de-emphasised the political participation of the masses, and its supposed 
democracy-building virtues, by developing an elite-centred analysis of democratic 
governance and political change (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986; Higley and Burton 
1989, 2006; Higley et al 1990; Dye and Zeigler 1996). Alternately, some scholars 
have sought to describe and account for newly emergent forms of political activity in 
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established democracies, through concepts such as ‘unconventional political 
participation’ (Booth and Seligson 1978; Marsh and Kaase 1979; Muller 1982; Dalton 
2008; Bourne 2010; Quaranta 2012; Lamprianou 2013), which includes illegal and 
violent activities, and ‘latent political participation’ (Ekman and Amna 2012) which 
refers to non-overtly ‘political activities’ occurring beyond formal democratic 
channels. Although such studies have considerable value in questioning an idealised 
and homogenous interpretation of democratic governance, the investigation of agency 
ultimately continues to be rooted in institutional and state-centric understandings of 
the political sphere.  
 A more expansive understanding of political agency has been articulated in 
studies of contentious politics. Scholars who have invoked political agency as a 
research agenda have suggested that to do so entails ‘going beyond’ the prevailing 
paradigms of political science research. It involves going beyond the conventional 
study of ‘politics’, or ‘how authoritative decisions are made and executed for a 
society’ (Easton 1957: 383), to encompassing an awareness of ‘the political’ as a 
terrain of contentious struggle over established power relations, undertaken by people 
themselves (Scott 1990; Rubin 1996; Haugaard 1997; Knauer 1980; Nash 2001; 
Hauptmann 2004; Mouffe 2005; Featherstone 2008; Lyons 2010). It involves going 
beyond the assumption that political authority resides in the physical dissemination of 
resources (Dye and Zeigler 1996: 2) to recognising that environments are symbolic as 
well as physical, shaped by communication, social interaction and classificatory 
practices (Heller and Jones 2013). Lastly, it demands that we view political action, not 
simply as a rational undertaking, but as comprising the building of group solidarities, 
shared relations and changes in political subjectivities (Buechler 1993; Polletta and 
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Jasper 2001; Eschle and Maiguashca 2005; Bayat 2010; Maiguashca 2013; Juris and 
Sitrin 2016).  
This thesis situates its study of political agency in light of this expanded 
conceptualisation of political actorness. These understandings of political agency have 
largely been elaborated within contemporary institutional, cultural and social theory, 
but political agency has also emerged as a point of enquiry in the Middle East politics 
literature, in light of a need to explain and account for the ‘Arab Spring’ (Dupont and 
Passy 2011; Gause 2011; Goodwin 2011; Elman 2012). The demonstrations and 
protests that broke out in the Middle East, ushered in by the self-immolation of the 
Tunisian street vendor Mohammed Bouazizi on 17 December 2010, were not only a 
palpable demonstration of ‘political participation’, but of agentive traits that are more 
subjective and even laudable: fearlessness and empowerment, a newfound capacity to 
articulate popular demands, and a consciousness that it is possible to alter 
authoritarian conditions through collective action (Gamson 2011; Pollack 2011a; 
Bellin 2012b; Brynen et al 2012; Cavatorta and Pace 2012; Lynch 2012; Dawisha 
2013; Tripp 2013; Elyachar 2014). The emergence of this new, collective spirit of 
political action was cited as evidence that, despite having seemingly countenanced 
authoritarian regimes for decades, Arab publics were not passive or politically 
apathetic (Hudson 2011; Durac 2012; Achcar 2013).  
This analysis of the Arab uprisings appears to validate a key concept in social 
theory: what James Scott (1990: 203) has described as ‘flash-in-the-pan’ moments of 
open contestation, or what have elsewhere been referred to as ‘historical watershed’ 
moments of change (Sewell 1999: 52) and ‘moments of madnesss…events in which 
the wall between the instrumental and the expressive collapses’ (Zolberg 1972: 183). 
Such moments of open political contestation purportedly enable individuals to 
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recapture their ‘human dignity’, and to reconfigure the authoritative meanings and 
classifications that shape their lives (Scott 1990: 208). Yet, it soon appeared that the 
Arab Spring had yielded a ‘depressingly modest harvest’, at least in terms of its 
impact on political governance (Brownlee et al 2015: 5), with only Tunisia 
maintaining a democratic transition out of the six countries that experienced regime-
challenging protests, and the region as a whole witnessing a limited shift in civil and 
political liberties. As Brownlee et al (2015: 211) go on to argue, ‘the idea that the self-
immolation of a frustrated fruitseller in a dusty Tunisian backwater could change the 
fundamental nature of Arab politics seems remarkably quaint, even naïve’. 
Consequently, the literature has refocused its attention away from the radical 
moment of contention in 2011, signalling the need to go ‘beyond the Arab Spring’ 
(Kamrava 2014) and towards delineating the historical roots of authoritarian stability 
and political change in the region (Gana 2013; Rand 2013; Badran 2014; Hinnebusch 
2014; Bamert 2015; Hess 2016; Roberts 2016). Nevertheless, the notion of an 
emergent political agency in the Arab uprisings remains a key area of investigation, 
and the scholarly allusions to this phenomenon in the immediate aftermath of the 
protests have raised a number of unanswered questions. What were the characteristics 
of the political agency that emerged in 2011? How did such this new form of 
‘political actorness’ contest dominant – in this instance, authoritarian - configurations 
of power? And to what extent did it transform political subjectivities? This enquiry is 
formulated into the central research question of the thesis: 
 
How, and to what extent, did open insubordination in the Arab Spring transform 
authoritarian structures of domination and generate new political subjectivities? 
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1.2 Political Agency and the Libyan Uprising of 2011  
 
The Arab uprisings saw six countries experience regime challenging protests 
(Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, and Yemen), and other demonstrations of 
varying intensity in Morocco, Algeria, Iraq, Jordan, and Sudan. In the midst of these 
cases, the Libyan uprising presents a particularly absorbing and under-investigated 
conundrum. Popularly dubbed the ‘17 February Revolution’, the Libyan uprising 
began on 15 February 2011, culminating in the capture of the city of Sirte and the 
death of Muammar al-Qadhafi on 20 October 2011. The uprising was a complicated 
instance of popular political mobilisation: it was initiated through the kind of large-
scale, peaceful demonstrations that were witnessed across the Arab world, before 
transforming into an armed insurrection supported by NATO intervention. 
Nevertheless, in the new rhetoric of the Libyan media in 2011, the uprising was 
portrayed as a decidedly popular, political undertaking, accomplished by Libyans 
themselves: 
 
There was the old Libya, its people oppressed, its wealth stolen, its 
creativity obliterated, its security lost…and the Libya of 17 February. This 
Libya is the present and future at once. It has created its own glory due to its 
revolutionary youth. It is building its own reality through the efforts of its 
sons, and it derives its strength from the history of its forefathers. And it is 
Libya as we have always wanted it, and as we see it and feel it: a free, civic 
state, preserving the dignity of its people, with institutions, a constitution 
and security. There is no place in it for terrorism or exclusionary slogans, or 
the suppression of voices ever again.2 
 
																																																								
2 Agela, Awad. “There is a difference” (tham’mata farq). Al-Manarah. 29 July 2011. Issue 6: 8.	
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The language is utopian but also present-oriented, depicting tangible practices of state 
building and seeing in such activities the emergence of a new form of civic 
consciousness in Libya. Following the rise of a civil society sphere in Libya, 
particularly in the city of Benghazi, and the election of a 200-member General 
National Congress (GNC) in July 2012, this language was paralleled in optimistic, 
scholarly assessments of the political trajectory of the Libyan uprising (Vandewalle 
2012a). It was argued that ‘the ouster of Gadafi and the success of the revolution have 
brought the majority of Libyans closer together and reinforced their sense of national 
identity’ (Deeb 2012: 77), and that ‘the Libyan people soundly rejected the 
authoritarian model that had plagued the country for centuries’ (St. John 2014: 137). 
In turn, the international media hailed the success of the National Forces Alliance in 
the 2012 elections as a success by liberal, secularist forces (Mezran and Knecht 2015: 
94), suggesting that the country was en-route to a successful democratic transition.  
The rapid emergence of new, participatory forms of political action in Libya is 
particularly striking in light of the despotic authoritarian government of Muammar al-
Qadhafi, who had ruled for more than four decades after overthrowing the 
constitutional monarchy of King Idris I in a bloodless coup d’état in 1969. Unlike 
other authoritarian regimes in the Middle East, which have been characterised as 
‘liberalized autocracies’, Qadhafi banned political parties, trade unions and NGOs, 
and civil society did not exist in any form (Joffé 2006: 117). Following the 
establishment of the Jamahiriya (‘State of the Masses’) in 1977, Qadhafi instated a 
structure of political governance that was purportedly based on the direct rule of the 
masses. In reality, political authority was informally embodied in Qadhafi and his 
inner circle, who was technically outside of the political system and therefore 
unaccountable (Pargeter 2006: 226). As a result, it has been argued that Libyan 
	 9	
society was thoroughly depoliticised, ‘unable to contemplate or express any ideas 
beyond those espoused by Qadhafi’ (Vandewalle 2015: 23). The suppression of 
popular self-representation under the Jamahiriya has been characterised as a 
longstanding feature of Libya’s social and political development, stemming from the 
fact that Libyan land has been ‘invaded, occupied and administered by foreign powers 
since the beginning of recorded history’ (St. John 2014: 123), and propounded in 
particular by Italian colonial rule in the twentieth century, which saw the destruction 
of local bureaucracy and the failure to create any institutions of representative 
government (Davis 1987: 58).  
Libya, as it has been researched thus far, presents a number of gaps pertaining 
to political agency. It has been argued that, under the Jamahiriya, Libyans simply 
‘learned to cope with a political system they had no chance of reforming’ 
(Vandewalle 2006: 129), but the nature of ‘coping’ as a mode of political dis-
engagement has not been unpacked in the scholarly literature on Libya. Moreover, 
there is a need to account for the sharp contrast between the purportedly depoliticised 
and apathetic Libyan society under Qadhafi, and the dynamic, vigorous and agentive 
Libyan society of the 2011 uprising. Lastly, there is a need to reconcile the politically 
engaged Libyan society of the uprising, with its rhetoric of a transformed political 
consciousness, with the fragmented Libyan political sphere following the uprising, 
with its fast-diminishing practice of civil resistance as a viable means of protest (Joffé 
2016: 136).  
The recent, burgeoning literature on Libya has chosen to contextualise the 
Libyan uprising, principally by focusing on post-revolutionary power struggles and on 
the structural factors underpinning political instability in the country (Serwer 2011; 
Lacher 2013a; Pack 2013; Sawani and Pack 2013; Cole and McQuinn 2015; Mezran 
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and Knecht 2015; Pack and Cook 2015; Randall 2015; Geha and Volpi 2016; 
Szczepankiewicz-Rudzka 2016; Willcoxon 2017). Within this literature, there have 
been some valuable discussions focusing on the phenomenon of civil resistance 
during the Libyan uprising itself (Joffé 2013, 2016; Khatib 2013b; Khalil 2014; 
Cherstich 2014; Rajabany and Shitrit 2014; Roberts 2016). However, these texts have 
largely described and celebrated modes of contentious activity without theoretically 
exploring the emergence of political agency as an open, representational practice 
under authoritarianism.  
 This thesis aims to contribute to the literature on Middle East politics by 
engaging with the interrelationship between political agency and authoritarian modes 
of domination. Firstly, it makes a contribution to the way in which authoritarianism 
has been studied by taking the Libyan Jamahiriya seriously as an ‘institution’: a 
dominant configuration of power comprised of both material and symbolic 
technologies of control, that shaped and constituted publically political subjectivities 
prior to the Libyan uprising. Secondly, it contributes to our understanding of ‘political 
agency’ in the Arab uprisings by unpacking the ways in which political actors actively 
articulated their claims against the Qadhafi regime. This representational activity is 
analysed as a ‘meaning making practice…the subjective process of conceptualising 
the world around us’ (Packer 2010: 52). In turn, the thesis also draws attention to the 
way in which this process of meaning making, not only negotiated and subverted, but 
also ultimately reinforced dominant constructions of reality. Lastly, through 
integrating complementary insights from various theories of contentious politics, it 
critically engages with the fundamental premises of social movement theory, noting a 
tension in its formulation of political agency as a phenomenon that is both strategic 
and expressive.  
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1.3 Theoretical Framework  
 
 
 
This thesis seeks to understand the way in which political agency emerges in relation 
to an authoritarian configuration of power. This point of enquiry necessitates a 
theoretical framework that can account for structural domination and change, but that 
also sees structure and agency as mutually implicating. The resultant theoretical 
framework, which is outlined in Chapter 3, draws on multi-institutional politics theory 
in order to understand the way in which power shapes meanings and is constitutive of 
political subjectivities. The theoretical framework also draws on theories of social 
movement activism and resistance, in order to account for the way in which political 
actors can contest and potentially transform dominant meanings through their 
representational practices. These theories are complementary in that they emphasise 
the significance of definitional, classificatory practices in shaping the symbolic and 
material sphere, irrespective of whether this discursive power is deployed by 
dominant or subordinate groups.  
The multi-institutional politics model argues that society is comprised of 
multiple ‘institutions’ that order reality through a combination of material and 
symbolic technologies of domination (Douglas 1986; Friedland and Alford 1991; 
Thornton and Ocasio 1999, 2008; Polletta 2004; Armstrong and Bernstein 2008). An 
institution is thus defined as an ordering of reality, or as a ‘supraorganizational pattern 
of activity’ that contains a symbolic system of meaning (Friedland and Alford 1991: 
243). Customarily in political science, the state has been seen as the most powerful 
social institution, with a particularly potent capacity to create new social categories, 
and an ability to shape the environment more profoundly than any other organisation 
(Polletta 2004: 165). However, Friedland and Alford (1991: 238) argue that in a 
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multi-institutional model, the centrality of the state as an institution is historically 
variable, and should not be taken for granted. Other social institutions that are of 
importance include the family, schools, and mass media (Valocchi 2005b: 756). 
 The concept of an ‘institution’ is particularly expansive, and should not be 
conflated with the use of the term ‘political institutions’, which largely refers to 
structures that create, enforce and apply government policies within a given type of 
regime (Sandberg and Lundberg 2012). An institutional understanding of domination 
involves going beyond the definition of power as a primarily material force, to one 
where it involves the dissemination of meaning systems, normative structures and 
categorisations of identity, value and interest in society (Valocchi 2005b: 751). 
Through this combined material and discursive power, also known as an ‘institutional 
logic’ (Thornton and Ocasio 1999), institutions can exert a powerful, even ‘invisible’, 
hold on our processes of classifying and recognising (Douglas 1986; Valocchi 2005b). 
As a result, individuals will tend to reproduce the symbolic order of a given 
institution, and may even come to believe in its definitional structures altogether 
(Friedland and Alford 1991: 250), thereby becoming self-regulating subjects 
(Foucault 1977, 1980).  
This thesis understands authoritarian regimes as ‘institutions’. Authoritarian rule 
has been defined as one in which there is a concentration of power, limited political 
pluralism, limited political participation, and the predominance of patrimonial 
governance (Purcell 1973; Moore 1974). Beyond this broad definition, it is commonly 
argued that authoritarian rule comes in many forms, with some regimes relying on the 
coercive repression of internal dissent in order to sustain their authority, and others 
deploying a range of different strategies including co-optation and divide and rule 
(Svolik 2009, 2012; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2011; Cavatorta 2013; Wahman et al 
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2013; Geddes et al 2014; Sassoon 2016). In addition to managing political dissent 
through material practices, however, authoritarian regimes also control and manage 
systems of signification. Although, as indicated above, all dominant configurations of 
power attempt to manage meanings, authoritarian rulers deploy this strategy 
extensively and as a ‘disciplinary device’, through which they are able to ‘enforce 
obedience and sustain the conditions under which regimes rule’ (Wedeen 1999: 5-6).  
A focus on authoritarian ‘regimes’ as the central unit of analysis, as opposed to 
‘states’ or even ‘systems’, is particularly well suited to an institutional understanding 
of authoritarianism. A ‘regime’ has been defined as an ‘ensemble of patterns’ 
(Schmitter and Karl 1991: 76) or an ‘ensemble of rules’ (O’Donnell and Schmitter 
1986: 65), formal and informal, that actors anticipate others to abide by in the process 
of gaining access to power, choosing leaders and policies and exercising authority 
(Kailitz 2013: 39). As a method of organising relations between ruler and ruled, the 
concept of a regime is connotative of dominant power dynamics, but it also suggests a 
socially-reinforcing system of authority, with scholars arguing that such patterns must 
be ‘habitually known, practiced, and accepted by most, if not all, actors’ (Schmitter 
and Karl 1991: 76). The concept of a regime, like the concept of an institution, 
implies that structure and agency are mutually implicating in the process of sustaining 
power. Moreover, the term ‘regime’ is not overly specialised. It has been argued that 
regimes create ‘rules of the game’, and that actors can manoeuvre in accordance with 
them (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986), but the content of such rules or the way in 
which they function in practice is not built into the concept itself.  
In contrast, the concept of a state is tightly circumscribed: states are ‘sets of 
political, military, judicial and bureaucratic organizations that exert political authority 
and coercive control over people living within the borders of well-defined territories’ 
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(Amenta et al 2002: 49). The investigation of states has been described as the central 
task of political science (Ishiyama and Breuning 2011: 5), and yet it has also been 
argued that ‘the state’ is merely one kind of political structure that is both time and 
culture-bound (Evans 1970: 119). Moreover, the analysis of state power in relation to 
contentious political action has generally focused on the role played by democratic 
institutions within advanced capitalist countries (Rucht 1996; McAdam et al 2001; 
Smith and Fetner 2010), as opposed to authoritarian contexts. In turn, the concept of a 
‘political system’ (Easton 1957, 1965) is useful in suggesting the interconnectedness 
of a dominant ordering of reality, but its conceptualisation of political life is similarly 
restricted, centering on ‘how authoritative decisions are made and executed for a 
society’ through the operation of political institutions such as parties, interests groups, 
government and voting (Easton 1957: 383). 
An institutional understanding of authoritarian regimes is particularly useful for 
grasping the mechanisms of structural domination, but it is less clear on how 
individual actors can transform the meanings that order their lives. Institutions, it is 
argued, engender an ‘embedded’ form of agency (Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 104): 
individuals can ‘transpose’ institutional meanings in order to further their own 
interests and to articulate their identities (Sewell 1992: 18-21), but they will generally 
reproduce institutional authority through their social practices (Armstrong and 
Bernstein 2008: 83). Moreover, the notion that institutional classifications reproduce 
‘belief in the institution’ (Friedland and Alford 1991: 250) does not fully 
accommodate social practices of dissimulation in authoritarian contexts (Wedeen 
1999). It is suggested that transformative moments of ‘institutional struggle’ can 
allow individuals to reconfigure dominant definitions of power and interest (Friedland 
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and Alford 1991: 250), but the theory does not delineate specific theoretical tools for 
investigating this process of contestation.  
As a result, and in order to understand agency as a meaning making practice that 
is capable of reinterpreting and transforming classificatory systems and practices, the 
thesis draws upon social movement framing theory and resistance theory. Both 
theories are fundamentally concerned with the way in which political actors engage in 
the social construction of reality, and both have conceptualised agency as a 
contentious representational capacity. The divergence is in their differentiated 
emphasis on the purposes and outcomes of such meaning making practices. 
Framing theory suggests that meaning making practices principally serve a 
strategic, mobilising purpose for a particular cause (McAdam et al 1996; Oliver and 
Johnston 2005; Johnston 2009; Doerr et al 2015). By articulating, packaging and re-
interpreting their motivations and grievances, actors can develop ‘collective action 
frames’ that redefine the socio-political context of action in strategically congenial 
ways (Snow et al 1986; Snow and Benford 1988; Gamson 1992; Laraña et. al 1994; 
Johnston and Klandermans 1995; Caroll and Ratner 1996; Davis 2002; Miceli 2005). 
Resistance theories suggest that, through openly contentious meaning making 
practices, individuals can reconfigure the dominant, symbolic structures of power that 
organise their lives (Sewell 1999; Hollander and Einwohner 2004; Jefferess 2008; 
Maiguashca 2013; Tripp 2013; Juris and Sitrin 2016) and transform their own 
understandings of themselves as publically political persons (Spivak 1988; Scott 
1990; Kurik 2016). In line with the principle that moments of open contention break 
the wall between the instrumental and the expressive (Zolberg 1972: 183), I position 
this two-pronged understanding of political agency as internally coherent, rather than 
contradictory. Indeed, it has been argued that dichotomies of identity vs. interest and 
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rationality vs. emotion fail to reflect the way in which these orientations can and do 
exist within the same contentious movement (Eschle 2005: 20; Armstrong and 
Bernstein 2008: 85; Marchetti 2013: 3).  
Lastly, the theoretical framework emphasises the importance of critically 
reflecting on the fluid and reciprocal relationship between power and subversion, in 
accordance with the influential argument that resistance is ‘never in a position of 
exteriority in relation to power’ (Foucault 1978: 95-96). In practice, this means that 
scholars should actively pay attention to the ways in which subversive discourses are 
inflected with new hierarchies and lines of exclusion (Vesser 1989; Abu-Lughod 
1990; Sharp et al 2000; Maiguashca 2013; Winegar 2016). As argued by Courpasson 
and Vallas (2016: 5), ‘When subordinate groups or classes defy their overseers, they 
often do so in ways that exercise power over groups and classes even more powerless 
than themselves – and they often do so in ways that are inflected with racial, gender, 
religious and ethnic hierarchies’. This thesis adopts this critical orientation in its 
evaluation of the extent to which discursive practices transformed – as opposed to 
simply subverted – the Qadhafi regime’s system of signification.  
 
1.4 Research Methods and Reflexivity  
 
 
The theoretical framework outlined above enabled me to disaggregate the central 
research question of the thesis into three distinct nodes of enquiry:  
 
1. How did the Jamahiriya operate as an institution, and how did it shape popular 
political agency prior to the uprising?  
2. How did political actors in the 2011 Libyan uprising engage in strategic, 
meaning making practices in their mobilisation against the Qadhafi regime?  
	 17	
3. How did meaning making practices subvert the Qadhafi regime’s symbolic 
order, and to what extent did they transform it?  
 
In order to answer these questions, this thesis deploys a range of qualitative research 
methods aimed at unpacking dominant and subversive semiotic practices in Libya. To 
that end, I analysed primary and secondary source materials on the Qadhafi regime, 
from cultural productions – such as Qadhafi’s speeches, official regime music and 
iconography, and sanctioned television comedies – to extensive reports on Libyan 
public sector administration that were commissioned by the Qadhafi regime in 2007. I 
also gathered and coded a selection of social movement materials, from activist 
statements, social media texts and YouTube footage, official documents, newspaper 
articles, and revolutionary cultural productions such as music, poetry and artwork, in 
order to understand the way in which political actors constructed and framed their 
motivations for action within the political and symbolic context of the Libyan 
uprising. In this vein, ‘digitalized stories of revolt’ are increasingly useful for 
reflecting people’s perceptions, and to some degree, their motivations for engaging in 
contentious action (Leenders 2013: 283). 
Alongside this textual analysis, I also conducted 31 semi-structured interviews 
with political activists and opposition figures who participated in the Libyan uprising, 
many of whom set out to explicitly communicate and reframe the motives and 
objectives of the Libyan uprising to internal and external audiences in 2011. These 
interviews were designed to gather a range of perspectives on the expressive and 
strategic components of political activism in 2011, by actors who were based both 
inside Libya and in the diaspora during the uprising. They also re-channelled the 
interpretation of textual materials in unanticipated directions, raising insights into the 
way in which power operated in Qadhafi’s Jamahiriya, and enabling me to question 
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the way in which the aftereffects of activism shape the subjectivities of political 
actors. The interviews were supplemented with secondary material from the strong 
body of research that emerged in the immediate aftermath of the Libyan uprising, 
prior to the outbreak of a civil war in 2014, which largely sheds light on the political 
perspectives of the formal Libyan opposition in 2011 (Chorin 2012; Sawani 2012, 
2013; Benotman et al 2013; Sawani and Pack 2013; Cole and McQuinn 2015), but 
which also explores some dimensions of civil society activism during the uprising 
(Khalil 2014; Rajabany and Shitrit 2014; Strakes 2016). 
The research methods used in this thesis have been triangulated in order to 
capture the intersection between actors’ representational practices in 2011, as 
reflected in social movement documents and materials, and actors’ contextualisation 
and subjective evaluation of these practices. In addition, these methods have also been 
deployed in a reflexive way, once again reflecting the constructivist orientations of 
this research. The concept of ‘reflexivity’ draws attention to the researcher’s role in 
the emergent process of critical enquiry, and suggests that researchers invariably enter 
into a dialogic relation with the problems, the people and the contexts that they 
investigate (O’Connor 2015). As a result, the personal assumptions, biases or 
prejudices of the researcher cannot be eradicated in the pursuit of value-free reliability 
and neutrality (Shacklock and Smyth 1998). Instead, research is actively enriched 
when researchers self-reflect upon ‘its location, its subjects, its process, its theoretical 
context, its data, its analysis, and recognize that the construction of knowledge takes 
place in the world and not apart from it’ (Ruby 1980: 154). 
Confronting our subjectivity as researchers has been described as particularly 
unavoidable in studies of ‘resistance’ against oppressive forces. This topic implies and 
even engenders a moral investment on the part of the researcher. As argued by 
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Hollander and Einwohner (2004: 550-551), ‘writing about resistance signals political 
solidarity with the oppressed and downtrodden; it permits the writer to choose sides in 
the power struggles that are interwoven with social life’. Indeed, it has even been 
argued that resistance is an ‘epistemological stance’ by researchers that ‘recognizes 
the individual and collective, embodied and spoken desire, pain, inquiry and lust for 
justice…[it] offers a lens for social analysis, engaged pedagogy and organizing’ (Fine 
et al 2014: 54). The study of resistance is here presented as inseparable from the 
struggles for progressive social change that are purportedly at the heart of resistance 
itself. However, this avowed recognition of scholarly subjectivity, as much as it 
fosters self-conscious research practices, must avoid risking what some scholars have 
described as a ‘romanticizing’ (Abu-Lughod 1990) and ‘fetishizing’ (Kellner 1995) of 
resistance. In practice, it must not prevent researchers, having committed to this 
stance of scholarly solidarity, from implementing the theoretical maxim that 
contentious meaning making practices should be examined for their exclusionary as 
well as subversive qualities.  
Throughout the cycle of researching, writing and restructuring this thesis, I was 
acutely conscious of the way in which my own experiences as a Libyan, and of the 
Libyan uprising, shaped my assumptions, research methods, and interpretive 
proclivities. I imported into the research process my own recollections of the Qadhafi 
regime, from the enforced re-performance of its propaganda while studying in a 
weekend ‘Libyan school’ in the UK, to witnessing the intersection of fear and 
dissimulation that characterised public speech about the Qadhafi regime in my visits 
to the country. The Libyan uprising ushered in a further set of personal experiences: 
participation in political activism, exposure to the sentiment of overwhelming 
collectivity, and the consumption of revolutionary cultural productions. These 
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recollections became points of entry into my research, shaping the types of interview 
questions I directed, but also signalling shared familiarities with the experiences of 
Libyan activists, and therefore at times blurring the line between interview and 
conversation.  
In addition, my experiences of the Libyan uprising had generated a set of beliefs 
and assumptions about the progressive and empowering nature of revolutionary 
activism. During the process of research, some of these assumptions came to the fore 
and were challenged through interviews with Libyan activists, many of whom were 
avowedly disillusioned with their revolutionary experiences, or were actively 
attempting to re-contextualise and make sense of the fleeting, ‘abnormal euphoria that 
accompanies revolution’ (Jones 2012: 5). The insights that arose from these 
discussions were in turn rechanneled and directed as questions in subsequent 
interviews.  
As a result, interviews were not simply a unidirectional means of eliciting 
information, but critical and dialogic reflections on both the affirmative and 
dispiriting aspects of political contention. During this recursive activity, there was 
undoubtedly a challenge in drawing attention to actors’ self-understandings and 
representations of reality, while simultaneously remaining at a critical, interpretive 
distance; of being reflexive, but without muting the voices of participants (Edwards 
and Ribbens 1998: 204). The study by Jessica Winegar (2016) on acts of aesthetic 
ordering during the Egyptian uprising was particularly helpful in delineating a way in 
which scholars can represent the agentive practices of activists while attending to the 
hierarchies and power dynamics that they engender.  
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1.5 Chapter Outline  
 
 
 
This thesis is organised into eight chapters, including the Introduction. The following 
chapter reviews the literature on Middle East politics as it has variously 
conceptualised and investigated the phenomenon of political agency under 
authoritarianism, prior to and in the aftermath of the Arab uprisings. It highlights the 
central strengths of this literature: its emphasis on the heterogeneity of authoritarian 
regimes types, its close examination of the way in which authoritarian institutions and 
structures of governance shape the orientations, interests and behaviours of domestic 
political actors, and occasionally, its exploration of non-institutionalised forms and 
vehicles of political participation in the region. The research question emerges based 
on the central gaps in this literature: namely, its relatively sparse attention to the 
symbolic practises of domination undertaken by authoritarian regimes, and its 
insufficient exploration of the way in which political actors can subvert and 
reconstitute  - during moments of open contestation - the meanings that structure their 
lives.  
Chapter 3 outlines the conceptual framework of the thesis. It begins by mapping 
out and critically engaging with theories that have conceptualised the nature of 
political agency under a dominant social structure. It extends the above discussion by 
touching on another prominent theory of contentious politics, political process theory 
(PPT), and by elaborating on the divergences and commonalities of multi-institutional 
politics theory, social movement theory and theories of resistance. Complementary 
insights from these three bodies of scholarship are integrated into one theoretical 
model that conceives of structure as both semiotic and material, and of structure and 
agency as mutually implicating forces. Chapter 4 describes the methodology of the 
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thesis. It justifies the selection of Libya as a case study of authoritarianism, noting the 
extent to which it both resembles but differs substantively from other authoritarian 
regimes in the Middle East. It delineates the constructivist and interpretivist 
methodological orientation of the thesis, the specific research methods that were used, 
and issues pertaining to ethics and validity.   
The three central, empirical chapters of the thesis each answer one of the 
research questions outlined above. Chapter 5 traces the Qadhafi regime’s ‘institutional 
logic’ as it was established through material (coercive and political) and symbolic 
structures of power. It outlines the way in which the Jamahiriya regularised behaviour 
by engendering ‘complicity’: enforcing popular participation in its political-
administrative system, and mandating the public re-performance of its symbols and 
rituals. Abiding with the Jamahiriya’s institutional logic fundamentally centred on 
upholding its contradictory and incommensurate claims: in particular, the substantive 
gap between what it professed in theory and the way in which it operated in practice. 
This contradiction, however, also supplied opportunities for agency, enabling people 
to manoeuvre within the Jamahiriya in furtherance of their own interests while still 
abiding by its terms of public engagement.  
Chapters 6 and 7 discuss the strategic and symbolic meaning making practices 
that emerged during the Libyan uprising. Chapter 6 outlines the central revolutionary 
framing outlets that emerged during the uprising, and the way in which they 
strategically articulated and packaged a cohesive grievance narrative designed to 
mobilise support for the opposition movement, and to topple the Qadhafi regime. 
However, the chapter also draws attention to the way in which these instrumental, 
collective understandings rested as much on the obfuscation of differences as they did 
on the clarification of meanings, and it scrutinises the implications of this tension for 
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political agency. In turn, Chapter 7 explores the symbolic, representational practices 
of the Libyan opposition movement in 2011. The chapter is structured on the 
theoretical premise that the transformation of a dominant system of meaning must not 
only consist of subversive modes of resistance, but also involve the active 
establishment of a more egalitarian, inclusive system of meaning. It delineates the 
structure and content of the revolutionary symbolic order that was generated during 
the uprising, and critically evaluates the way in which it altered the Jamahiriya’s 
classificatory schemas and behavioural norms. Drawing on the material and semiotic 
understanding of structure outlined in the theoretical framework, it also evaluates the 
extent to which the revolutionary rhetoric was crystallised in new modes of civic 
understanding and practice. 
The final chapter draws together the individual arguments developed in the 
empirical chapters, and restates the thesis’ contribution towards the literature on 
Middle East politics and social movement theory. The thesis’ ‘problematisation’ of 
political agency, and of contentious meaning making practices during the Libyan 
uprising, points towards a much broader need to explore the way in which 
authoritarian regimes shape the semiotic contexts of political activism. Nevertheless, 
it is important not to overextend the implications of this argument. The thesis 
advances one definition of political agency, focuses on intra-institutional, as opposed 
to inter-institutional, conflict, and does not shed light on the numerous, sub-national 
contexts of meaning making that emerged during the Libyan uprising. There is, 
however, substantive room to go beyond its preliminary observations, and to 
investigate, both the post-revolutionary dimensions of institutional transformation in 
Libya, and the way in which meaning making practices are continuing to reshape and 
create new narratives of revolution and self in the aftermath of the Libyan uprising.  
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2 
Literature Review: Political Agency in the Middle 
East 
 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
The concept of political agency has frequently surfaced in the literature on Middle 
East politics, at times explicitly, at others indirectly. Although this literature is 
heterogeneous in its theoretical and empirical underpinnings, it has consistently 
engaged with the concept of political agency with careful attention to the autocratic 
environments in which political actors operate. This chapter will begin by reviewing 
two broad subsets of research: the literature on liberalised autocracy and authoritarian 
resilience, and the literature on informal, contentious and latent political participation 
in the Middle East. The former body of work has emphasised the agency of ruling 
elites, while the latter has stressed the agentive capacity of ordinary citizens, the 
downtrodden and the dispossessed. However, both coalesce in pointing towards the 
shaping and even determinant influence that authoritarian structures have on the 
activities and identities of political actors.  
The emergent body of research following the 2011 Arab uprisings shifted the 
parameters of this discourse towards the vulnerability of autocracy. The penultimate 
section of this chapter will delineate the way in which the literature on the Arab 
uprisings grappled with the sweeping display of political agency and suggested its 
capacity for radically reconfiguring both political subjectivities and authoritarian 
dynamics. The Arab uprisings, which were accompanied by a ubiquitous if brief 
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scholarly engagement with the concept of agency, necessitate that new questions be 
asked regarding the relationship between agency and authoritarianism during 
moments of open contestation. The chapter concludes by indicating the central 
research question underpinning the thesis: a question that emerges from the trajectory 
of the literature as a whole, as it has alternately characterised political agency in the 
Middle East.   
 
2.2 Political Agency and Resilient Autocracy   
 
 
 
The persistence of authoritarianism in the Middle East has shaped the way in which 
comparative political scientists have investigated political agency in the region – or 
indeed, been reluctant to do. The proliferation of autocracy in the Middle East situated 
the region outside comparative analyses of democratic systems (Duverger 1964) and 
beyond the Latin American and Eastern European ‘third wave’ of democratisation 
paradigm (Huntington 1991). Bernard Lewis (1958: 51) declared that ‘the classical 
West European pattern of freely-elected, multi-party legislative assemblies has been 
or is being abandoned’ in the Middle East. In consequence, and for a substantive 
period of time, relatively little was written of Middle East regimes in comparative 
political research (Dahl 1971; Almond et al 1978; Kavanagh and Peele 1984; 
Diamond et al 1988; Andrain 1994; Dogan and Kazancigil 1994; Kopstein and 
Lichbach 2000) and even less of popular political engagement. 
The relative neglect of the Middle East partly stemmed from the underlying 
assumption that the region was somehow ‘exceptional’ in its resistance to democracy, 
either for cultural reasons (Kedourie 1992) or due to economic conditions (Crystal 
1990). More commonly, however, the prevailing democratic ‘transition paradigm’ 
	 27	
emphasised the accelerated nature of democratisation processes and outlined stringent 
criteria for identifying ‘consolidated democracies’ (Linz and Stepan 1996). As a 
result, it was not equipped for the analysis of messy and incomplete (Cavatorta and 
Durac 2011: 17) or ‘open-ended’ and ‘tentative’ (Sadiki 2011: 3) democratic 
transitions, such as were unfolding in the Arab world. 
The counterpart to the ‘exceptionalism’ thesis over-emphasised nascent 
democratisation processes in the region, with scholars citing the growth of political 
parties and electoral participation in some countries as evidence to that end (Hudson 
1991; Brynen et al 1995, 1998; Abukhalil 1997; Ehteshami 1999). Saad Eddin 
Ibrahim (1995) listed the holding of national and municipal elections in Algeria, 
Yemen and Jordan as evidence of ‘serious democratization processes’ and the 
‘opening up’ of Arab polities, while Laith Kubba (2000: 84) argued that the growth of 
civil society in the region signified ‘ground for optimism about democratic prospects 
in the Arab world’. By focusing on the formal emergence of democratisation, such 
texts usefully challenge the notion of mass Arab depoliticisation, but they have less to 
say about the dynamics of autocracy and political agency beyond the transitology 
framework.   
In the preceding two decades, the comparative politics literature has eschewed 
the democratisation paradigm, arguing that the liberalisation initiated in the 1990s had 
simply ushered in ‘pseudo-democracy’ and ‘new authoritarianism’ (Volpi 2004; King 
2009; Albrecht 2010), that political openings came purely at the discretion of 
autocrats (Brownlee 2002a), and that hallmarks of democracy, such as pluralism and 
popular mobilisation for political reform, had in fact declined (Bellin 2004). Instead 
of dismissing or detecting signs of democratisation, it argued that the robustness of 
authoritarianism necessitated a focus on autocracy as a mode of governance in the 
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Middle East: not in the negative sense - as the absence of democracy, or as a transient 
political set up en-route to democracy - but as a distinct analytical category (Brownlee 
2002b; Bellin 2004; Volpi 2004; Posusney and Angrist 2005; Brownlee 2007; 
Schlumberger 2007; Sadiki 2011; Wright and Escribà-Folch 2011; Gerschewski 2013; 
Kailitiz 2013; Köllner and Kailtiz 2013). 
 The principal contribution of the authoritarian resilience literature is in its 
insistence on the heterogeneity of autocracy, and its attempts to classify and 
distinguish between different varieties of authoritarian regime (Geddes 1999; Gandhi 
and Przeworski 2006; Kailitiz 2013; Wahman et al 2013; Geddes et al 2014). The 
overt purpose of these typologies is to facilitate causal explanations of why certain 
regimes remain stable, but they are also significant for their understanding of the 
entangled relationship between structure and agency. Thus, ‘personalism’ or 
‘sultanism’ - which signifies the lack of institutional constraints on an autocrat’s 
personal discretions – is not an absolute categorisation of certain authoritarian 
regimes, but exists on a continuum and is dependent on a regime’s patrimonial 
capacity (Wright and Escribà-Folch 2011; Stepan and Linz 2013; Johnston 2015). The 
more customary and complicated arrangement is the combination of authoritarianism 
and democracy, also known as ‘liberalized autocracy’ (Brumberg 2002), ‘electoral 
authoritarianism’ (Schedler 2006; Kailtiz 2013) or ‘hybrid competitive 
authoritarianism’ (Stepan and Linz 2013).  
The literature argues that liberalised autocracies are characterised by structural 
resilience due to their deployment of three central strategies. Firstly, they possess and 
deploy the material power contained within the state’s coercive apparatus. ‘Strong’ 
authoritarian regimes use repressive measures and organisationally exclude rival 
movements, keeping them fragmented (Brownlee 2007: 2). This has been described as 
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the hallmark of durable Arab authoritarianism (Bellin 2004: 143; Sadiki 2011: 283). 
Secondly, autocracies deploy patronage and co-optation techniques – from 
distribution of rents to policy concessions - selectively in order to consolidate their 
power and to resist breakdown (Brownlee 2002; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Svolik 
2009). Bellin (2004: 148-149) connects these two strategies by arguing that a coercive 
apparatus can be organised along patrimonial lines, and that rentier income can 
sustain expenditure on military and security forces. Lastly, it is agued that patterns of 
‘legitimation’  - ‘what both members of the elite and the ordinary people believe 
about the ruler’s right to rule’ - also serve to delimit popular political agency and to 
strengthen the stable organisational basis of autocracies (Kailitz 2013: 41). This is 
bolstered by a regime’s dissemination of powerful rhetorical tropes, such as the claim 
that citizens are ‘unfit’ to rule themselves through democratic means and that they 
need to be ruled over by individuals or institutions that know better (Volpi 2004: 
1071).  
The emphasis on such mechanisms of control is useful for understanding the 
structural strength of authoritarianism, but it arguably leaves little room for political 
agency, even in so-called liberalised autocracies. The comparative politics literature 
attempts to sidestep this implication, arguing that political elites and ruling coalitions 
are sufficiently powerful to be necessary for the survival of dictators (Svolik 2009: 
478), and that elite interests are protected by political parties and legislative 
authoritarian institutions (Wright and Escribà-Folch 2011). In particular, ‘civilian 
dictators’ lack unmitigated authority and require the cooperation of coalitions and 
institutions such as elections (Gandhi and Przeworski 2006: 18). Nevertheless, the 
thrust of the literature suggests that, despite the minimal level of competition 
permitted in such systems (Wahman et al 2013), the entire democratic process in 
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liberalised autocracies is largely cosmetic, functioning as a ‘instrument’ of conflict-
management for the ruling elite (Gershenson and Grossman 2001) and enacting a 
display of ‘election fetishism’ (Sadiki 2011: 3). Elections are more effectively 
scrutinised as an indicator of political trends and competitive struggles over resources, 
rather than as forms of political participation (Brownlee 2007: 9-10).  
The literature on authoritarian resilience is valuable for engaging with the 
phenomenon of authoritarianism on its own terms, and for delineating the way in 
which autocratic structures shape and condition the agency of other political actors. It 
also points towards the symbolic and auxiliary significance of pseudo-democratic 
processes, indicating the way in which they shed light on the interactions between 
dictators and political elites, and imbuing the citizens who participate in such 
seemingly vacuous exercises with a degree of agency (Lust-Okar 2008: 81).  
There remains, however, a gap in this literature’s investigation of political 
agency, stemming from its attempt to account for the survival of autocracies. 
Ultimately, it focuses on the agency of political elites as they navigate and exploit 
ruling systems to their advantage, seeing this capacity as constrained by liberalised-
autocratic systems that benefit rulers more than they empower citizens. Beyond 
suggesting the co-dependence of dictators and other political elites, this top-down 
approach does not facilitate the study of popular political engagement, and of the 
agentive capacity contained therein. Social forces such as ethnicity, regionalism and 
kinship, and even Islamist political movements, are explored insofar as they impact 
the pseudo-democratic process, and not as forms or manifestations of political agency 
(Ehteshami 1999; Kubba 2000; Brumberg 2002; Herb 2002; Lucas 2003; Cavatorta 
2006).   
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Where popular agency is evoked in the comparative politics literature, it too 
serves to account for authoritarian resilience. Volpi (2004: 1068) argues that the 
longevity of pseudo-democratic systems is not simply due to militarist cliques and 
elites, but reflects ‘a grave societal indecision about the state…[citizens] remain 
deeply divided about what an end to “hard” forms of autocratic rule should signify for 
the reorganisation of the polity’. This ‘societal indecision’ isn’t probed further or 
analysed as a form of political activity. For Gerschewski (2013: 20), ‘the number and 
intensity of public protests’ is the only significant, measurable indicator of societal 
discontent, and their absence indicates the societal legitimacy of authoritarian 
regimes. Diamond et al (2003: 16) continue to deploy the term ‘depoliticization’ to 
refer to the absence of popular political activity in the Middle East, terming it ‘one of 
the most pernicious cultural and ideological legacies of autocracy throughout the 
Middle East’. 
Whilst the classification of authoritarian regimes types, and the description of 
the structural dynamics of pseudo-democracies, is one of the analytical strengths of 
this literature, it has impeded the discussion of popular forms of political engagement. 
Indeed, there is even a sentiment within the literature that, ‘no matter what the 
explanation is,’ the populace isn’t pushing sufficiently for political participation and 
democratic reform in the region (Bellin 2004: 145) even if that is down to the 
‘element of fear’ (Sadiki 2011: 283). Moreover, the suggestion that autocracies create 
a contractual system of legitimacy by ingratiating their existence into the ‘belief’ 
system of society (Gerschewski 2013; Kailitz 2013) implies that Arab subjects are 
entirely constituted by and internalise authoritarian systems of domination. The 
argument that only the formal breakdown of autocracy signifies the collapse of this 
belief-system (Gerschewski 2013: 20) further entrenches this neglect of more covert 
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forms of political contention. Overall, the emphasis is on the powerful material and 
coercive capacities of autocracies. There is an absence of discussion on the symbolic 
dimensions of structural authority, and a concomitant need for the literature to 
conceptualise a more dynamic relationship between authoritarianism and a visibly 
quiescent populace.   
 
 
2.3 Political Agency: Beyond Democratisation and Authoritarian Resilience  
 
 
In an effort to expand the conceptualisation of political agency in the Middle East, a 
body of literature – contemporaneous with that on authoritarian resilience - has 
focused on political engagement beyond the formal electoral sphere (Abu-Lughod 
1990; Singerman 1995; Hoodfar 1997; Bayat 2005, 2010; Albrecht 2008, 2010; 
Alhamad 2008; Lust-Okar 2008; Beinin and Vairel 2011), in what has been termed a 
‘post-democratization’ approach (Cavatorta and Durac 2011). This scholarship does 
not conceive of agency as confined to the manoeuvrings of political elites within 
pseudo-democratic institutions, but explores agency in own right: as ‘everyday’ and 
symbolic, manifested in informal social networks, undertaken by rural or less-
educated actors, and existing in an ‘enmeshed’ (Abu-Lughod 1990: 41) relationship 
with authoritarian power. Such texts attempt to transcend the structuralist and cyclical 
orientation of the autocracy literature, which was caught between the polarity of 
detecting democratisation and affirming authoritarian stability.  
The first insight contained within this Middle East politics literature is that 
‘informal channels of political participation’ are significant outlets for political 
activity (Alhamad 2008). Such channels are defined as loosely-based, informal 
groupings that are indigenous to the region, based mainly on kin, religion, 
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neighbourhood, occupation, and commercial interests (ibid: 36). By imbuing these 
‘everyday’ social vehicles with political significance, Alhamad purposefully shifts the 
focus of analysis from elite political activity to popular engagement, while 
emphasising that such vehicles are shaped by the historical contexts of the 
communities in which they originate. Diane Singerman (1995) also illustrates the way 
in which a range of everyday spheres of activity in Egypt– such as marriage and 
educational networks - still have ‘political’ import, structuring the boundaries and 
interests of the political and economic order. This is echoed in Homa Hoodfar’s 
(1997) ethnographic study of low-income Egyptian households, in which the 
household serves as a socially situated institution that both protects individuals from 
radical state policies, and enables women to access economic resources and personal 
security. For Asef Bayat (2010: 11), urban public space, not democracy, is the ‘key 
theatre’ of popular political participation in the Middle East.  
In addition to expanding the discussion on participatory vehicles of action, these 
studies also strive for a nuanced understanding of the motivations underpinning 
political behaviour in the Middle East. Informal channels of participation undoubtedly 
serve a material purpose, enabling citizens to further their personal interests (Alhamad 
2008: 36), and facilitating popular ‘survival strategies’ in light of economic 
liberalisation policies (Hoodfar 1997). However, this is not their sole purpose. 
Singerman (1995: 8) argues against reducing political agency ‘to mere self-interest 
and cost benefit analysis’, and instead develops the argument that contentious 
collection action is pursued for its own sake, in order to enhance interpersonal 
relationships. People forge identities and enlarge solidarities in the process of 
furthering their individual and collective interests (Bayat 2010: 12). In this view, 
political agency  - despite the trappings of authoritarianism – remains a potent force 
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for social transformation, mediated through a complex web of institutions, cultural 
norms and personal and collective interests.   
Finally, these studies strongly advocate for recognising the potency of political 
agency even when it is understated, latent or otherwise concealed. Bayat (2010: 41) 
concedes that ordinary urban subjects in the Middle East, such as the unemployed and 
housewives, structurally lack the power of disruption, but they are nevertheless able to 
make ‘silent’ and modest claims against ‘the state, the rich, and the powerful’. The 
actions described by Bayat – which include survival strategies such as the unlawful 
acquisition of land and shelter - signify ‘interstitial manoeuvres in the gaps and 
fissures of the power structure’ rather than direct, collective, clearly articulated 
opposition to that structure itself (Chalcraft 2016: 2). Nevertheless, Bayat proposes 
that this form of agentive action is ambitious in its scope, contesting state prerogatives 
such as the meaning of order and control of public space, and is potentially 
transformative, with such quiet and widespread actions eventually triggering social 
change through the power of big numbers. Singerman (1995: 4) has also advocated 
this view, arguing that political action can be subterranean and concealed, particularly 
under repressive conditions, but that popular political activity can predate and 
ultimate give rise to ‘peak moment such as demonstrations’. Laila Alhamad (2008) 
emphasises the importance of context in defining the significance of outwardly ‘non-
political’ activities, such as the growing of a beard as an act of defiance in Algeria. 
Through these studies, political agency is represented as circumspect but persistent in 
its occupation of social, political and symbolic structures, and as strategic as well as 
cooperative in its motivations. However, in understanding agency ‘as it is’, it is firmly 
located within the political status quo, and its radical potential is deferred to an 
indeterminate point in the future.  
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This literature on camouflaged forms of political engagement develops 
conclusions about political agency principally as a by-product of its empirical claims. 
Its insights can be bolstered with reference to a branch of literature that has sought to 
understand the relationship between agency and structure (or power/subject relations) 
in a much more targeted sense (Mitchell 1988; Massad 2001; Makdisi and Silverstein 
2006; El Shakry 2007). Such texts are also positioned outside of the democratisation 
paradigm, but they emphasise the way in which political agents are discursively 
constructed by powerful systems and practices in the Middle East, whether 
authoritarian or colonial in nature.  
 Focusing on power as it is exercised and diffused by the mechanisms of the 
modern state, Timothy Mitchell (1988: 174) argues that new technologies of 
‘disciplinary power’ in Egypt, from the Egyptian army’s system of rural discipline to 
the national programme of schooling, worked directly on the bodies of individuals in 
order to produce a habit of obedience. Omnia El Shakry (2007) also elaborates upon 
processes of knowledge production by examining the impact of colonial discourses on 
the production of social-scientific inquiry in Egypt. Joseph Massad (2001), in the case 
of Jordan, focuses on the manner in which national identities were produced and even 
imposed by state institutions, arguing that they were internalised by nationalistic 
discourses and came to appear as eternal essences in the self-understandings of 
subjects. These studies are bound by their insistence on the mediating and shaping 
role of structure on political subjectivities. Power is articulated as having a ‘hold’ on 
subjects for whom ‘reality is simply that which is capable of representation’ (Mitchell 
1988: 178). Whereas Bayat (2010) spoke of agentive capacity as enabling and 
reformist, Saba Mahmood (2005: 15) detaches ‘the notion of agency from the goals of 
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progressive politics’ altogether, and understands it ‘only from within the discourses 
and structures of subordination that create the conditions of its enactment’. 
The limitation of studies on power/subject relations is that they risk depicting 
subjects as fully determined by the discursive structures that they occupy, thereby 
rendering them speechless and lacking in agency. Lisa Wedeen (1999) indirectly 
counters this argument. Although she outlines the constitutive rhetorical and coercive 
universe of the Syrian cult of Hafiz Al-Asad, she also draws attention to the way in 
which the populace was able to subvert the cult’s meanings, mock its grandiosity and 
exploit its apparent contradictions in everyday acts of political engagement, even 
while participating in its rituals. Above all, she challenges the implication – explicit in 
the authoritarian resilience literature, and suggested in studies on power relations – 
that subjects come to ‘believe’ in, or be entirely defined by, the proclaimed 
‘legitimacy’ of authoritarian regimes (ibid: 12). While conceding that under 
authoritarianism, the empowering capacity of political agency remains circumscribed 
because of its fundamentally covert nature, Wedeen suggests that moments of radical 
contestation can potentially lead to the reconfiguration of constitutive authoritarian 
discourses.  
Other studies on Middle East politics have purposefully foregone a top-down 
approach to political agency, instead using frameworks such as social movement 
theory, and drawing on the phenomenon of civil society activity in the region (Garon 
2003; Cavatorta 2006, 2013; Pratt 2007; Cavatorta and Durac 2011). One such strand 
of literature has challenged the claim of depoliticisation through the phenomenon of 
Islamism, which is described as a ‘recurring phenomenon that affects the lives of 
millions of people in the Muslim world’ (Hafez 2003: 3 - see also Wiktorowicz 1999; 
Ismail 2001; Takeyh 2003). This literature usefully expands the remit of the 
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institutional political arena in the region, but it too often presents Islamist opposition 
movements as distinctive political entities, understanding ‘activism’ as principally 
comprising ‘Islamist activism’ (Wickham 2002; Clark 2004). This analytical slant is 
not extended to the broader populace, or channelled towards investigating political 
agency in a more general sense. Moreover, this literature’s deployment of social 
movement frameworks – largely for the study of the organisational, networking and 
recruitment patterns of Islamist activists - is too often overlaid onto the socio-political 
context of the Middle East rather than purposefully adapted or critiqued.  
As with the comparative politics literature on authoritarian resilience, the 
Middle East politics literature begins from the premise that the politics of the region 
must be grasped on their own terms, beyond transitology frameworks. Both literatures 
challenge (using a range of theoretical frameworks) the claim that the Middle East is 
depoliticised, apathetic or devoid of political agency. However, where the 
comparative politics literature sketched a constricted understanding of political 
agency, as exercised by dictators, ruling elites and political coalitions, the latter has 
expanded the scope of enquiry to include latent, contentious and collective forms of 
political agency. In doing so, it addresses some of the gaps raised by the comparative 
politics literature, even if it lacks the typological precision in categorising varieties of 
authoritarianism. Indeed, studies by Mitchell (1988), Wedeen (1999), and Mahmood 
(2005) are insightful in suggesting the non-coercive means by which autocrats can 
assert their control over society, thereby adding nuance to comparative legitimation 
theory (Gerschewski 2013).  
Despite characterising the Middle East as an agentive political environment, the 
thrust of the literature, prior to the Arab Spring, depicts political activity as bound, 
and even constrained by, resilient authoritarian regimes. Even a study that affirms the 
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strength of civil society activism and associational life in the Arab world concludes by 
declaring that such activity ultimately encourages a ‘restructuring of political 
authority which remains profoundly authoritarian’ (Cavatorta and Durac 2011: 143). 
As noted above, there is a suggestion that popular political activity can predate and 
lead to the emergence of ‘peak moments such as demonstrations’ (Singerman 1995: 
4), thereby transforming both agency and structure in the process (Wedeen 1999) but 
the scarcity of open contestation in the region deferred further exploration of this 
theory.   
The literature during and subsequent to the ‘Arab Spring’ shifted the parameters 
of the debate. It paved the way for renewed discussion of the democratisation 
paradigm, but it also generated compelling assertions regarding the transformative 
impact of radical political contestation. 
 
2.4 Political Agency and the Arab Spring 
 
 
The political upheaval in the Arab world, from December 2010, led to the swift 
emergence of an extensive body of scholarship that grappled with the phenomenon of 
widespread – and unanticipated – political activity in the region. This was 
retrospective in tone, attempting to account for why the event was unforeseen by 
Middle East researchers (Gause 2011; Goodwin 2011; Hudson 2011; Lust 2011; 
Elman 2012). It was also self-interrogatory, suggesting that the Arab uprisings had 
shattered prevailing analytic frames for understanding the region, and ‘certainly cast 
some doubts on the validity of the paradigm of authoritarian resilience’ (Pace and 
Cavatorta 2012: 127). As argued by Elyachar (2014: 458), ‘Dominant concepts in the 
social sciences about the Arab world – that Arabs were passive, that Egyptians were 
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patient, that Arab states were “too strong” – had all collapsed’. Alternatively, if the 
scholarship was accurate at the time, then it was the populace itself who had changed: 
‘the people of the Middle East are no longer willing to simply accept their 
misery…they are willing to take to the streets and risk their lives to demand change’ 
(Pollack 2011b: 7).  
 The Arab uprisings generated two broad scholarly trends in Middle East 
studies. In one respect, researchers began to engage with structural democratisation 
paradigms once again (Brynen et al 2012), with some optimistically describing the 
uprisings as beckoning a ‘fourth wave’ of democratisation (Howard and Hussain 
2013; Møller and Skanning 2013; Aboushouk 2016). The removal of some dictators, 
and the persistence of others, sparked renewed discussion on the strength and stability 
of different forms of autocracy (Bellin 2012a; Brownlee et al 2013; Bank et al 2014; 
Derichs and Demmelhuber 2014). This literature extends the agenda set by studies 
such as Brynen et al (1995, 1998) by analysing the connection between the Arab 
uprisings and democratisation theory (Anderson 2012; Stepan and Linz 2013). Once 
again, it suggests that democracy is being ushered into the Middle East, but this time 
‘from below’, reflecting the Arab public’s demand for democracy and human rights 
(Khatib 2013a). As argued by Stephen Grand (2002), ‘More than anything else, the 
Arab Spring has been about a yearning for democracy’.  
The case for democratisation theory partly rests on the assumption that the 
uprisings constituted a coherent political movement that fundamentally challenged the 
post-colonial political order of the Arab World, and, above all, called for democracy 
and civil rights (Ismael and Ismael 2013; Selim 2013), ‘not just in name but also in 
practice and in all its particulars’ (Pollack 2011b: 7). Later studies extended this claim 
by attempting to quantify the scope of democratisation in the region, citing the degree 
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of fundamental change to the leaderships and constitutional structures of authoritarian 
regimes as evidence to that effect (Davis 2016; Roberts 2016). 
Proclamations of impending democratisation in the Middle East have always 
generated claims to the contrary; in this instance, by studies calling for 
circumspection, particularly in light of the durability of many Arab regimes under 
public pressure (Bellin 2012a, 2012b). Similar studies have questioned the 
compatibility between democracy and Islamist parties, who performed well 
electorally during what was dubbed the ‘Islamist winter’ of 2011 (Cook and Stathis 
2012; Turner 2012; Tibi 2013). Indeed, for Joshua Stacher (2012) and Roger Owen 
(2012), the Arab uprisings serve as a context for analysing the adaptability of certain 
autocratic political systems over others, and for refocusing attention on the coercive 
capacities of ruling elites. However, the debate over democratisation and authoritarian 
resilience is a familiar and recursive one: although it is relevant in light of the regime 
changes brought about by the Arab Spring, it continue to bypass the significance of 
popular political agency in favour of structural, explanatory frameworks. 
Alternately, an extensive branch of literature has focused on the agentive and 
subjective dimensions of popular protests, seeking to understand the ‘people’ behind 
the event (Dupont and Passy 2011). Questions pertaining to grievances, subjectivities 
and decentralized networks - which had constituted a small subset of the literature on 
Middle East politics prior to the uprisings – emerged rapidly in light of the intense 
spectacle of contestation in 2011 (Chalcraft 2011; Gamson 2011; Goodwin 2011; 
Telhami 2011; Dabashi 2012; Armbrust 2013; Rennick 2013; Sabea 2013, 2014; 
Shahin 2014; Abdelrahman 2015). Within this field, some studies deployed the Arab 
Spring as a prime context for examining the relationship between agency and 
structure during instances of popular contention in the region. John Chalcraft (2016: 
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7-8) argues that the novelty of the ‘Arab Spring’ must be grasped with reference to 
long-term episodes of ‘unruly, transgressive and creative contentious politics in the 
history of the MENA’. In doing so, he emphasises the parallel significance of agency 
(innovation and spontaneity) and structure (existent organisational networks) in 
fuelling cycles of protest (ibid: 516). Charles Tripp (2013: 5), in an extensive study on 
the interplay between power and resistance in the Middle East, has also demonstrated 
that the Arab uprisings emerged from a context of subtle ‘long-simmering 
resentments’, such as the 1980s riots in Tunisia, workers’ protests in Egypt, and the 
1980 ‘Berber spring’ in Algeria. Certainly, understanding the ‘roots’ and ‘contexts’ of 
the protests has increasingly emerged as a key research agenda, even if a number of 
these studies prioritise structural factors over agency-centric explanations (Gana 
2013; Rand 2013; Badran 2014).  
More commonly, the literature in the aftermath of the Arab Spring re-centred 
political agency by emphasising its novel mode of emergence and its radical nature 
(Elyachar 2014). The Arab uprisings were described as an  ‘Arab Awakening’ 
(Pollack 2011a; Cavatorta and Pace 2012; Ramadan 2012; Dawisha 2013) evoking 
George Antonius’ 1938 seminal work The Arab Awakening, and suggesting not only 
the reinvigoration of Arab nationhood (Roberts 2016: 273), but the exceptional nature 
of this particular contentious moment. A stream of sanguine assessments suggested 
that the Arab uprisings had reconfigured ‘what was imagined to be possible’ in the 
minds of Arab populations (Brynen et al 2012: 111), imbuing the region’s peoples 
with new forms of self-understanding (Hanafi 2012), ‘a new energy and a new sense 
of possibility’ (Bellin 2012b: 48), and ‘creat[ing] the possibility of self-
consciousness’ (Tripp 2015: 3). This emergent political subjectivity is in turn depicted 
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as transformative of structure, constituting a literal and metaphorical ‘breaking of the 
chains of authoritarianism’ (Affaya 2011).  
This bold appraisal of political agency rests on what has been described as a 
defining quality of the Arab uprisings: the visual phenomenon of large crowds, 
demanding peaceful change and articulating their right to freedom, dignity and other 
‘human’ aspirations (Stepan and Linz 2013: 21; Roberts 2016: 272; Willis 2016: 50). 
The public articulation of individual and collective interests is represented as the 
hallmark of political agency, in part because it possesses tangible, practical 
implications. The regional chant ‘the people want the fall of the regime’ (Ash-shaʻb 
yurid isqaṭ an-niẓam) has been described as a strikingly direct statement of the 
popular will of the Arab people (Achcar 2013: 13), no longer couched in euphemism 
or understatement. Moreover, the broader subset of demands expressed by protesters 
is represented as progressive and pragmatic, encompassing calls for ‘meaningful 
democratic change’ (Dawisha 2013: 11), ‘the setting up of free and fair elections’ 
(Deeb 2012: 68) and ‘hopes for a decent life and the possibility of earning an honest 
wage’ (Roberts 2016: 276). The rhetoric in which such demands was expressed 
stemmed from ‘Arab political culture’ (Brynen et al 2012: 111) and was adapted to 
the individual socio-political contexts of local protesters (Raman 2012). The process 
of articulation is thus depicted as empowering because it is pragmatic in nature, 
progressive in purpose and organic in origin. Such qualities have also been ascribed to 
the Arab media outlets that emerged during the protests, and which played a 
prominent role in amplifying the demands of protesters (Brynen et al 2012: 251).  
In addition, these practices of contentious articulation are emblematic of 
political agency because they are symbolically significant, imbuing ‘the people’ with 
the capacity for unfettered speech (Sabea 2013). Tripp (2013: 221) has argued that the 
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public expression of collective demands amplifies individual identities and 
subjectivities, and paves the way for ‘voices that have been written out of history, 
giving them the chance to reassert themselves and their rights’. It also nurtures 
collective identities by imbuing protesters with a ‘compelling unity of purpose and 
method’ (Dawisha 2013: 110). There is a sharp contrast between the constraints of 
authoritarianism and the euphoric openness of the revolutionary moment that further 
enhances the symbolic significance of such expression: ‘After decades of repression, 
and their inability to express their opinions…the Arab world finally broke its chains 
in order to say what it wants, whenever it wants’ (Bell 2013). Contentious articulation 
by protestors affirms their identities as claims-makers and signals their ability to 
demand accountability from their oppressors.  
The central contribution of this agent-centred literature is in its sustained focus 
on the bottom-up dynamics of political contestation in the region. It is not the political 
elites, but the ‘ordinary citizens who went onto the streets and public cities day after 
day’ whose grievances, motivations, and activities are the central subject of study 
(Dawisha 2013: 110). This approach has supplied valuable analyses of the local and 
regional dynamics shaping different forms of claims-making in 2011 (Heydemann 
and Leenders 2011; Weyland 2012; Bamert et al 2015; Hess 2016), in addition to in-
depth studies of the individual contexts in which protests took place, particularly in 
Egypt and Tunisia (Ghannam 2012; Gana 2013; Sabea 2013; Korany 2014; Shain 
2014; Wahdan 2014; Willis 2016).  
In some respects, this literature is a pertinent extension to the contextually-
sensitive tradition of Middle East scholarship, outlined above, which had always 
operated beyond the democratisation paradigm (Singerman 1995; Wedeen 1999; 
Bayat 2010). However, it differs by focusing on an instance of visible – rather than 
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concealed or imperceptible – political contestation. The result is that its conclusions 
are far bolder, suggesting the transformative potential of such revolutionary events. 
Walter Ambrust (2013) argues that the killing of the Egyptian protesters on 28 
January propelled initiatives for rethinking the place of women in society, while 
public spaces such as Tahrir Square in Egypt served as a ‘critical imaginary’, 
disrupting the political and social familiar and reconstituting the notion of the ‘the 
people’ (Sabea 2013). The literature is at its strongest when it connects such 
overarching claims about symbolic systems with an analysis of the contextually 
specific practices undertaken by local actors.  
However, there are a number of key questions arising from these studies, 
pertaining especially to their conceptualisation of agency during the Arab uprisings. 
What is the relationship between the empowering forms of political agency that 
emerged in 2011, and existent authoritarian regimes? A prior line of argumentation – 
in both the comparative politics and Middle East literatures – is that authoritarian 
regimes transmit dominant meanings to the populace, either by presenting a narrative 
of legitimacy (Gerschewski 2013), creating rituals (Wedeen 1999) or imposing 
practices of categorisation and classification (Massad 2001). The Arab Spring 
literature does not tend to probe the impact of open contestation on such meanings, 
focusing instead on agentive action as a discrete phenomenon. Where it does discuss 
the subversion of authoritarian practices, they are presented as coercive, material 
systems of control (Bellin 2012b: 35): for instance, prohibitions on public protest, or 
repressive political leaderships. The discussion of political engagement is not 
accompanied by an analysis of the anatomy of power.  
The study by Tripp (2013) is a noteworthy exception to this trend. It engages in 
an extended discussion of the way in which forms of open resistance reveal the 
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dynamics of authoritarian power, unmasking its natural guise and disrupting its 
representations of subjugated peoples. However, its principal focus remains on 
resistance, and on its subversive qualities, instead of theorising the emergence of 
political agency as a more expansive concept. In addition, Tripp’s analytical 
framework approaches resistance as an overwhelmingly positive occurrence, 
emphasising the way in which it empowers local actors to reclaim public spaces, 
political institutions and historical narratives. Although Tripp (ibid: 12-13) suggests 
that resistance may have become imbricated with power, and given way to 
disillusionment, an absence of consensus and practices of ‘Othering’, this is presented 
as occurring in the aftermath of the 2011 protests, and not during the moment of 
resistance itself.  
In some respects, the Arab public has gone from being fully constituted by 
power to fully constituting, without necessarily exploring or problematising this 
seamless transformation, and without sufficiently heeding Abu-Lughod’s (1990) 
injunction to avoid romanticising acts of resistance. Similarly, although there have 
been analyses of revolutionary ‘setbacks’ that have taken place after the Arab 
uprisings, such as the reversion to military rule in Egypt (Roberts 2016), manipulation 
of the misguided Tamarod youth movement in 2013 (Elyacahar 2014: 460) and the 
‘hijacking’ of protests by Islamists (Bradley 2012), ‘the sense of community and 
exhilarating communitas generated during the struggle’ (Werbner et al 2014: 8) 
remains largely undisputed.  
There is thus a need to unpack the practice of open, articulated contention 
during moments of protest, and to explore its internal dynamics – the extent to which 
it was collective and unfettered – in addition to its potentially imbricated relationship 
with power. This should be done without framing contentious activity in terms of a 
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‘modernist narrative of progress, democracy, liberation and socio-economic 
distribution’ (Chalcraft 2016: 4), or indeed, in terms of retrenched authoritarianism.  
 
 
2.5 Political Agency under Authoritarianism: Toward a Point of Enquiry  
 
 
 
This overview has highlighted a number of gaps within the literatures on comparative 
politics and Middle East politics, as they have respectively engaged with the 
phenomenon of political agency under authoritarianism. The comparative politics 
literature has supplied useful typologies for classifying the material practices of 
authoritarian regimes and for grasping the robustness of authoritarianism, but it offers 
less clarity on the discursive and symbolic dimensions of authoritarian power. It has 
also neglected popular modes of contention in its focus on elite behaviours and 
structures. The Middle East politics literature partly addresses the latter by drawing 
attention to ‘everyday’ forms political engagement, but it too presents 
authoritarianism as a circumscribing and defining force on the agency of the Arab 
populace. Thus, the first gap suggests the need to explore the complex and conflictual 
relationship between political agency and authoritarian domination within a particular 
social context.  
Secondly, the Middle East politics literature on the Arab Spring raises new 
questions about the extent to which practices of open, articulated contention – such as 
those manifested during the widespread protests and demonstrations – are capable of 
transforming both agency and authoritarianism. The literature is useful for re-focusing 
its energies on the concept of agency, but there remains a need to unpack such 
assertions further, particularly as many studies have ascribed the re-entrenchment of 
authoritarianism to the emergence of post-revolutionary setbacks, rather than as being 
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potentially rooted in the internal dynamics of contention itself. Above all, the 
analytical case base remains rather narrow, centred principally on Egypt and Tunisia, 
despite the range of authoritarianisms highlighted by the comparative politics 
literature. 
Drawing on the concepts and gaps of this literature, the central research 
question of this thesis is:  
 
How, and to what extent, did open insubordination in the Arab Spring transform 
authoritarian structures of domination and generate new political subjectivities? 
 
This research question can be further disaggregated into two constituent parts: a need 
to identify the nature of power structures and agency prior to open contestation, and 
the extent to which these are subsequently transformed during a radical event such as 
the Arab uprisings. The following chapter will explore the theoretical frameworks that 
have attempted to understand the relationship between structures of power and 
contentious political agency and resistance, and will integrate the most relevant 
insights into a model for understanding political agency in the context of the Arab 
uprisings.  
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3 
Theoretical Framework 
 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The previous chapter indicated that the dynamics of political agency under 
authoritarianism, and during instances of open insubordination, are key gaps emerging 
from the literature on Middle East politics. The central research question is as follows: 
 
How, and to what extent, did open insubordination in the Arab Spring 
transform authoritarian structures of domination and generate new political 
subjectivities? 
 
This formulation signals the need for a theoretical framework that views structure and 
agency as theoretically interconnected and mutually implicating: an orientation that is 
increasingly adopted in the social sciences (amongst others, Giddens 1976, 1981; 
Wendt 1987; Sewell 1992, 1996; Buechler 2014). Ultimately however, the framework 
should be agency-centric, as the focus of the research question is not on 
demonstrating the pre-eminence of structural power but on understanding the 
emergence of political agency in relation to it.  
This chapter will begin by outlining the core theoretical approaches that have 
supplied a framework for understanding the emergence of political agency in relation 
to particular structure of power. The frameworks reviewed here have been developed 
by political sociologists (Snow et al 1986; Snow and Benford 1988; Polletta 2004; 
Armstrong and Bernstein 2008) who themselves draw extensively on feminist, 
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cultural and institutional understandings of political agency (Bourdieu 1977, 1985; 
Smith 1987, 1990; Friedland and Alford 1991; Sewell 1992; Thornton and Ocasio 
1999, 2008). I utilise social movement theory principally because it has reflected 
intensely and explicitly upon the notion of political agency using social movement 
case studies (Maiguashca 2013: 118; Marchetti 2013: 2), while drawing attention to 
the importance of the ‘public enactment’ of contentious practices (Williams 2004: 
102). Most importantly, it has done so with an emphasis on the structural contexts 
within which agentive action emerges (Morris 1992; Meyer 2002) rendering it a 
fruitful body of theory with which to engage.  
  This chapter reviews three approaches to understanding the emergence of 
political agency: structural social movement theories (particularly multi-institutional 
politics theory, which emerged from within the discipline), framing theory, and 
resistance theories. It delineates their characteristics, and their strengths and 
limitations for answering the research question. Following this, the final section of the 
chapter outlines a conceptual model for investigating political agency, linking 
together complementary concepts while ensuring epistemological coherence.  
 
3.2 Structural Social Movement Theory  
 
3.2.1 Political Process Theory  
 
The theoretical social movement literature, from its inception in the 1980s, has 
concerned itself with the way in which contentious activity is situated in relation to 
political structures (Klandermans et al 1988; Morris and Mueller 1992; Jenkins and 
Klandermans 1995). The most influential branch of social movement theory to have 
dealt with this subject is Political Process Theory, or PPT (McAdam 1982; McAdam 
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et al 1996). The underlying premise of PPT is that in order to understand the nature of 
open political contestation, we have to grasp the structural contexts in which this 
action occurs, thus adopting a top-down perspective (Maiguashca 2013: 123). 
Political agency is rooted within guiding arrangements and dynamics that have to be 
clearly outlined. 
Having adopted this premise, PPT deploys the term structure to describe ‘those 
political institutions, arrangements, and processes that distinguish one political 
context from another’, and which are defined as an objective, durable, and 
constraining force (Polletta 1999: 64-65). In the context of contentious action, it 
specifies that the most significant structures are the institutions of the nation state 
(McAdam et al 1996; Meyer et al 2002; Tilly and Tarrow 2007; Marchetti 2013). The 
definition of states endorsed by PPT is that of states as ‘sets of political, military, 
judicial and bureaucratic organizations that exert political authority and coercive 
control over people living within the borders of well-defined territories’ (Amenta et al 
2002: 49). As indicated in this quotation, the structural power of the state is 
conceptualised as being principally material in nature, emanating from a state’s 
coercive functions and its capacity to regulate the formal political sphere (Maiguascha 
2013: 123). The emphasis is on identifying ‘both durable and variable aspects of the 
state relevant to a given movement at a particular point in time’ (Smith and Fetner 
2010: 18), with the implication that the variability in such structures is internally 
generated rather than affected by external actors.  
PPT argues that political action is both constrained and enabled by state 
structures. State structure is an enabling force in that the relaxation of this authority – 
indicated above to be material and/or coercive - allows political action to emerge 
through ‘political opportunities’, which either encourage or discourage political actors 
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to deploy their resources in pursuit of contentious activity (Tarrow 1996: 54). 
Structural political contexts ultimately sanction the availability of contentious activity 
available to particular populations (Tarrow 1993a: 283). Following such openings, 
political actors can challenge and be situated in a directly contentious relationship 
with governmental authority (Tilly 1978; Della Porta 1996; McAdam et al 2001; Tilly 
and Tarrow 2007).  
Attempts within PPT to delineate the precise nature of state capacity have 
focused on democratic institutions within advanced capitalist countries (Della Porta 
1996; Rucht 1996; Tilly 1999; McAdam et al. 2001; Amenta et al. 2002; Smith and 
Fetner 2010). Changes within democratic institutions afford political actors the space, 
opportunity or resources through which to mobilise themselves into action. For 
instance, policy environments can open up in ways that subsequently shape the 
collective action decisions of a social movement, thereby influencing the forms and 
outcomes of political activity (Foweraker 1995; Tarrow 1996). In particular, the 
coercive capacities of state power play an important role in repressing or policing 
protest, thereby hindering its emergence (Tilly 1978; Kriest et al 1995; Della Porta 
1996). 
One of the strengths of PPT is the attention it draws to the shaping role of state 
institutions on the form, trajectory and timing of political action. The premise is 
sound: we cannot understand agency as isolated from its context, and PPT elaborates 
mechanisms for understanding the emergence of claim making procedures. 
Nevertheless, critiques of this dimension of PPT abound: principally, that its 
mechanisms for political action function as ‘structural variables’ (Gamson and Meyer 
1996; Goodwin and Jasper 1999, 2004). Thus, PPT neglects the agentive components 
of action - the way in which political actors shape and structure the meanings that 
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propel them to action (Snow and Benford 1988) – and so tends to describe conditions 
rather than choices, despite packaging structural openings in the language of 
‘opportunity’. 
However, the more glaring limitation of PPT is not its structuralist bias, which 
is to be anticipated, nor even that it assumes the existence of a liberal democratic 
state, although this poses a difficulty when translating its framework to authoritarian 
regimes (Kenney 2001). It is that, above all, its very conception of structural power is 
rooted in the political institutions of the state. ‘Environments’ are defined in a 
material sense, consisting of particular political, coercive and regulatory practices 
(Foweraker 1995; Tarrow 1996) and not as possessive of symbolic or discursive 
authority. The literature review highlighted a gap in understanding the meanings 
delimited by authoritarian regimes, and the way in which such meanings were 
contested or affirmed prior to and during the Arab uprisings. PPT, which 
conceptualises meaning or ‘culture’ as entirely distinct from structure (Polletta 2004: 
163), is thus unsuited to tackling this aspect of the research question.  
Lastly, despite its emphasis on the enabling function of political structure, PPT 
does not offer a fully interactionist account of the dynamics between political contexts 
and political agency, beyond the concept of ‘political opportunity structures’. There is 
little indication that political actors can shape the contexts and environments of 
activity: only a functionalist emphasis on the way in which insurgents ‘can be 
expected to mobilise’ in response to state-level changes (McAdam et al 1996: 10). 
The notion of an ‘expected’ response also cements PPT’s assumption that social 
movement participants are utility maximising, rational actors, thereby leaving no 
room for understanding the way in which participants can be ‘animated by an 
entangled mixture of feelings and calculations’ (Gould 2004: 173). Ultimately, what 
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is lacking in PPT is a framework for grasping the underlying, conflictual power 
relations connecting actors to the structures they are positioned in opposition to, and a 
more nuanced view of ‘the texture and scope of human agency’ (Gould 2004: ibid) 
that takes into account political subjectivities and processes of meaning making 
(Polletta 1999, 2002: Crossley 2002: Maiguashcha 2013).  
 
3.2.2 Multi-Institutional Politics Theory  
 
 
A theoretical alternative to PPT that has attempted to offset its limitations, whilst 
affirming the significance of structural power, is multi-institutional politics theory 
(Armstrong and Bernstein 2008). This conceptual framework builds on contemporary 
institutional, feminist and cultural theory (Douglas 1986; Swidler 1986; Smith 1987, 
1990; Fligstein 1991; Friedland and Alford 1991; Sewell 1992, 1999; Scott 1994; 
Thornton and Occasio 2008), in addition to existent critiques of PPT (Crossley 2002; 
Polletta 1999; 2004). In what they describe as a ‘theory of society and power’, 
Armstrong and Bernstein (2008: 82) argue that domination is organised around 
institutions, defined as ‘supraorganizational patterns of human activity’, which are 
simultaneously material and symbolic. Their primary objective is to draw attention to 
existent conceptualisations of the symbolic dimension of political structures, i.e. the 
meanings generated by them, and the way in which these meanings go on to shape 
dominant understandings of political reality (Polletta 1999; Sewell 1999) and material 
conditions, resources and inequalities (Valocchi 2005b). In doing so, they 
disaggregate the monolithic entity of the state and move beyond the idea of power as 
a predominantly material force (Clemens and Cook 1999). 
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The fundamental tenets of the multi-institutional model constitute a substantive 
expansion to PPT. Its first principle is that society is a ‘multi-institutional’ system. In 
this formulation, ‘structure’ or ‘power’ does not exist as a homogenous and totalised 
entity (Sewell 1992: 16) but is manifested within a multiplicity of different 
institutional spheres: the state, capitalism, democracy, and the family, according to 
Friedland and Alford (1991: 248), but also science (Moore 1999), law (Bernstein 
2003), medicine (Turner 1999) and the media (Gamson 1989), all of which have been 
analysed as influential institutional spheres. In this conception of power, the state 
undoubtedly remains an important institution: they (states) ‘generally establish rules 
that govern other institutions of society’ (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008: 82), ‘alter 
the environment more profoundly and systematically than other organizations’ 
(Fligstein 1991: 314) and have a particularly potent capacity to create new social 
categories (Polletta 2004: 165). However, the model differs from PPT in viewing the 
‘nature, power, logic, and centrality of states as historically variable’, without taking 
their significance for granted (Friedland and Alford 1991: 238). As a result, ‘the state’ 
is viewed as one of many institutional loci of power, rather than an entity possessed of 
an abstract drive for power and control that is de facto the subject of study. 
Secondly, when the state (or any other institution) is selected as a focus of 
analysis, its practices of domination are not reducible to the deployment of material 
resources in order to elicit obedience and assent, as assumed by PPT, but also include 
the way in which ‘symbols, belief systems, even values’ prefigure as part of the 
practice of domination (Friedland and Alford 1991: 237). The understanding of 
institutions as both material and symbolic systems is a central part of the multi-
institutional theoretical model (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008: 83), inspired by the 
theoretical tradition on the interconnectedness of classifications and objective social 
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practices (Foucault 1977; Bourdieu 1977, 1985). As fundamentally classificatory 
systems, institutions authorise certain relations, fix processes of interaction, 
disseminate narratives and traditions, and above all, delineate the dimensions of 
conformity and deviance (Douglas 1986; Gamson 1989; Polletta 1999). These 
categorisations of power, interest and prestige subsequently shape the way in which 
resources are distributed within society (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008: 84-85). An 
institution’s material and symbolic practices are thus inextricably connected and 
mutually reinforcing. 
One of the most salient concepts within multi-institutional politics theory is 
‘institutional logic’ (Sewell 1992): a term that describes the mechanism through 
which institutions exercise this dual capacity for material strength and symbolic 
organisation. Institutional logics have been defined as ‘the socially constructed, 
historical patterns of material practices, assumptions, values, beliefs, and rules by 
which individuals produce and reproduce their material subsistence, organize time 
and space, and provide meaning to their reality’ (Thornton and Ocasio 1999: 804). 
Institutional logics govern the interactions of individuals and groups by constituting 
the ‘rules of the game’ through which actors operate and can engage in political 
struggle (Smith 1987; Friedland and Alford 1991; Polletta 2004). Most significantly, 
the literature argues that institutional logics can come to ‘constitute actors’ by creating 
a value system that supplies individuals with vocabularies of motive and a sense of 
self (identity) in relation to that value system (Clemens and Cook 1999: 454; 
Friedland and Alford 1991: 251), and through practices of categorisation that delimit 
meanings, expectations and behavioural norms (Douglas 1986; Valocchi 2005b). The 
multi-institutional model emphasises that these routinised practices of categorisation 
are particularly powerful because they can come to appear as a natural way of doing 
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things, delineating the normal and excluding the abnormal, and concealing their 
influence as they begin to be ‘taken for granted’ (Bourdieu 1977; Douglas 1986; 
Gamson 1989; Clemens and Cook 1999; Polletta 2004). 
 Moreover, the constitutive capacity of institutional logics contributes to the 
reinforcement of institutions themselves, and of the social relations and meanings that 
they generate (Friedland and Alford 1991: 249; Clemens and Cook 1999: 445). 
Individuals are not passive bystanders in relation to this process but active 
reproducers of meaning, who ‘themselves and for themselves constitute the 
observability and reportability of what has happened or is going on’ (Smith 1987: 
161). The concept of institutional logics affirms the mutually-reinforcing connection 
between structure and agency. In contrast to PPT, multi-institutional theory stresses 
that a dominant configuration of power does not operate in externality to political 
actors (with actors at most responding to structural changes) but is embodied in the 
material and symbolic practice of actors themselves (Smith 1987: 175).  
At this juncture, it could be argued that multi-institutional theory diminishes the 
agency of political actors by emphasising the overpowering authority of institutions. 
However, Armstrong and Bernstein (2008: 87) lend institutions a degree of fragility 
by introducing the concept of ‘institutional contradiction’. This term caveats the 
constitutive power of institutions, suggesting that their meanings are potentially 
contradictory and therefore open to exploitation by various actors. Contradiction can 
be intra-institutional, with instabilities of meaning inherent in one institution: for 
instance, the institutional construction of ‘minorities’ or outliers that then become a 
subsequent basis of challenge (Clemens and Cook 1999: 449). Contradiction can also 
be inter-institutional, appearing when the logics or claims of institutions are 
incommensurate and can be subsequently exploited by challengers (Friedland and 
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Alford 1991: 241). In both instances, it is evident that individuals and groups can 
disrupt ‘stable’ institutional routines – both material and symbolic - by seeking out 
alternative interpretations to established symbols and practices (Collins 1990; 
Clemens and Cook 1999; Steensland 2006).  
The central strength of this theoretical model is that it develops a clear 
framework for conceptualising any dominant configuration of power that political 
actors are shaped by, operate within and negotiate. The ‘cultural environment’ 
(Williams 2004) of political action is here disaggregated and identified as existing 
within specific institutionalised contexts (Crossley 2002: 139). This conception of 
structure is particularly valuable for analysing ‘authoritarianism’ as a mode of 
practice embodied in specific political regimes, encapsulating its material dimensions 
(Bellin 2004; Gandhi and Przeworski 2006; Svolik 2009) and its symbolic capacities 
(Mitchell 1988; Wedeen 1999), and stressing the way it is both constitutive of actors’ 
identities and potentially rife with contradiction. Ultimately, Armstrong and Bernstein 
build effectively on PPT: they retain the theory’s original commitment to delineating 
the material dimensions of structural power but offset its limitations by broadening 
the scope of its authority and its impact on social relations.  
There remain some limitations to using this framework as the sole basis for 
answering the research question. Although it is effective in outlining a conception of 
structure, and even suggests that such structure is subject to change by political agents 
during everyday instances (Sewell 1999), it does not supply concrete theoretical tools 
for examining the nature of contestations over meaning, particularly in moments of 
open confrontation. Neither does the theory offer a clear outline of the ways in which 
actors can exploit institutional contradictions. Armstrong and Bernstein assert that 
agents have the potential to be re-constitutive of their material and symbolic worlds, 
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but their focus remains on delineating the way in which institutions constitute actors 
through the mechanisms of institutional logic.  
Secondly, the constitutive capacity of institutions, which defines individual 
identities and practices, risks diminishing political agency if it is applied 
comprehensively to authoritarian contexts. The notion that ‘institutional thinking is in 
the minds of individuals’ (Douglas 1986: 4) would struggle to accommodate the 
phenomenon of ‘acting as if’: the re-performance of authoritarian rituals despite 
scepticism or disbelief in their legitimacy and authenticity (Wedeen 1999). This does 
not diminish the usefulness of the framework, but it suggests the need for a delicate 
balance between acknowledging the structural strengths of institutions, while 
remaining open to the myriad of ways in which actors navigate institutional logics. 
‘Institutional contradiction’ cannot become the new ‘political opportunity’ (a 
structural condition masquerading as a choice), but must be analysed as a set of 
tangible, subversive practices undertaken by political actors. 
 
3.3 Social Movement Framing Theory  
 
 
A prominent approach to analysing the agentive dimensions of contestation is framing 
theory, which has emerged as a key conceptual toolkit in the scholarship on social 
movements and political mobilisation (Snow et al 1986; Snow and Benford 1988; 
Gamson 1992; Hunt et al 1994; Caroll and Ratner 1996; Benford and Snow 2000; 
Miceli 2005). As with multi-institutional politics theory, this too is rooted in social 
movement studies; however, where the structural branch of social movement theory 
stresses the durability of a configuration of power, framing theory asserts that it can 
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be contested, altered and even transformed, and in turn supplies tools for analysing 
political agency through this process. 
Framing theory places the construction of identities and individuals’ meaning 
making practices as central to its understanding of this process of political 
contestation (Laraña et. al 1994; Johnston and Klandermans 1995; Davis 2002). 
Avoiding determinism, it emphasises the element of ‘choice’ underpinning the 
relationship between political actors and structures, arguing that actors can engage in 
the social construction of reality through their own discursive practices (Jasper 2004). 
It views structure and agency as inextricable. Individuals occupy an existent system of 
meaning that they are capable of reconstructing: ‘experiences are frames, but I frame 
my experiences’ (Crook and Taylor 1980: 246).  
The central process in this social construction of reality involves ‘framing’ or 
re-presenting meanings within a particular context. Frames are ‘schemata of 
interpretation’ that enable individuals to locate and label particular occurrences within 
their social environment (Goffman 1974), and ‘framing’ itself is defined as an active, 
processual phenomenon that implies agency at the level of reality construction 
(Benford and Snow 2000: 614). The meanings that actors encounter within their 
socio-political environments, which both constitute reality and actors’ own identities, 
are susceptible to change through a process of re-articulation (Tarrow 1992, 1993a; 
Johnston and Klandermans 1995; Benford and Snow 2000; Meyer et al. 2002; 
Williams 2002; Blühdorn 2006; Kockleman 2007; Lindekilde 2014).  
According to the framing literature, one key purpose of the ‘framing’ 
undertaken by actors is to mobilise people against an existent and dominant authority 
(Snow and Benford 1988: 199). Political agency is conceptualised here as a strategic 
capacity, involving interaction with existent structures in order to achieve a change in 
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the power status quo. Contentious, collective groups of political actors, here presented 
as ‘social movements’, undertake this ‘signifying work’ in ‘ways that are intended to 
mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner bystander support, and to 
demobilize antagonists’ (Snow and Benford 1998: 198). Actors can even evoke 
suppressed contentious meanings or ‘hidden transcripts’ of dissent in order to re-
express them as grievances and motivational impetuses for action (Gamson 1992). In 
addition to its instrumental significance, the act of framing is also said to shape 
political subjectivities, because it constitutes an ‘enlargement of personal identity for 
participants and offers fulfilment and realisation of self’ (Gamson 1992: 56). 
According to the literature, this enlargement of identity takes place on both a personal 
and collective basis, due to the building of group solidarities and shared relations with 
a broader community or practice (Polletta and Jasper 2001; Eschle and Maiguashca 
2005; Maiguashca 2013).  
The central concept in framing theory is ‘collective action framing’: a term that 
describes the process through which actors undertake this framing work and generate 
resultant schemata of interpretation, or ‘collective action frames’ (Snow and Benford 
1988). According to David Snow and Robert Benford, collective action framing can 
be broken down into three procedures. The first is ‘diagnostic framing’, or ‘the 
identification of a problem and the attribution of blame or causality’ (1988: 200). 
Customarily, it is much simpler for a set of actors to achieve consensus over the 
former than the latter. The second is ‘prognostic framing’, the purpose of which is 
‘not only to suggest solutions to the problem but to identify strategies, tactics, and 
targets’ (Snow and Benford 1988: 201). Often there is a direct correspondence 
between the identification of a problem and its presence within the framing of a 
proposed solution. Finally, ‘motivational framing’ encapsulates the development of a 
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‘vocabulary of motive’ and encourages other individuals to undertaken collective 
action (Snow and Benford 1988: 202). Taken as a whole, collective action frames 
communicate a sequencing of events, or a ‘narrative’, which is actively disseminated 
as an alternative understanding of social reality (Polletta and Gardner 2015: 535).  
The relationship between collective action frames and extant meanings within a 
particular environment is clarified in the central concept of ‘frame resonance’ (Kubal 
1998; Snow and Benford 1988; Zald 1998; Williams 2004). Snow and Benford 
(1988), building on Gramsci (1971) and his argument that any political education 
must be linked to the nature of the belief system it targets, argue that ‘resonance’ 
captures the notion that new meanings must be evocative of existent understandings in 
order for a target audience to find them compelling as a motivator to action (see also 
Valocchi 2005a: 54). There should be a ‘salience’ between the values that a 
movement is trying to promote and the ‘larger belief system’ of potential constituents 
(Snow and Benford 1988: 205). However, new frames must also shift the parameters 
of the debate slightly so as to be sufficiently contentious (Noakes and Johnston 2005: 
11). For instance, the framing of ‘a woman’s body is her own’ in the women’s 
movement ‘makes sense only in a cultural discourse that highlights notions of 
individual autonomy’, while rechanneling the configuration of that discourse for the 
attainment of novel goals (Zald 1988: 266-67). In order to achieve this balance, actors 
engage in ‘frame alignment’ discourses, whereby new, radical meanings are carefully 
calibrated with existent understandings (Benford and Snow 2000: 614; Noakes and 
Johnston 2005: 8). 
Lastly, there have been attempts to develop a framework for evaluating the 
meaning making strength of framing processes (Snow and Benford 1986, 1988). An 
initially extensive model by Snow and Benford has been simplified by Noakes and 
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Johnston (2005: 15), who have outlined three ways of evaluating a frame and 
disaggregating the ‘qualities’ that make framing more resonant: 
 
1. ‘Cultural compatibility’: whether the content of a collective action frame 
synchronises with an extant stock of meanings.  
2. ‘Frame consistency’: whether the internal narrative communicated by a 
collective action frame is cohesive.  
3. ‘Empirical credibility’: whether the frame coheres with the way in which 
the target audience sees the world and/or unfolding events on the 
ground.  
 
In addition to the qualities of the frame, it has been that argued ‘claims makers’ 
themselves, whose primary role is ‘to communicate the movement’s frames to current 
and potential constituents’ (Noakes and Johnston 2005: 7-8) must also have 
credibility according to the recipients of such meanings (Williams 2004: 105). Noakes 
and Johnson concede that this evaluative criteria is not exhaustive and has not been 
‘empirically verified’, but state that its utility is in capturing the variable strength of 
collective action frames. This attempt to delimit ‘frame resonance’ arguably acts as a 
check on political agency by suggesting that the meaning making process is not 
automatically constitutive of social reality, with its impact dependent on the interplay 
of text and context.  
The principal strength of framing theory is that it supplies a clear framework for 
understanding and analysing political agency as a representational capacity that is 
situated in relation to an existent, and dominant, configuration of meaning. It is 
agentive because it is centred on the role of individuals as knowledge producers, 
capable of transforming their social worlds and their political subjectivities. In its 
most minimalist variant of ‘collective action framing’, framing theory is parsimonious 
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but with a wide applicability, building neatly on an influential sociolinguistic theory 
instated by Erving Goffman (1974), who deployed frame analysis in order to study the 
cognitive organisation of social experience. Thus, although framing theory has 
traditionally been oriented towards democratic contexts (Blühdorn 2006: 17; Heller 
and Jones 2013: 165), its general, interactional principles have led to its increased 
applied to non-Western democratic contexts (Irwin-Zarecka 1994; Osa and 
Corduneanu-Huci 2009; Clarke 2013; Drissel 2017). Through the concept of frame 
resonance, framing theory is also useful in specifying the precise linkage between a 
collective action frame, produced and articulated by contentious political actors, and 
the particular system of meaning in which this frame is located and through which its 
injunctions become relevant (Polletta 1999: 70).  
Despite its utility, there remain some limitations to framing theory. The first is 
the broad and somewhat amorphous way in which it understands structure. The theory 
refers to ‘larger belief systems’ (Snow and Benford 1988: 205), a ‘dominant culture’ 
(Noakes and Johnston 2005; Johnston 2009) and ‘cultural environments’ (Hart 2007: 
1) but it does not specify the material or symbolic sites in which cultural norms are 
embodied. Whereas multi-institutional theory argues that meanings are located within 
specific institutional contexts, framing theory views this ‘culture’ as environmentally 
diffuse: ‘the extant stock of meanings, beliefs, ideologies, practices, values, myths, 
narratives and the like’ (Snow et al 1986: 629). This makes it difficult to gauge the 
scope of  ‘frame resonance’. How do we clarify which particular meanings political 
actors should be amplifying, if the ‘cultural environment’ comprises all societal 
values? 
Secondly, framing theory has been critiqued for understanding agency as a 
principally strategic capacity (Steinberg 2002; Gould 2004; Jasper 2004). The framing 
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process is presented as a way for individuals to attain tangible political outcomes, and 
frame resonance is a way of exploiting culture to maximise tactical goals. The 
‘culture’ or established set of meanings which actors have access to is often described 
as a ‘tool kit’ or ‘pool of resources’, to be strategically selected from in order to 
mobilise as many people as possible (Swidler 1986; d’Anjou and Van Male 1998; 
Noakes and Johnson 2005). This is evident in the way in which framing processes 
have increasingly been quantified in a bid to explain ‘mobilization success’ (Jasper 
and Poulsen 1995; McAdam et al 1996; Zald 1996; Johnston 2002, 2009; Oliver and 
Johnston 2005; Westby 2005; Howell 2012; Jasper 2014; Doerr et al 2015). For 
instance, Hank Johnston (2009: 6) stresses that ‘cultural factors…still can be grouped, 
counted and their influence analysed’, and argues that ‘even though culture is 
everywhere, it is important to approach it systematically and parse it into categories 
that are empirically verifiable’. Polletta and Gardner also indicate that it is possible to 
empirically establish ‘the political consequences of popular stories on…the 
policymaking process’ (2015: 544). Such research suggests that the practical impact 
of framing can be measured, even though it has been acknowledged that affirming the 
success of frame resonance by determining it post-hoc risks tautology (Williams 
2003: 107). 
This strategic understanding of framing, and of political agency more generally, 
arguably undermines the constructivist underpinnings of framing theory. The initial 
formulation of framing theory (Snow et al 1986; Snow and Benford 1988) defies the 
distinction between instrumental and expressive understandings of political agency, 
and stresses the significance of framing on individual and collective subjectivities: a 
view that continues to be upheld (Polletta 1997; Gamson 2002; Meyer 2002; Williams 
2002; Eschle 2005; Maiguashca and Marchetti 2013). However, although this 
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perspective is often affirmed, it is neglected in empirical accounts of framing 
processes. Framing studies that have focused on mobilisation success (Johnston 2002, 
2009; Oliver and Johnston 2005; Westby 2005) have not explored the way in which 
issues of recognition, perception and representation constitute a stake in the process of 
struggle. This representational process is particularly crucial for social movement 
actors whose identities have been delimited by dominant cultural codes (Crossley 
2002; Williams 2004).  
Finally, the concept of frame resonance potentially diminishes the contentious 
nature of reality construction. ‘Resonance’ suggests that new understandings must 
cohere with established cultural norms in order to be persuasive (Snow and Benford 
1988: 205). However, social movement theorists also concede that ‘popular culture 
mostly contains interpretations of situations synchronized to support the status quo’ 
(Noakes and Johnston 2005: 10) and that therefore frames must possess an 
oppositional approach towards this popular tool kit (d’Anjou and Van Male 1998; 
Tarrow 1998). Chalcraft (2016: 21) poses this contradiction as a question: ‘when 
cultural frames resonate widely, then to what extent are they contentious?’ This is 
particularly problematic for understanding framing during moments of radical 
contestation such as the Arab uprisings, where a system of meaning was more 
substantively challenged (Affaya 2011). Although this tension is not well resolved in 
the literature, it can be minimised through a more precise breakdown of the ‘cultural’ 
content of collective action frames: which institutional contexts are they situated 
within, and in what ways do they affirm and contest their meanings? Noakes and 
Johnston (2005: 8) also attempt to offset the internal incongruity of ‘frame resonance’ 
by suggesting that a cultural stock contains a multiplicity of interpretations, some of 
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which may well be contradictory; as a result, actors can select and package only those 
that are most congenial to their cause.   
To conclude, framing theory’s strength is in presenting tools for analysing 
agency as a strategic, representational capacity for meaning making. In moments of 
open contestation, political actors generate ‘collective action frames’ that capitalise on 
what is resonant within a dominant system of meaning, and do so in order to mobilise 
others to contentious action. The framework is less useful for understanding the 
negotiation of meaning as a symbolic practice that is constitutive of political 
subjectivities. Although framing theory affirms the significance of symbols, it 
conflates them with strategic frames and does not investigate them in their own right. 
This leaves a gap in understanding the expressive, subjective dimension of political 
agency and representational practice. 
 
3.4 Theories of Resistance  
 
The final approach to understanding the dynamic relationship between political 
agency and structure is contained within theories of resistance. What I label here the 
‘resistance literature’ is a broad body of work that is interdisciplinary in its theoretical 
underpinnings and empirical focus, encompassing feminist theory, post-colonial 
theory and post-structuralist approaches (Foucault 1965, 1977; Sewell 1999; 
Hauptmann 2004; Hollander and Einwohner 2004; Mouffe 2005; Stahler-Sholk et al 
2007; Tripp 2013; Vinthagen and Johansson 2013; Courpasson and Vallas 2016). 
The resistance literature has engaged critically with the concept of ‘political 
agency’ in the process of investigating acts of resistance. Resistance has been defined 
as ‘a politics of contention on a more fundamental scale’ (Tripp 2013: 4) involving 
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‘active efforts to oppose, fight, and refuse to cooperate with’ modes of control (Proffit 
1996: 25). Writing of resistance as a politically agentive action has tended to involve 
an expanded understanding of what is ‘political’, going beyond formal opposition to 
particular policies and denoting a realm of conflictual power relations (Scott 1990; 
Rubin 1996; Nash 2001; Hauptmann 2004; Hollander and Einwohner 2004; Slater 
2004; Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Lyons 2010). As summarised by Bice 
Maiguashca (2013: 120), ‘By adding the descriptor “political” to the notion of agency, 
one draws attention to a particular kind of collective action which reflects a process of 
contestation and embodies a challenge to existing authorities and structures of power’. 
Acts of resistance, by contesting power, are in this sense a prime embodiment of 
political agency, and political agency encompasses – but is not limited to – acts of 
resistance.  
In the precursor to their discussion of women’s resistance in Togo, Charles 
Heller and Branwen Jones offer a succinct definition of political agency, and of the 
relationship between agency and structure: 
 
We conceive of political agency as the capacity to take part in the struggle to 
define the modalities of life in common (2013: 166 – authors’ emphasis).  
 
This definition of political agency – which also contains an understanding of structure 
- can be partitioned into three constituent parts: definitional capacity, modalities of 
life, and struggle. The following discussion will unpack these three qualities, 
indicating their respective salience within the broader resistance literature and 
outlining their significance for answering the research question.  
The first aspect of Heller and Jones’ definition is that political agency comprises 
a capacity to ‘define’. This immediately demarcates political agency as a 
	 68	
representational practice: ‘a kind of social and semiotic facility’ involving ‘the degree 
to which one can control the expression of a sign’ (Cockleman 2007: 375). In this 
regard, agency is understood as a practice that is negotiated and constructed, rather as 
a fixed status or position: it is contingent, capable of emergence and retreat, ‘ongoing 
and in process’ (Featherstone 2008: 6). Indeed, it has even been argued that agency is 
present in the ways in which people ‘inhabit’ particular norms and systems of 
meaning, because this too involves some re-inscription of those definitions and 
representations (Mahmood 2005: 15).  
 The resistance literature emphasises that practices of articulation and 
representation construct political subjectivities (Kurik 2016: 56). The ability to 
‘define’ and classify, to influence the way in which people perceive the world, and to 
create categories of inclusion and difference, is powerful not just because of its social 
impact, but because it empowers identities (Spivak 1988; Oliver-Smith 1991; Staheli 
1999; Takhar 2013; Kurik 2016). As a result, imposed representations, or ‘symbolic 
practices of power’, undoubtedly ‘interfere with people’s political “subjectivities”, 
with their sense of themselves as political persons’ (Wedeen 1999: 81). This insight 
usefully extends the claims of multi-institutional politics theory. Multi-institutional 
theory states that systems of meaning can constitute identities, but the resistance 
literature reverses this premise by arguing that representational practices can re-
amplify subjectivities by enlarging the sphere of social actors’ enablements (Agha 
2007: 388). By drawing attention to the significance of representational activity for 
political subjectivities, the resistance literature also moves us beyond a notion of ‘the 
self-controlled, rational political subject’ that underpins structuralist theories of social 
movements (Maiguashca 2013: 119), and even pervades, as I argue above, the 
methodological positioning of constructivist framing theories.  
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Secondly, what is being defined are ‘the modalities of life in common’: a term 
that denotes the social practices and power relations that function as ‘norms’ within a 
particular cultural context (see Scott 1990: 57). The cultural environment is 
constituted of material and symbolic authority, and representational practices derive 
their significance principally from the structural context in which they are located 
(Flowerdew 1997; Hoy 2004; Cockleman 2007; Courpasson and Vallas 2016). The 
people who contest systems of signification are in turn constructed by the very world 
in which such systems proliferate (Ortner 1997: 8). In this sense, this concept of 
‘modalities of life’ coheres well with the multi-institutional politics literature. 
However, resistance theories, by focusing specifically on oppressive structures, 
contain additional insights about the way in which authoritarianism shapes practices 
of representation. Lisa Wedeen (1999) in her study of Syria under Hafiz al-Asad, 
argues that authoritarian regimes rely extensively on symbolic performances in order 
to impose a dominant system of meaning on society, even if those meanings are 
palpably disingenuous. As a result, symbolic displays generate systems of meaning 
that are pervasive and replicable, but are nevertheless not believable. One of the main 
ways in which authoritarian regimes constitute the ‘rules of the game’  – to use 
institutionalist terminology (Friedland and Alford 1991) – is by creating an official, 
prescriptive grammar, or rhetorical universe, that is reproduced by individuals and 
groups. This grammar features a slipperiness of language that enables the presentation 
of half-truths, the assimilation of inconvenient factual truths into an overarching 
narrative, and ’50-60 sentences that most people are fluent in’, and which comprise 
the ‘rhetorical formulae’ for speaking about the regime (Wedeen 1999: 40). The 
concept of a reproducible but incongruous institutional logic distinguishes this theory 
of resistance from multi-institutional politics theory: the latter equates the 
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pervasiveness of institutional meaning with ‘normalcy’ or the accepted order of 
things. Instead, in the case of Syria, the reproduction of these practices is clearly 
accompanied by a ‘shared condition of unbelief’ (Wedeen 1999: 121).  
Finally, this process of defining the modalities of life in common is a ‘struggle’ 
(Heller and Jones 2013: 133), and the definitional sphere is a fundamentally 
‘conflictual’ (Haugaard 1997) domain of interaction, involving contestation between 
political actors and the socio-historical structures in which they are located 
(Maiguashca 2013). As with framing theory, this understanding qualifies the 
durability of structural power by suggesting that it contain the seeds of conflict. 
However, the notion of ‘struggle’ makes it clear that the strategic ‘resonance’ of 
cultural meanings is not sufficient to enforce change, but that existent meanings may 
need to be more radically contested if new definitions are to take root (Weedon 1987).  
According to the resistance literature, the struggle over meaning is magnified in 
significance when it takes place publically rather than privately. The public 
replication of dominant meanings tends to reinforce power relations by abiding with 
an oppressor’s terms of engagement, even if actors are struggling to define their own 
meanings privately (Scott 1990: 67; Vinthagen and Johansson 2013: 37). Everyday 
contestation can and does undermine power, but it is heterogenic and contingent, and 
does not always present itself as resistance (Vinthagen and Johansson 2013: 1-2). In 
contrast, moments of open struggle – described as ‘flash-in-the-pan’ moments (Scott 
1990: 203) can be more fundamentally transformative of both meanings and political 
subjectivities (Tarrow 1993a; Wedeen 1999; Vinthagen and Johansson 2013; Juris 
and Sitrin 2016). An open or public struggle can transform meanings because it 
possesses punitive ramifications: the contestation over meaning can enable weaker 
people to ‘demand responsibility and accountability’ from the dominant power (Scott 
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1990: 51). It is through simultaneously contesting meanings and demanding 
accountability that political actors experience ‘personal authentication’, ‘fulfilment 
and satisfaction’, and ‘recaptured human dignity’ (Scott 1990: 208-9). 
The above discussion outlined the three central dimensions of political agency, 
as captured by the resistance literature: ‘definition’, ‘struggle’, and ‘the modalities of 
life in common’. One final, overarching insight that pervades the resistance literature 
is that the process of contesting dominant representations can potentially instate new 
relations of domination (Foucault 1977, 1978). This occurs because conceptual 
systems are inevitably shared (Wedeen 1998: 85), and because ‘systemic power 
relations are “internalised” at the individual level, shaping our sense of self and our 
future possibilities’ (Maiguashca 2013: 127). As a result, practices of resistance use 
the tools they condemn (Vesser 1989) and ‘generate their own exclusions, hierarchies 
and dominations’ (Juris and Sirtrin 2016: 32), thereby potentially ‘dividing the world 
into binary opposites’ (Tripp 2013: 12). Thus, scholars should avoid romanticising the 
representational practices of the downtrodden, and recognise the intersectionality 
between power and contestation (Abu-Lughod 1990; Sharp et al 2000). 
Due to the reciprocal relationship between power and contestation, the 
transformation of a dominant system is difficult to achieve (Wedeen 1999). David 
Jefferess (2008) supplies a way out of this impasse, arguing that opposition to a 
definitional system of meaning can only be transformative when it moves beyond 
rejection, to an active articulation of alternative power relations. If contestation is 
simply seen as a Manichean dichotomy between actors and structure, as it customarily 
is in the resistance literature, then the identities inscribed by the dominant system will 
simply be reinforced (Jefferess 2008: 14-15). Consequently, Jefferess goes beyond the 
idea of resistance-as-opposition/subversion in order to present the notion of 
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resistance-as-transformation, understood as ‘freedom to’ rather than simply ‘freedom 
from’ (Jefferess 2008: 181). An alternative set of meanings, practices and 
relationships have to be imagined and ultimately constructed for such contestation to 
be transformative (Juris and Sitrin 2016: 40).  
The principal strength of the resistance literature is in outlining the semiotic and 
conflictual relationship between political agency and existent structures of meaning. 
This constitutes a meaningful expansion to the two aforementioned theories. It 
develops the multi-institutional understanding of ‘structure’ by arguing that 
authoritarian or oppressive systems of meaning can impose dominant understandings 
through generating rituals of compliance, rather than belief. Secondly, it proposes that 
new meanings must not only ‘resonate’ with existent understandings, as framing 
theory delineates, but generate an alternative set of representations, if political agency 
is to emerge as a radical force. Finally, the literature emphasises that by reconstituting 
systems of meaning, political agents also constitute their individual and collective 
political subjectivities. Although framing theory touches on the significance of 
political subjectivities, it does not develop this into a cohesive framework.   
A distinctive insight developed by the resistance literature is the tight 
imbrication of agency and structure. Multi-institutional politics theory affirms that 
agency is contained within structure: structures of meaning are not situated in 
exteriority to political actors, but are reinforced through their practices, norms and 
routines (Smith 1987, 1990). Resistance theories flip this understanding by suggesting 
that structure is also contained within agency: agentive challenges to dominant 
meanings contain exclusionary categorisations and power practices (Maiguascha 
2013). This looped understanding suggests the need for researchers to be reflexive in 
their analysis of agency, to be attuned to re-perpetuations of power, and to 
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differentiate between ‘resistance as subversion’ and ‘resistance as transformation’ 
(Jefferess 2008).  
A limitation of the resistance literature emerges in its conception of ‘the 
political’ as an arena of conflict. This understanding is largely fruitful, but it can lead 
to a dichotomous contrast between politics as an ‘institutionalized arena of the 
political system’ and the political ‘as a type of conflictual relation that can develop in 
any arena of the social’ (Slater 2004: 22). This view assumes that ‘the political 
system’, understood as state institutions, is identical to ‘institutions’ in general. In 
fact, and as the multi-institutional politics literature indicates, the term ‘institution’ 
can be broadened to refer to any supraorganisational pattern of activity that contains a 
symbolic system of meaning (Friedland and Alford 1991: 232). I suggest that using 
the term ‘institution’ remains theoretically useful. It does not signify a retreat to the 
formal policymaking arena, but can still encompass a conflictual relation within a 
particular social arena. 
 
3.5 Theoretical Framework of the Thesis  	
 
The purpose of this theoretical framework is to facilitate a critical analysis of political 
agency prior to and during moments of open contestation. It applies and integrates 
relevant typologies and tools emerging from the three frameworks reviewed above: 
multi-institutional politics theory, framing theory, and resistance theories. Having 
outlined the strengths and limitations of each body of literature, this theoretical model 
draws together the most relevant elements for answering the research question, whilst 
ensuring epistemological coherence. 
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This theoretical framework conceptualises political agency as a representational 
capacity that shapes and contests structural configurations of power and meaning. It 
disaggregates the study of political agency into three parts: 
 
1. The delineation of a prevailing ‘configuration of power’ within a particular 
institutional context, comprising a system of meanings and an ordering of 
reality.  
 
In a study of agency, it is critical to begin with a conceptualisation of the structural 
status quo. Multi-institutional theory describes ‘structure’ as locatable within the 
material and symbolic practices of specific institutions, and as perpetuated through 
‘institutional logics’. This understanding views structure as invested with meaning, 
and as a shaping, even determinant force on political agency. All three of the 
theoretical frameworks indicate that dominant meanings, symbols and categorisations 
constitute political identities and subjectivities. In turn, political actors can contribute 
to the retrenchment of these dominant meanings by re-performing institutional rituals 
and routines, such that they become imbedded into everyday social experience.  
In this understanding of structure, I emphasise that institutional meanings shape 
‘publically political’ personhood. This is a slight modification to multi-institutional 
politics theory, which emphasises that actors’ identities and subjectivities are 
constituted by institutional meanings that they come to ‘believe’ in. I adapt multi-
institutional theory with reference to the resistance literature, which argues that 
authoritarian and oppressive structures can impose meanings and practices that are 
covertly recognised as disingenuous. Thus, by asserting that institutional practices 
shape ‘public’ subjectivities, there is room to understand the retrenchment of meaning 
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and the performance of ritual as borne out of acts of compliance, rather than belief. 
The resultant dynamic arguably remains the same – the affirmation of dominant 
meanings – but the relationship between agency and structure can be understood in a 
more nuanced way. It permits scope for analysing subtle forms of ‘everyday’ political 
contestation that overtly affirm power, but covertly subvert it. It also facilitates the 
analysis of authoritarian regimes, which rely extensively on rituals and imagery in 
order to impose a dominant pattern of meaning onto society.  
Having conceptualised the structural status quo, and the way in which it 
customarily shapes political subjectivities, this framework branches out to 
conceptualising political agency during moments of open contestation in two ways. 
 
2a.   The emergence of contentious political agency as a representational and 
strategic response to this system of meaning.  
 
Drawing on social movement framing theory, this aspect of the framework 
understands agency as a strategic and representational response to a particular 
configuration of meaning. Contentious political agency is strategic in two respects: a) 
it draws on ‘resources’ of meaning prevalent within the structural status quo in the 
process of challenging it and, b) it does so in order to attain instrumental political 
goals, such as collective mobilisation. It is ‘representational’ in the sense that it is 
articulated through the creation of rhetorical ‘collective action frames’ by political 
actors.   
Collective action frames are a prime embodiment of strategic political agency 
because they entail an active process of narrative construction around a particular 
cause. They involve and demonstrate a representational capacity: the demarcation of 
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particular injustices, the framing of solutions, and the generation of vocabularies of 
motive around which other political actors (and the societal group in question) can 
unite. Most importantly, they build on or refer to the aforementioned system of 
meanings through a process of ‘frame resonance’. This involves the selection of 
salient meanings or understandings within a particular semiotic system in order to 
mobilise other political actors.   
 
2b. The emergence of contentious political agency as a representational and 
symbolic response to this system of meaning.  
 
Drawing on theories of resistance, this final part of the framework conceptualises 
political agency as a representational and symbolic response to a dominant system of 
meaning, in parallel to the conceptualisation of agency as strategic. It is 
‘representational’ in that, once again, it emerges through the construction of 
meanings, narratives and particular understandings of social reality. However, it is 
‘symbolic’ in that these representations are not here analysed as an instrumental force, 
or as targeted towards achieving tangible political outcomes, but as significant for 
their transformation of individual and collective political subjectivities, and of the 
symbolic system they negotiate as a whole.  
Whereas strategic framing seeks ‘resonance’ with some aspects of an existent 
configuration of meaning, symbolic contestation seeks to comprehensively challenge 
its other dimensions. The distinction pertains to the way in which new representations 
are situated in relation to dominant understandings. Political subjectivities emerge 
when symbolic contestation undertakes two consecutive processes: the subversion of 
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exclusionary meanings, followed by the creation of an alternative system of meaning 
that empowers actors and reimagines previously-set hierarchies of power.  
However, a degree of reflexivity must be built into this understanding of agency 
as symbolic contestation. The resistance literature stresses that even transformed 
imaginaries may manifest an internal hierarchy of dominance or exclusion. The 
analysis of radical representations must be accompanied by an active investigation of 
the ways in they inscribe their own institutional logics. This should be analysed, not 
as occurring in the aftermath of contention, but as potentially imbedded in 
representational activities. 
 
To summarise, this theoretical model develops a two-pronged understanding of 
political agency as an instrumental and symbolic representational practice. It is 
instrumental in that it seeks material goals attendant from contesting a structure of 
meaning. It is symbolic in that it undertakes the alteration of this system of meaning, 
and the transformation of political subjectivities in the process. Above all, it is 
historically emergent, situated in relation to an overarching and constitutive 
configuration of meaning.  
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4 
Methodology and Research Design 
 
 
This chapter will outline the methodology of the thesis. This has sought to 
operationalise the multidisciplinary theoretical model outlined in the previous chapter, 
while retaining epistemological coherence. It outlines the rationale for selecting the 
Libyan uprising, of all Arab Spring occurrences, as a case study of open contestation 
under authoritarianism, before specifying the method for the collection and analysis of 
empirical material, and the manner in which issues pertaining to research ethics and 
validity were identified and resolved.  
 
4.1 Case Selection of Libya 
 
In this thesis, Libya has been selected as a case of both authoritarianism and of 
popular contestation during the 2011 Arab uprisings. In the broadest sense, a case has 
been defined as ‘a well-defined aspect of a historical episode that the investigator 
selects for analysis’ (George and Bennett 2005: 17). The sustained focus on a 
particular historical episode generates a set of expectations about the research: for 
instance, the expectation that such studies possess internal validity, a deep scope of 
proposition and concentrated data availability (Gerring 2007: 38). However, case 
study research is frequently associated with the scientific method, where the role of 
the case study is to enable generalisations through the testing of hypotheses. In this 
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view, case studies are most useful in shedding light on a larger ‘population’ or class of 
cases (Gerring 2007: 20) or in generalising to theoretical propositions (Yin 2009: 15).  
At this juncture, it is important to specify the way in which Libya is deployed as 
a ‘case’ in this thesis. The scientific method does permit the case study a role in 
exploratory research, and in line with this understanding, the thesis will seek to 
develop broad insights about the nature of political agency and symbolic contestation 
that can be applied and investigated in similar contexts (Gerring 2007: 40). In the 
context of study research, such an approach has been described in the social science 
research literature as a ‘trade-off’ between ‘high internal validity and good historical 
explanations of particular cases versus making generalizations that apply to broad 
populations’ (George and Bennett 2005: 22). 
However, this thesis does not seek to represent its central contributions as 
stemming from causal inferences or from generalisability, nor does it set out to attain 
such outcomes. This stems from the constructivist orientation underpinning the 
theoretical model, which, while comprising neither a theory nor methodology, ‘does 
enable and constrain our research designs and our choice of the tools in making our 
case’ (Kratochwil 2008: 88). In contrast to the scientific method, the 
constructivist/interpretivist paradigm – as defined by Michael Burawoy - deploys a 
case in order to reveal the essential nature of society at large and to understand the 
case, not to generalise from it; it searches for ‘societal significance’ rather than 
‘statistical significance’ (in Small 2009: 20). As a result, strategic and symbolic 
meaning making practices are investigated as intersecting phenomena rather than as 
distinct and measurable variables. As indicated in Chapter 3, this is a conscious 
deviation from the claim that ‘cultural factors…can be grouped, counted and their 
influence analysed’ (Johnston 2009: 6), and moves towards the view of culture as an 
	 80	
institutional schema that shapes social interactions in ways that are symbolic as well 
as material (Polletta 2004). 
Because this thesis adheres to some of the stated methodological tenets of 
political science research, it is important to outline the basis on which the ‘case’ of 
Libya has been selected, amongst other instances of Middle East authoritarianism and 
contestation. Firstly, the case of Libya has been selected theoretically (LeCompte and 
Schensul 1999: 158), partly based on the fact that it can – in some respects - be 
termed a classic ‘case’ of a repressive authoritarian regime, which underwent an 
instance of rapid and open political contestation in 2011. The considerable variety of 
authoritarian regime types in the Middle East, and variations in their distribution of 
power, has admittedly rendered it difficult to supply a general definition of this 
category or to deductively apply typological classifications (Stacher 2012; 
Hinnebusch 2014). Indeed, Brynen et al (2012: 2) have argued that ‘we are far from 
convinced that there was or is a single Arab authoritarianism; rather, there is an array 
of political settings with histories, structural conditions, and dynamics that share both 
similar and strikingly dissimilar characteristics’.  
Nevertheless, there are recurrent traits that are said to underpin authoritarian 
regimes. Libya has been classified as one of eight Arab republics – the others being 
Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Yemen, Syria and Tunisia, and Sudan – all of which shared 
certain commonalities: a similarly structured coercive apparatus, centralized 
leadership, and a system of economic management underpinned by cronyism and the 
distribution of benefits to networks of support (Sasoon 2016). The coexistence of 
monopolised, personal rule with the provision of material benefits to loyal clients has 
been described as ‘neo-patrimonialism’: a central concept in the analysis of 
authoritarianism. Neopatrimonial regimes have been defined as: 
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hybrid political systems in which the customs and patterns of patrimonialisfm 
co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions. As with classic 
patrimonialism, the right to rule in neopatrimonial regimes is ascribed to a 
person rather than to an office…The chief executive undermine the 
effectiveness of the nominally modern state administration by using it for 
systematic patronage and clientelist practices in order to maintain political 
order. Moreover, parallel and unofficial structures may well hold more power 
and authority than the formal administration (Bratton and van de Walle 1997: 
62).  
 
To extend this definition, ‘neopatrimonial regimes are “neo” because they do not rely 
on traditional forms of legitimation or on hereditary success’ (Snyder 1992: 396). In 
the context of case study research, it is important not to equate authoritarian rule in 
general with neo-patrimonialism, or to suggest that a legal-rational bureaucracy 
cannot exist within an authoritarian regime (Erdmann 2013). The concept does, 
however, retain considerable applicability when studying authoritarianism in the Arab 
world. Studies of authoritarian regime maintenance in the region have demonstrated 
the way in which authoritarian regimes, from the 1950s onwards, widened elite 
contestation (co-optation) in order to narrow mass inclusion (Owen 2004; 
Schlumberger 2007; Stacher 2012; Hinnesbusch 2014; Sassoon 2016). Patron-client 
relations were systematically deployed in order to mobilise and incorporate 
individuals into state organisations (Stacher 2012: 40), such that, in the Arab 
uprisings, ‘all the republics were neo-patrimonial’, albeit to different extents 
(Hinnebusch 2014). Neo-patrimonialism has even been described as a pervasive 
social phenomenon that can be used to account for the lack of an active civil society 
in the region (Barakat 1993).  
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In accordance with this definition, Libya can be described as a ‘typical case’ of 
neopatrimonial authoritarianism: one that exemplifies ‘a typical set of values, given 
some general understanding of a phenomenon’ (Gerring 2007: 91). Libya, as a single 
resource-based economy with a large public sector, is one of the least-diversified 
economies in the world (St. John 2013: 93). Its significant oil rents have historically 
been used by the country’s elites in order to attract regime support and to offset 
political and economic grievances with material incentives, as evidenced in the 
spending patterns of the Qadhafi regime, which largely extended the distributive 
mechanisms originated by the monarchy (St. John 2008: 66). The Qadhafi regime also 
created and maintained other patronage networks, promoting its clients – including 
local tribes and families - to the inner circles of the government, bureaucracy, security 
and armed forces, even at the expense of national and institutional loyalty (Achcar 
2013: 167). For instance, the security sector was largely governed by the logic of 
patrimonialism and was not subject to civilian control (Vandewalle 2008: 235), with 
officers perpetually rotated in order to avoid the bond between officer and soldier 
becoming too strong (Michaels 2014). The Qadhadhfa, Qadhafi’s home tribe located 
in the region of Sirte, and other tribes perceived to be supportive of the regime, 
received a large share of the country’s resources and investments, which were 
shielded from public scrutiny (Mekouar 2016: 55). 
However, although Libya can be termed a ‘typical case’ of authoritarian 
governance among other Arab republics, sharing in their neopatrimonial 
characteristics, it also presents as somewhat of a ‘deviant case’. Deviant cases are 
those that are of ‘surprising value and are in turn investigated for their theoretical 
anomalies’ (Gerring 2007: 107). It has been noted that, in its system of governance, 
Libya possessed ‘fundamental differences from other authoritarian regimes’, 
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including the Arab republics, stemming from their divergent historical patterns of 
political development (Sassoon 2016: 70). At the heart of this divergence is what Dirk 
Vandewalle (1998; 2006; 2008; 2012a; 2012b) has described as the pursuit of a 
deliberate policy of ‘statelessness’ in Libya, throughout the twentieth-century but 
particularly following the seizure of power by Qadhafi in 1969. Partly due to the brief 
and oppressive nature of Libya’s experience with colonialism, and partly due to the 
proliferation of tribal support structures, Qadhafi was ‘liberated from conventional 
notions of the state’ (Davis 1987: 58). States are normally defined through their 
organisational capacity to make strategic choices, adopt particular solutions to 
problems, and make effective interventions (Friedland and Alford 1991: 242). 
However, Qadhafi’s Jamahiriya did not set out to do any of those things. 
Conventional questions at the heart of modern political systems, such as the gathering 
of revenues, the need to develop institutional capabilities, and the necessity of 
political compromise, were not accorded any importance by Qadhafi (Vandewalle 
2012b: 190). 
Moreover, the Qadhafi regime was particularly repressive in its systematic 
destruction of civil society, and in its dismantlement of independent unions, civic 
organisations and any associations with political overtones. Authoritarian regimes in 
Tunisia and Egypt ‘possessed strong social institutions, such as trade unions, national 
conscription army, civil society, ulama and urban intelligentsias’, who could 
articulate some form of dissent (Pack 2013b: 5), while in the Maghreb, ‘show 
democracies’ in countries such as Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco all witnessed 
alliances between the government and civil actors, albeit at the expense of freedom 
(Garon 2003: 3). Throughout the Arab autocracies, it was common to witness 
multidimensional restructurings of power between political opponents and the state 
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(Lust-Okar 2005), or what Albrecht (2010: 18) has defined as ‘competitive 
interactions with the incumbents of a political regime based on a minimum degree of 
mutual acceptance’. In contrast, such power relations and alliances were not tolerated 
in Libya, which did not – unlike other neo-patrimonial regimes – possess even a 
written constitution. As argued by George Joffé (2006: 117) the Libyan political 
vision denied any civil activism outside that sanctioned by the Qadhafi regime, and it 
never adopted the stance of being a ‘liberalized autocracy’ that both tolerated and 
controlled civil society initiatives. Qadhafi’s condemnation of political parties as 
dictatorial instruments paved the way for a committee-congress system of government 
that purportedly facilitated direct democracy, and was doctrinally based on the 
premise of ‘mass rule’ (Khalil 2014: 95). In practice, it enabled Qadhafi to govern 
unofficially as leader and guide of the revolution (St. John 1987: 136).  
The Qadhafi regime’s attempt to create a new species of administrative and 
political structure has led Roger Owen (2004: 55) to argue that, by the early 1980s, 
‘the structure of the Libyan state showed considerable differences from that to be 
found anywhere else in the Middle East,’ at odds with both single party regimes and 
those under monarchical rule. It also ‘rendered meaningful comparison with the rest 
of the Maghreb states increasingly difficult’ (Willis 2012: 5). 
Subsequently, Libya continued to differ from other Arab countries in its 
approach towards state-managed political and economic liberalisation. From the late 
1980s, and again in the aftermath of the September 2011 terrorist attacks, countries 
such as Egypt and Tunisia underwent a process of ‘opening up’, instigating a process 
of infitah (limited market-based reforms) and toying with the ideals of free markets 
and democratisation (Brynen et al 2012: 5). In the decade prior to the Arab uprisings, 
Libya partially moved away from isolationism, witnessing an increase in private 
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sector activity and attempting to undertake institutional reforms. In 2003, Qadhafi’s 
son Saif al-Islam emerged as a key interlocutor, establishing the National Economic 
Development Board (NEDB) which was tasked with drawing up the country’s market 
liberalisation reforms (Bartu 2015: 36). Media liberalisation reforms led by Saif al-
Islam included the establishment of the newspapers Ouya and Quryna in 2007, which 
permitted some degree of criticism to be directed at government corruption (Dizard et 
al 2011: 353).  
However, the process of liberalisation, most notably including the attempt to 
draft a constitution, was repeatedly met with firm resistance from regime hardliners. 
The technocrat prime minister Shukri Ghanem, a proponent of liberalisation and 
privatisation, was removed in 2006 (Vandewalle 2012b: 201), and in November 2010, 
then prime minister al-Baghdadi al-Mahmoudi shut down all of Saif’s reform-oriented 
media outlets, followed by the arrest of 22 journalists affiliated with them (Mezran 
and Knect 2015: 83). Thus, there was some economic reform, but no substantive 
attempt at any political reform, even cosmetic (St. John 2008). Ultimately, it has been 
argued, any practical move towards representative democracy or introduction of a 
market economy would have undermined Qadhafi’s political power base and entire 
framework of governance, which rested on highly developed patronage networks (St 
John 2014: 135).  
Libya’s neopatrimonial system thus resembles other authoritarian regimes, 
while its distinctive political and historical trajectory sets its mode of governance 
apart from the other republics that experienced regime-challenging protests during the 
Arab uprisings. And yet, I do not believe that we should simply classify Libya as an 
anomalous ‘sultanistic’ regime, in contrast with other Arab autocracies (Stepan and 
Linz 2013). Sultanism has been situated as an extreme variant of neopatrimonialism: 
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‘autocracies whose guidance rests on the whims of a supreme leader…power, 
corruption and plunder are concentrated in a small circle dependent on the leader’s 
beneficence’ (Johnston 2015: 621). However, this definition generates a tendency to 
completely neglect institutions altogether and to focus simply on the near-complete 
personal discretion of leaders and their ideologies (Chehabi and Linz 1998). Instead, I 
argue that the Jamahiriya, as with other authoritarian regimes, can still be analysed as 
an institution in its management of material and symbolic sources of power, even if its 
political system of governance operated in a distinctive way.   
The analysis of Libya will focus on the periods both prior to and during the 
Libyan uprising. In the following chapter, the thesis will present an analysis of the 
Qadhafi regime’s practices of domination, and the way in which they shaped political 
agency in the Jamahiriya. This is modelled on multi-institutional politics theory, 
which indicates the importance of first delineating the ‘institutional logic’ within a 
particular configuration of power, before exploring the way in which its meanings are 
engaged with, contested and transformed during moments of open contestation. 
Chapter 5 does not set out to offer a historical account of Libyan politics under 
Qadhafi, of which there are many such valuable studies already (El-Fathaly and 
Palmer 1980; Anderson 1986; Davis 1987; St. John 1987; El-Kikhia 1998; 
Vandewalle 1998, 2006; Wright 2010; Pargeter 2012), but to proceed thematically, 
delineating the Jamahiriya’s material and symbolic practices of power, in accordance 
with the theoretical framework, while comparing these practices with other Arab 
autocracies, in line with the intended contribution to the literature on Middle East 
politics.  
In Chapters 6 and 7, the timeframe for the analysis of the 2011 Libyan uprising 
is principally from the onset of online mobilisation for protests in January 2011, to the 
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takeover of Tripoli by opposition forces on 21 August. This circumscription is to 
some extent synthetic: it is difficult to analyse the Libyan uprising as a ‘spatially 
delimited phenomenon’ (Gerring 2007: 9). For instance, the fighting between pro and 
anti-Qadhafi forces continued in towns such as Bani Walid, long after the proclaimed 
‘liberation’ date. However, this period of time nevertheless encapsulates the most 
significant juncture in the Libyan uprising, during which revolutionary ‘framing’ 
practices – articulations of the objectives, motivations, and symbols of the revolution 
– were most prevalent and novel. In line with the theoretical framework, if the 
moment of ‘open insubordination represents a dramatic contradiction of the smooth 
surface of euphemized power’ (Scott 1990: 56), this timeframe of the 17 February 
uprising constitutes such a radical moment of public contestation.  
 
4.2 Methodological Approach 	
 
The epistemological perspective adopted in this thesis is a constructivist one, in that it 
adopts two commitments that have been described as central to the constructivist 
mode: the view that ‘agency matters in social life’, and the conviction that ‘the 
notions that actors have about their actions matter’ (Kratochwil 2008: 86). This 
centralisation of agency and of political subjectivities undergirds the theoretical 
framework outlined in Chapter 3. In accordance with this perspective, the overarching 
methodological approach I deploy is an interpretivist one. Interpretivist approaches, as 
outlined by Clifford Geertz (1973: 3-4) seek not to arrive at laws but to search for 
meanings in their study of ‘culture’, or semiotics. They ‘start with the insight that to 
understand actions, practices and institutions, we need to grasp the relevant meanings, 
beliefs and preferences of people involved’ (Bevir and Rhodes 2004: 130). The 
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interpretive approach involves a process of ‘sorting out’ established symbols and 
structures of signification, while connecting the description of symbols to specific 
events and occasions that articulate social relationships and hierarchies.   
As conceptualised by Geertz (1973: 30) the interpretive method is, by nature, a 
disorderly process, in which objectivity cannot be attained. However, he nevertheless 
urges practitioners not to descend into ‘intuitionism and alchemy’ or to let their 
sentiments run loose. This caution is reiterated by John Gerring (2007: 7), who 
suggests that case study ‘interpretation’ is all too often comprised of quasi-mystical, 
imaginative qualities. The following chapters, which seek to investigate both the 
strategic and semiotic components of meaning making practices, and to do so with 
reference to the Jamahiriya’s institutional logic, attempt to avoid Gerring’s impasse in 
two ways. Firstly, the interpretivist methodology is situated alongside a deductive 
analytical approach that deploys the tools of ‘framing theory’ in Chapter 5. Social 
movement documents were deductively coded in accordance with Snow and 
Benford’s theoretical framework, in order to describe the way in which Libyan 
activists generated strategic, collective understandings. Framing thus served as the 
starting point for interpreting meaning making practices in accordance with the 
theoretical principle of ‘frame resonance’, and in relation to the Jamahiriya’s 
institutional logic.  
Secondly, the constructivist perspective indicates that terms and concepts can 
only be understood ‘through the rules by which they are constituted…it is not 
observations but shared understandings that constitute the relevant facts’ (Kratochwil 
2008: 93). Chapter 7 explores the symbolic, representational practices of Libyan 
actors during the uprising, but the act of semiotic contestation and affirmation within 
revolutionary cultural productions is interpreted against the backdrop of the shared 
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understandings, or ‘cultural schemas’ (Sewell 1992) communicated and imbedded 
into social life by the Jamahiriya. As argued by Wedeen (1999) analysis of 
transgressive practices requires a corresponding identification of the logic of a 
particular system of domination. Thus, the process of interpretation is not illusive but 
dialogic, involving a mediation of the symbiotic relationship between oppressive 
authoritarian and subversive revolutionary systems of meaning. There remains, 
nevertheless, an element of subjectivity in the description, comparison and appraisal 
of symbolic practices.  
 
4.3 Data Gathering Methods 	
 
The methods used in this research were all of a qualitative nature, and therefore suited 
to generating rich, in-depth information about the way in which political actors 
perceive and interact with the world around them (Miles and Huberman 1994; Fraser 
1995; Adcock and Collier 2001; Auerbach and Silverstein 2003; Maxwell 2012; 
Lindekilde 2014; Yin 2016). Qualitative methods have been seen to add a missing 
‘subjective’ component to conventional empirical-analytic research, by enabling 
researchers to document actors’ perspectives, motives and self-understandings 
(Auerbach and Silverstein 2003: 22). As indicated in Chapter 3, the theoretical 
framework centralises meaning making practices. In turn, and if meaning is the 
condition in which a person’s life, or significant events in it, ‘make sense’ (Wuthnow 
1987: 35), then it has been argued that ‘qualitative research is the study of meaning, 
and this requires access to the subjective interpretations people attach to their 
objective circumstances’ (Packer 2010: 52 – author’s emphasis). The use of 
qualitative research methods is also appropriate for the interpretivist orientation of 
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this thesis, in which ‘descriptive validity’ or ‘authenticity’ (Maxwell 2012) is 
considered to be the determinant parameter for evaluating the strength of the 
inferences made, over generalisability.  
 The research methods deployed in this thesis can be categorised into three main 
types: semi-structured, in-depth interviews with Libyan activists and political figures; 
‘social movement material’ from the 17 February uprising, spanning media 
statements, movement communiqués, slogans and cultural productions such as music 
and graffiti; and archival material on the Qadhafi regime, including speeches, 
documents on the institutional-administrative structure of the Jamahiriya, 
iconographic displays such as regime-sanctioned music, and tolerated comedic 
television programmes. Taken together, these forms of material enabled the analysis 
of what has been termed ‘the dynamic relationship between texts and their wider 
social, cultural, and political context’ (Lindekilde 2014: 208). The combination of 
strategic messaging materials (such as official statements by political actors) and 
symbolically rich texts (such as cultural productions) was designed to address a two-
pronged theoretical framework that focuses on the semiotic and strategic components 
of rhetorical contestation.  
 
Interviews 
 
Semi-structured interviews served as a central research method for this project, and 
contributed substantially to unpacking the representational and meaning making 
practices of Libyan activists, and indeed, their rationalisation of these activities. 
Unlike strictly systematic modes of questioning, this method was particularly valuable 
for generating unanticipated insights and perspectives (Peabody et al 1990), and for 
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exploring the values and understandings through which participants perceive and 
structure their actions (Morris 1991). I conducted 31 interviews with Libyan activists 
and political figures who were involved– in various dimensions – in the mobilisation 
effort against the Qadhafi regime. This group comprised a diversity of actors: 
opposition figures involved in or connected to Libya’s National Transitional Council 
(NTC); diaspora activists based in the UK, the USA and Canada; and youth protesters 
who were based in different Libyan cities (Benghazi, Tripoli and Zawiya). Some of 
the activists I interviewed traversed these categories, travelling from the diaspora to 
Libya in order to be more directly involved in the revolutionary effort. 
As noted by Mario Small (2009: 28), in-depth interviews should not be assessed 
by the standards of classical statistics, in which bias and representativeness are key 
metrics of appraisal, but be guided by the principle of ‘saturation rather than 
representation’. Through the ‘selection’ of interviewees (Stake 1995: 56), I focused 
on gauging the perspectives of individuals who played a central role in ‘framing’ the 
Libyan uprising to constituents and bystanders by communicating its grievances and 
objectives. In line with the agency-centred perspective of the research, I was 
particularly focused on interviewing actors whose voices and experiences had 
received little exposure in the media coverage of the uprising. This is not a 
contradictory endeavour: many of the activists I interviewed, despite playing a 
prominent role in ‘framing’ the uprising, had deliberately shielded their personal 
identities from public view in an effort, at the time, to be representative of ‘all 
Libyans’. Other Libyan activists have narrated their revolutionary experiences in the 
form of memoirs, interviews and stories, many of which were published in opposition 
newspapers during this uprising, and this material was used as a secondary 
consolidating source. 
	 92	
I contacted activists principally through targeted outreach, ‘purposively’ 
selecting those who would yield relevant but diverse insights for the study (Yin 2016: 
93). On occasion, this was followed by snowballing from the initial pool of 
interviewees, speaking to some activists as an offshoot of existent interviews. The 
initial subset of activists that I interviewed were already pre-identified as being 
prominent voices in the revolutionary discursive space - for instance, the founders of 
the Libyan Youth Movement, and members of the Libyan political opposition under 
Qadhafi – and I reached out to them using social media outlets and/or email 
communication. After these interviews, some of them were able to refer me to other 
activists whom they thought would shed complementary or even different 
perspectives on the Libyan uprising (for instance, by being located in another city 
during the events). This approach was particularly fruitful: in particular, the referrals 
on the basis of ‘difference’ insured that I spoke to a wide demographic of activists, 
often with different political affiliations, modes of activism and interpretations of 
what transpired in 2011.  
The escalation of instability and outbreak of violence in Libya, which began in 
August 2014, led the UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO) to deem travel to 
Libya unsafe, including the Western region, in which I was initially planning to 
conduct interviews. This presented an initial barrier to the generation of empirical 
material, but one that I attempted to offset: the majority of the interviews were held 
across various UK cities, with activists who were either located in the country or 
visiting temporarily from Libya; others I conducted in Tunisia, which I travelled to in 
March and April 2015, and the remainder over Skype or telephone. The interviews 
themselves constituted substantial discussions, with most around two hours long, and 
held in either English or Arabic, depending on the interviewee’s preferred language. 
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There was a common structure to the line of questioning. Interviews unpacked the 
nature of the individual’s political activism in relation to Libya, prior to and during 
the uprising, and engaged with the way in which their perceptions of that activity 
emerged and shifted over time. Questions were also adapted based on the insights 
generated during the course of the interview, and in accordance with my own, pre-
researched understanding of their role during the uprising. 
While conducting and analysing the interviews, I was attuned to the fact that 
participants were relaying recollections of past events, and that they were not 
speaking presently about their activism, as is customarily the case in social movement 
framing research (Johnston 2002; Valocchi 2005a; Lindekilde 2014). Accounts of 
past activism are undoubtedly shaped by experiences of current events (Irwin-Zarecka 
1994; Olick and Robbins 1998), and – as noted in the Introduction – the current 
context of political instability in Libya generated a tone of revolutionary 
disillusionment that saturated the content of some interviews. However, I do not 
believe it possible or desirable, from a constructivist perspective, to eliminate this 
subjective dimension and to separate activists’ subjective reconstructions of their 
motivations, from their ‘actual’ motivations, however contemporaneous the research. 
As argued by Robert Miller and John Brewer (2003: 191), ‘the meanings that people 
ascribe to their actions may be incomplete, not taking account of deeper motivations, 
inhibitions or humankind’s capacity for self-deception’. In addition, although the 
current political context in Libya did shape the direction of the interviews, this was 
consciously incorporated into the questions in an attempt to understand the way in 
which the aftereffects of activism shape activists’ perceptions of their political 
agency. Because interviews were triangulated with social movement material from 
2011, I was also able to situate activists’ retrospective interpretations of their motives 
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with the understandings that were communicated during the revolutionary period 
itself.  
 
Social Movement Materials  
 
In order to understand the emergence of contentious, representational activity during 
the Libyan uprising, this thesis relies substantively on what have been termed ‘social 
movement materials’: a data corpus that includes ‘anything that is written, can be 
translated into texts, or whose symbolic meaning can be analysed’ (Lindekilde 2014: 
209). This includes qualitative material both produced by movement activists or about 
movement activists, for instance, by the revolutionary media outlets that sprang up 
during the 2011 Libyan uprising. Due to digitalisation these materials are now 
available on a much greater scale. Reinoud Leenders (2013: 283) has argued that 
digitalised storytelling tells powerful, effective and accessible stories of revolution: 
these stories reflect people’s perceptions, and ‘give us important hints of how people 
perceive themselves, their conditions, their goals, their tactics, and their opponents’. 
The spread of social media platforms and the availability of these texts has shifted the 
challenge from being one of obtaining social movement materials, to one of filtering 
and selecting them.  
Online material was collated into different categories of text. One category 
comprised statements publicised by both political elites (members of the Libyan 
NTC) and by diaspora and civil society activists: these took the form of written 
statements, audio and video interviews and newspaper op-eds. A second category of 
materials comprised the Arabic media messaging of the Libyan uprising. I collated 
and manually coded the weekly and fortnightly editions of two revolutionary 
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newspapers that were published between May and August 2011: Al-Manarah, which 
was printed and distributed across all opposition-controlled territories in Libya from 
June 2011, and Mayadeen, which was distributed in Benghazi from May 2011. I also 
substantiated this written material with episodes of political programmes that were 
aired on Libya Al-Ahrar, the main opposition television channel in 2011, and 
subsequently uploaded onto the video hosting website, YouTube. The third class of 
materials comprised the cultural productions of the uprising. I transcribed and 
analysed over 70 revolutionary songs that were produced from January to August 
2011, as well as a collection of revolutionary graffiti and artwork, slogans and chants. 
This latter collection, alongside interviews, formed the central empirical basis for 
Chapter 7, in which I describe the process of symbolic contestation during the 
uprising.   
Social movement materials, which encompassed both instrumental and 
expressive texts, enabled a varied appraisal of the manner and extent to which 
representational practices transformed the Qadhafi regime’s construction of social 
reality. Such material was gathered from a diversity of sources, including an archived 
version of the official NTC opposition website, Western news outlets, independent 
Libyan opposition websites, social media platforms and dedicated online portals such 
as the Libyan Uprising Archive. The scope of this material is vast and the analysis of 
it in its entirety was far beyond the remit of this study. In some instances, as in the 
coding of the two revolutionary newspapers, I self-imposed a limit based on 
theoretical selection: both newspapers have distinctive ideological leanings, and were 
disseminated in different areas of Libya. In other instances, as with cultural 
productions and activist statements, I continued to collate and analyse the material 
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until a saturation point was reached, and the analysis began to yield recurrent insights 
and understandings.  
 
Qadhafi-era Materials  
 
Another branch of empirical material that I analysed was generated prior to the 
Libyan uprising, and was targeted at understanding the Jamahiriya as a material and 
symbolic ‘institution’. This included speeches by Qadhafi and his son Saif al-Islam, 
regime iconography (particularly music) and all available, online episodes of the 
state-sanctioned television programme ‘They Said It’ (Galooha), which was aired 
intermittently from 1998 to 2005 during the month of Ramadan, and which trod a fine 
line between regime subversion and affirmation. A limited number of speeches made 
by Qadhafi were available to view online; others were extensively quoted in a book 
published by Mohammed Magariaf, the founder of the main opposition group in exile, 
which I managed to obtain. In addition, I also analysed satirical materials that were 
developed by Libyan opposition members in exile, and that were uploaded onto 
websites such as Libya Al-Mostakbal. These materials were bolstered substantively 
by the interviews, many of which included subjective reflections on life under the 
Jamahiriya, and were supported by studies that have described the operation of 
Qadhafi’s political system (Vandewalle 2006; Pargeter 2012; Wright 2012), and 
dynamics of citizen participation and ‘political culture’ in Libya (Al-Werfalli 2011). 
Lastly, in addition to these texts, Chapter 5 also examines a series of documents 
produced for the Libyan government by Adam Smith International, one of the UK’s 
largest foreign aid contractors, in 2007. Titled ‘Libyan Public Sector Administration 
Development’, this project scrutinised Libyan government organisations and 
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institutions, civil service executive structures and the entire process of policymaking 
in Libya, principally in order to make multiple recommendations for institutional 
reform. This project provided a valuable insight into the mechanisms through which 
the ‘formal’ Libyan political system, and the Libyan public sector as a whole, 
operated –or indeed, failed to operate - in practice. Above all, the chapter interpreted 
the findings of this avowedly apolitical report, not simply as evidence of civil service 
failings, but as part of the Jamahiriya’s broader institutional dynamics, and the way in 
which it embedded popular complicity within its material practices of domination.  
 
4.4 Ethics and Research Validity 	
 
In the previous section, I outlined some of the ethical challenges pertaining to safety - 
which posed a barrier to conducting fieldwork in Libya - and the way in which I 
attempted to mitigate these difficulties. Another ethical issue was encountered in the 
course of seeking interviewees for my research. My initial objective was to speak to 
youth in the UK who had travelled in the summer of 2011 to fight alongside Libyan 
opposition forces, particularly in the Western region and in the Eastern Nafusa 
mountains. I was advised that such an endeavour posed a risk to the youth involved, 
many of whom were wary of speaking about their experiences, or refused outright to 
do so, under the risk of being flagged up as extremists. I decided to close this 
particular line of investigation, and to focus instead on activists based originally in 
Libya, or on diaspora youth who had travelled to facilitate revolutionary media 
operations. 
In a similar vein, I chose to anonymise the identities of those who did 
participate in my research, in order to guarantee their safety. Anonymity in research 
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has been described as one form of ‘confidentiality’: that of keeping participants’ 
identities secret to all persons other than the primary researchers (Saunders et al: 
2015). It is often ‘taken-for-granted as an ethical necessity’, for instance by the 
Economic and Social Research’s Council’s (ESRC’s) Framework for Research Ethics 
(Moore 2012: 333). Protecting participants’ identities can safeguard them from 
persecution and retaliation for their beliefs and actions (Scott 2004: 244), particularly 
since we cannot reliably predict the future harm that comes from naming them (Wiles 
et al 2012: 47). In this thesis, I chose to undertake the most common form of 
anoymisation, which consists of disguising the personal identities of respondents by 
assigning them pseudonyms, and concealing other ‘identifying details’ such as the 
specifc nature of their organisational affiliation where it appears throughout the thesis. 
This was not a simple decision, balanced as it was against the need to respect 
paricipants’ wishes to ‘receive recognition’ and be credited for their voices (Grinyer 
2002; Giordano et al: 2007). However, I judged it to be a necessary concession, in 
light of the volatile political context in Libya, and due to the sharing of potentially 
sensitive information by some interviewees.     
Pertaining to the validity of my data, I encouraged issues relating to my own 
positionality as a Libyan woman, whom activists perceived to be vested in the 
collective experiences – and political consequences - of the Libyan uprising. It was 
particularly important for me to be aware of the way in which activists’ narration of 
their revolutionary experiences was attuned and modified according to the way in 
which they perceived my identity as a Libyan. It was not uncommon for interviewees 
to preface the interview by asking which region of Libya I came from, or to gauge my 
opinions on the current political conflict by enquiring about whether or not I 
supported the Islamist-leaning General National Congress or secularist-leaning House 
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of Representatives. I was often asked what I thought of the revolution and its 
transitional trajectory, and to assign ‘blame’ for the unfolding conflict.  
 It is difficult to determine the extent to which such queries (and my answers) 
influenced the veracity and depth of the responses I was given. As outlined in the 
Introduction, I sought to adopt a reflexive research practice during the data gathering 
process, in recognition of the principle that researcher objectivity and ‘neutrality’ is 
an unattainable pursuit (Shacklock and Smyth 1998). It is certainly the case that 
having shared experiences and identities with certain interviewees encouraged them to 
open up about ‘our revolution’ and their assessment of it, thereby strengthening my 
empirical material on the emergence of a collective revolutionary aesthetic. In certain 
contexts, I was conscious of the need to be politically open-minded and to present 
myself as being so, but to avoid expostulating at length about my own political views; 
to attempt to maintain the dialogic spirit of the interviews but without transforming 
them into a two-way polemic. To some extent, the relevance of my revolutionary 
positionality to those I interviewed, and to the answers they were willing to supply, 
indicates the way in which the re-narration of the Libyan uprising has become a 
particularly contentious process: a point I elaborate upon in the Conclusion.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to outline the underlying methodology of research for this 
thesis. It began my clarifying the justification for the selection of Libya as a ‘case 
study’ of authoritarianism, describing the way in which it coheres with the 
neopatrimonial underpinnings of authoritarian regimes, while diverging in its system 
of political governance. In order to understand Qadhafi’s regime as a case of 
	 100	
authoritarianism, and of emergent political agency, this thesis deploys and triangulates 
a range of empirical resources, from interviews with activists to ‘social movement 
materials’ and Qadhafi-era texts. In parallel, these enabled the analysis of the Qadhafi 
regime’s logic of practice, and of the strategic and semiotic components of 
contentious, representational activity. In adopting a primarily interpretivist analytical 
approach to such materials, the chapter has indicated that the thesis does not align 
itself with positivist methodologies or with the social scientific method of research, 
which strives for generalisability and well-defined casual outcomes, but with a 
constructivist methodology that seek internal validity and in-depth case 
understanding.  
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5 
The Libyan Jamahiriya as Institution 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
 
This chapter will describe the exercise of power in Qadhafi’s Jamahiriya (‘State of 
the Masses’) prior to the Libyan uprising of 2011. It will do so by analysing the 
Jamahiriya as an institution, comprised of both material technologies of control and a 
system of symbolic organisation. This orientation is grounded in the multi-
institutional politics framework, which has conceptualised the material-symbolic 
underpinning of power and underscored the resultant ‘institutional logic’ that this 
creates (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008). If an institutional logic is taken to signify the 
organising principles of a particular social world (Jackall 1988: 112), then the 
Jamahiriya’s institutional logic mandated the performance of contradiction in the 
procurement of material subsistence. Through this logic, the Jamahiriya routinised the 
disempowerment of the Libyan populace, shaped publically political identities, and 
generated political compliance. However, the internal incongruities of this logic 
enabled Libyans to manoeuvre within its strictures and to act ‘as if’ (Wedeen 1999) in 
regards to its symbolic practices. 
This chapter is split into three central sections. The first two delineate the 
Jamahiriya’s material practices, consisting of coercive mechanisms and a system of 
political governance. Coercive practices in the Jamahiriya resembled those deployed 
in other Arab authoritarian regimes, and operated principally through a combination 
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of repression, co-optation and the symbolic perpetuation of fear. Conversely, the 
system of political governance was distinctive to the Jamahiriya. It was not based on 
a set of ‘nominally democratic’ (Gandhi 2006) or ‘sultanistic’ (Chehabi and Linz 
1998) principles, but constituted ‘the rules of the game’ within which Libyan society 
operated (Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 112). The system of governance created 
organisational and institutional disorder, and deployed disorder as a mechanism of 
material distribution within Libya. Through this system, Qadhafi maintained political 
control while demobilising and eroding the representational capacity of the Libyan 
populace.   
The final section indicates the way in which these material practices were 
buttressed by a symbolic order that ‘cluttered’ public space (Wedeen 1999: 157), and 
that ordered reality by mandating that citizens reaffirm its symbols. The chapter goes 
on to argue that, despite the dominance of this symbolic order, it did not necessarily 
generate unwavering ‘belief in the institution’ (Friedland and Alford 1991: 250). 
Instead, people signalled their agency by exploiting the instabilities inherent within 
this system of practice, performing its logic while recognising its disingenuousness. 
Taken as a whole, this chapter aims to illustrate the material and symbolic practices 
underpinning the Jamahiriya’s delimitation of political agency prior to the 2011 
uprising.  
 
5.2 Material Control in the Jamahiriya: Coercion and Co-optation    
 
 
 
On 2 March 1977, in the Libyan city of Sabha, Qadhafi renamed Libya ‘The Great 
Socialist People’s Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’ (Al-Jamahirriya al-arabiyya al-Libiyya 
al-sha’abiyya al-ishtirakiyya al-uthma). This pronouncement was the culmination of 
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almost a decade of political experimentation by the Libyan leader, that saw him 
establish and then discard the Egyptian single-party model, the Arab Socialist Union 
(1971-1973), for being inadequate as an instrument of mass, popular mobilisation 
(Vandewalle 2006: 105). The Jamahiriya, which was to last almost unchanged until 
the end of Qadhafi’s rule, ushered in a system of governance that purportedly vested 
all political authority in the Libyan people, and was underpinned by two acts: 
Qadhafi’s launch of a ‘Cultural Revolution’ in the city of Zuwara in 1973, and the 
publication of Qadhafi’s ideological treatise The Green Book in 1975 (El-Kikhia 
1997: 47). The Green Book articulated a ‘Third Universal Theory’: a conception of 
individual, national and pan-Arab liberation that comprised an alternative to both 
communism and capitalism (St. John 1987: 27). The Cultural Revolution, whose 
primary objective was mass mobilisation and mass participation, served as a practical 
embodiment of this popular authority.   
Arab autocracies have customarily paid lip service to democratic values, despite 
deploying political pluralism as a survival strategy in practice (Posusney and Angrist 
2005). In contrast, Qadhafi eschewed democracy, arguing that representation involves 
the surrender of natural personal sovereignty, and claiming that party systems and 
parliaments are ‘obsolete structures’ that function as instruments of the rich (al-
Qadhafi 1980: 11). In place of democracy, the Jamahiriya spawned a highly 
convoluted system of popular representation, embodied in its unicameral legislature, 
the General People’s Congress, and an extensive cluster of local decision-making 
bodies, the Basic Popular Congresses. This system of formal power has been 
characterised as politically ineffectual, paling in comparison to informal structures of 
authority (Vandewalle 2006: 119) and eclipsed by extensive mechanisms of coercion 
and repression (Sassoon 2016: 71). Alison Pargeter (2012: 105) argues that within a 
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year of the establishment of the Jamahiriya, ‘Qadhafi had effectively rendered its 
formal political institutions impotent, turning them into little more than a façade’, and 
controlling them with instruments of repression.  
Such accounts partially capture the reality of the Jamahiriya’s material 
authority. The literature on Arab autocracies has emphasised the significance of 
coercion to the origins and longevity of authoritarian regimes (Bellin 2005; 
Schlumberger 2007; Svolik 2012; Sasoon 2016). This was similarly the case in the 
Jamahiriya, which was, according to the Libyan dissident Fayez, ‘a regime that lived 
off security’ from its inception.3 Qadhafi rose to power through the military: deposing 
the monarchy in a bloodless coup d’état, he formed and was named commander-in-
chief of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), which was comprised of 12 
‘Free Officers’ from the Military Academy (El-Kikhia 1997: 39). The RCC was 
formally abolished with the instatement of the Jamahiriya, and Qadhafi swiftly 
underwent the power trajectory that has been described as the transition from ‘first 
among equals’ to ‘established dictatorship’ (Svolik 2012: 6). Nevertheless the military 
remained an important mechanism of control, with four of the original RCC members 
given prominent positions as head of the army, police and chief of staff (Vandewalle 
2006: 79). 
The military was a central instrument in the Qadhafi regime’s coercive 
apparatus, but there was an underlying tension in the way in which it was managed. 
Military colleagues occupied top positions in the political governance structure, in this 
respect resembling Egypt, where a large section of the political elite came from the 
military during the era of Gamal ‘Abd al-Nasser (Stacher 2012: 51). In particular, 
Abdel Salam Jalloud, the deputy chairman of the RCC, was to become one of the 
																																																								
3 Interview with Fayez, exiled anti-regime dissident, 27 January 2016. London.		
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most prominent figures in the Jamahiriya: a ‘roving economic ambassador’ for the 
Qadhafi regime (Vandewalle 2006: 105). However, a coup attempt led by two RCC 
members, stemming from a conflict over the country’s ideological direction, was 
thwarted in August 1975. Following this attempted takeover, the military became 
subject to tight monitoring (Vandewalle 1998: 83). Qadhafi began to engage in ‘coup-
proofing’: a tactic that was designed to avoid a situation in which ‘repressive forces 
metamorphosize from an obedient servant into a potential political rival’ (Svolik 
2012: 15). This was partly achieved by bestowing sensitive army positions to 
members of his Qadhadhfa tribe (Sassoon 2016: 84), and by selectively distributing 
resources and investments to other selected tribes, such as the Warfalla and Maghraha 
(Mekouar 2016: 55). This both fostered rivalries among different tribes and 
strengthened the regime’s security (Achcar 2013: 167).  
In addition to being facilitated by mechanisms of patronage, coup-proofing was 
also achieved through Qadhafi’s establishment of alternative security structures. 
Although the Jamahiriya originated in a military institution, its coercive authority was 
ultimately sustained through the creation of an overlapping web of intelligence and 
security services that reduced Qadhafi’s reliance on the army (Vandewalle 2016: 
147). In this respect, the Libyan Army began to resemble that of Iraq and Syria 
(Sassoon 2016) and arguably the ‘rentier militaries’ of the Gulf monarchies (Hertog 
2011) in which counterweight armies commonly functioned as a monitoring 
mechanism and a parallel support structure for the dictator. Within this expanding 
security sector, the ‘revolutionary committees’ soon served as the Jamahiriya’s 
central instrument of coercion (Wright 2012: 208). Established in 1976, and growing 
in prominence between 1979-1987, the revolutionary committees were an alternative 
to both the formal mechanisms of political governance, which Qadhafi quickly 
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realised might produce undesirable results, and the army, with its propensity towards 
revolt. In a speech given in 1977, Qadhafi described the revolutionary committees as 
the ‘human embodiment of the revolution’: an indispensable part of the Jamahiriya’s 
system of revolutionary emancipation and popular governance:  
 
Human freedom cannot be achieved except with revolution, because 
revolution is the final answer to the question of freedom, and the 
revolutionary committees are the instrument of this revolution. And this is 
the reason why revolutionary committees have been established. They are 
not traditional political structures that aim to monopolise power, but groups 
of preachers and missionaries who have embraced The Green Book, and its 
mission of popular sovereignty…4 
 
Comprised of individuals carefully selected by Qadhafi and reporting to him directly, 
the revolutionary committees were described by the regime a ‘suicide squads’, willing 
to make any sacrifice in order to defend the Revolution  (St. John 1987: 134). As with 
the army, those individuals were often chosen from the Qadhadhfa and interconnected 
tribes, with Qadhafi assigning his cousin and two brothers to security and intelligence 
(Sassoon 2016: 123). Thus, and although Qadhafi denied that the revolutionary 
committees were motivated by or accrued any material benefits, they were in fact 
managed through the deployment of co-optation, in common with other instruments 
of control in Arab autocracies. More specifically, where elevating political party 
members to senior positions is the principal mechanism of co-opting individuals (and 
the population at large) into the Arab authoritarian status quo (Stacher 2012; Svolik 
2012; Sassoon 2016), the revolutionary committees became the equivalent instrument 
in the Jamahiriya. They were effectively a mechanism of patronage, enabling Qadhafi 																																																								
4 Speech by Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, cited in Mohammed Magariaf, The Crimes of Libya’s 
Revolutionary Committees: Who is Responsible for Them? 27.	 
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to actively engineer and shape his support base by channelling oil revenues towards 
his allies (Cole and McQuinn 2015: 20).  
Other individuals were promoted to the revolutionary committees on the basis 
of demonstrable political loyalty to the revolution. Huda bin Amer, one of Qadhafi’s 
most conspicuous aides, attained notoriety during the 1984 hanging of student 
dissident Al-Sadeq Al-Shuwehdy in Benghazi, in which she stepped forward and 
grabbed onto his legs during the execution. The act earned her a rapid promotion to 
leader of the Revolutionary Committee in Benghazi, and the clandestine nicknames 
‘Huda the Executioner’ (Huda al-shannaga) and ‘The Immoral bin Amer’ (Dhalal bin 
Amer) in the city of Benghazi, where she was widely reviled.5  
Qadhafi characterised the revolutionary committees as a ‘popular instrument, 
emerging from within society itself, and internally regulating…they monitor the 
activities of all members of the revolution, instruct and direct them, and punish them 
if they deviate from the path of the revolution’.6 Thus, the coercive remit of the 
revolutionary committees was extensive, centred on the ‘enforcement of the 
Jamahiriya’s political and ideological goals’ through monitoring anti-regime activity, 
deploying repressive measures against dissenters and enemies of the Jamahiriya, and 
planting informants at every level of society (Sassoon 2016: 7). The revolutionary 
committees were accorded seemingly arbitrary powers. Immediately following the 
establishment of the Jamahiriya, the revolutionary committees were involved in 
purges against supporters of non-compliant political ideologies, such as Islamism and 
Marxism, infiltrating university campuses in an attempt to crack down on their 
																																																								
5	Ibzewu, Fathalla. “The City of Benghazi”. Libya Al-Mostakbal, 20 March 2009. Available at: 
https://goo.gl/Vy55kj				
6 Speech by Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, cited in Mohammed Magariaf, The Crimes of Libya’s 
Revolutionary Committees: Who is Responsible for Them? 27.	
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promulgation (Hilsum 2012: 70), and participating in the violent suppression of 
student uprisings (or ‘cleansing’ of universities in Benghazi and Tripoli) in the 1970s. 
The domestic influence of the revolutionary committees was bolstered by their 
capacity, in the 1980s, to undertake the physical liquidation (al-tasfiya al-jasadiya) of 
expatriate Libyan dissidents, whom Qadhafi referred to as ‘stray dogs’ and ‘enemies 
of the revolution’ (Vandewalle 2006: 122). In authoritarian regimes, exiles are 
frequently considered a fertile base for oppositional undertakings and tend to lead to 
the expansion of the regime’s repressive activities abroad (Chehabi and Linz 1998: 
25). In particular, the revolutionary committees targeted the National Front for the 
Salvation of Libya (NFSL), the most prolific opposition movement abroad (Stanik 
2003; El-Fathaly 2006; Tawil 2011). The Libyan Ambassador to the UK and the 
foreign intelligence chief, Moussa Koussa, was suspected to have sanctioned the 
revolutionary committees’ assassinations of several NFSL members in London in 
1980 (Pargeter 2012: 103-105). A spate of subsequent killings, including the murder 
of NFSL figure Ali Abuzeid in London in 1995, have gone un-investigated but are 
suspected to be the work of the revolutionary committees.7 Consequently, the 
identification and avoidance of revolutionary committees was considered to be a 
central challenge for Libyan dissidents living in the diaspora during the 1980s.8 
The coercive apparatus of the Jamahiriya was laced with symbolic undertones. 
In his speeches, Qadhafi categorically excluded and censured the identities of who 
questioned the revolutionary committees, asserting that ‘anyone who holds any 
resentment towards the revolutionary committees is not one of us, and is sick, and has 
deficiencies, and needs to review himself’.9 In the Jamahiriya, dignified personhood 																																																								
7 Interview with Dania, Benghazi-based journalist and campaigner, 27 August 2015. London.		
8 Interview with Mustafa, anti-regime dissident and human rights campaigner, 4 March 2015. London.		
9 Speech by Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, cited in Mohammed Magariaf, The Crimes of Libya’s 
Revolutionary Committees: Who is Responsible for Them? 32. 	
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and belonging to the ‘revolution’ were only ascribed to those who belonged to, or 
supported, the work of the revolutionary committees. The regime also deployed 
symbolism in order to magnify the impact of its repressive activities, The month of 
April came to involve and signify an annual bout of bloodshed against university 
students deemed to be involved in anti-regime activity, with public executions taking 
place in 1977, 1980, 1983 and 1984.10 To further publicise their impact, hangings 
were frequently aired on television during the month of Ramadan in the 1980s: a sign 
that the most spiritual and collective of moments were not beyond the reach of the 
regime’s terror.11 The use of ‘show trials’ as a public demonstration of the 
Jamahiriya’s coercive capacity resembles the public hangings of spies in Iraq, in 
which Saddam Hussein’s regime deployed radio and television ‘as potent instruments 
to bring these proceedings into nearly all Iraqi homes’ (Sassoon 2016: 138).  
The most infamous and far-reaching instance of regime repression inside Libya 
is the Abu Slim massacre on 29 June 1996, where, following a demonstration about 
prison conditions, the security authorities killed 1170 prisoners in the space of a few 
hours (Sassoon 2016: 134). In a country where families are large and diffuse, ‘such a 
massacre touches tens of thousands of people’, particularly in the East of Libya, from 
which most of the victims originated (Hilsum 2012: 4). The massacre’s symbolic 
import also extended beyond the act itself due its surreptitious nature: Qadhafi first 
publically admitted that it took place in a speech in April 2004 (Joffé 2016: 124), 
Colonel Abdullah al-Sanusi, head of the country’s security since 1992, was widely 
believed to have borne responsibility for the massacre (Kersten 2016: 189), but this 
was not verified or publically addressed, even in later attempts by Qadhafi’s son Saif 
																																																								
10 “So Not to Forget the Victims of Gaddafi in April”. Libya Tribune. 7 April 2017. Available at: 
https://goo.gl/XCfqx9		
11 Interview with Aisha, women’s rights activist, 6 April 2016. Skype.		
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al-Islam to open up investigations into the case. The massacre magnified the 
powerlessness of the Libyan populace in the face of the regime’s power. Until the 
regime admitted to its occurrence and released the names of those killed, families of 
Abu Slim prisoners would continue to visit the prison for many years, delivering food 
and other provisions to inmates without knowing if they were even alive.12  
Through their use of excessive, seemingly unbridled force, authoritarian 
security services create a ‘miasma of fear’ that in turn becomes a ‘powerful tool used 
by these organizations to bolster their authority’ (Sassoon 2016: 114). Throughout 
Qadhafi’s rule, the regime imprisoned, tortured and killed opposition writers and 
artists, and censored all dissenting intellectual thought (Diana 2014). As a result, 
Libyans speak of a crippling fear of Qadhafi’s security apparatus prior to the Libyan 
uprising, rendering people unwilling to broach any vaguely political topic in public. 
Housam, who grew up in Tripoli, describes this as an exaggerated perception that the 
regime was listening in to every single conversation: ‘I remember once chatting to a 
friend on the beach about something political, when he started to look right and left in 
a panic...I said to him, do you think the regime has a fish here with a spying device or 
something?!’13 The activist Fawzi noted that this fear was particularly associated with 
the physical strongholds of the Qadhafi regime: ‘When you drive by Bab-Al-Aziziya 
[Qadhafi’s compound] people wouldn’t even talk in their cars, because they believed 
that French companies had set up magical radar systems that could hear what you 
were saying inside your car...they thought every single phone call was tapped’.14  
The ability to engender and uphold a public perception of the ruler’s 
omnipotence has been described as a characteristic of ‘authoritarian cults’ such as the 
																																																								
12 Interview with Hussein, NTC representative, 7 November 2016. London.	13 Interview with Osama, reformist anti-regime demonstrator in Tripoli, 30 December 2015. Skype.		
14 Interview with Fawzi. 29 December 2015. Skype.		
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cult of Syria’s Hafiz Al-Asad (Wedeen 1999). Igor Cherstich (2014: 103) recounts 
conversations with Libyans in Tripoli in which they alleged that Qadhafi had dealings 
with dark powers, using sorcery to transcend the limits of the physical world and 
survive multiple assassination attempts. As argued by James Scott (1990: 49), ‘if 
subordinates believe their superior to be powerful, the impression will help him 
impose himself and, in turn, contribute to his actual power. Appearances do matter’. 
One Libyan described the fear of Qadhafi’s security services as ubiquitous but not 
unfounded: it stemmed from the perception that the revolutionary committees had 
infiltrated every segment of Libyan society through recruiting covert informants. As a 
result, there was a veiled understanding that ‘the closest people to you’ could be 
regime spies, including family members and friends.15 This perception even led to the 
circulation of a joke that Libya was the ‘land of a million spies’ (shosheed) in contrast 
to Algeria, the ‘land of a million martyrs’ (Al-Werfalli 2011: 148-149). This targeted 
involvement of a populace in a regime’s policies of control, which was evident in 
Algeria, Egypt, Tunisia, and Syria (Sassoon 2016: 149) creates popular ‘complicity’ 
in upholding a regime’s mode of domination (Wedeen 1999). The Tripoli-based 
activist Osamadescribed this as a pervasive phenomenon during the rule of Qadhafi: 
 
This type of slander destroyed the social fabric of Libya. Under Qadhafi, the 
worst accusation was being called ‘a rat’. They’d say ‘Look, it’s a rat, catch 
him’, even if you hadn’t done anything suspicious. I remember an incident with 
a friend who was part of the Popular Guard. Because of a disagreement with 
another person, he was accused of being a ‘rat’. A few days later and he was 
gone. If someone wrote a ‘report’ on you, that was the end.16 
 
																																																								
15 Interview with Aisha, women’s rights activist, 6 April 2016. Skype. 
16 Interview with Osama, reformist anti-regime demonstrator in Tripoli, 30 December 2015. Skype.  
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This fear and mistrust, not only of the regime, but of other Libyans in general, also 
persisted among Libyans in exile. The activist Mustafa argued that people did not 
want to be seen to harbour any dissenting thoughts: ‘even those Libyans who went 
abroad, where there was literature by the opposition out there, you can’t believe how 
frightened they were to even look at it. Most people just didn’t want to know’.17 
Abdul Rahman and Ali, both of whom were raised in the UK, recall being warned to 
‘keep away’ from Libyans and to refrain from broaching political topics, in order to 
avoid association either with dissidents or with the regime’s security services 
(mukhabarat).18  
The multi-institutional politics literature has emphasised that the material and 
symbolic powers of an institution shape representational practices and ways of acting 
within a particular social sphere (Friedland and Alford 1991). In the case of the 
Jamahiriya, some of those interviewed indicated the political significance of habitual 
turns of phrase in the Libyan dialect, seeing them as directly generated by the 
Jamahiriya’s coercive mechanisms. One such phrase is the common expression ‘turn 
a blind eye’ (deer el-howla). To ‘turn a blind eye’ is to feign ignorance of a subject 
about which one is well informed. It can be used in any social setting, but under 
Qadhafi’s rule, it was deployed if one was questioned by a suspected member of the 
revolutionary committees. Salem described this as a covert ‘defence mechanism’ 
practiced by Libyans: by feigning ignorance in a way that appears unpractised, the 
speaker could avoid being entrapped into saying anything negative about Qadhafi or 
the Jamahiriya, particularly when discussing public affairs.19 Cultivating a non-
committal mind-set, and presenting perpetually alterable opinions, enabled the 																																																								
17 Interview with Mustafa, anti-regime dissident and human rights campaigner, 4 March 2015. London.  
18 Interview with Yahya, activist and NTC coordinator, 29 November 2016. Skype; Interview with Ali, 
rebel coordinator and fighter in Tripoli, 9 February 2015. Skype.			
19 Interview with Salem, former economic analyst and anti-regime demonstrator, 10 December 2016. 
Birmingham.  
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speaker to remain in a state of plausible deniability: an important skill in a context 
where one could potentially be surrounded by spies.20  
The counterpart to skillfully ‘turning a blind eye’ is to fool others by ‘a run’ 
(jarya): a fabricated story that successfully hoodwinks the listener. A jarya can occur 
in the most casual and everyday settings, which makes it particularly difficult to 
detect. To successfully ‘run with’ a listener involves a degree of rhetorical skill and 
confers one-upmanship, suggesting as it does the social savvy of the person doing the 
‘running’.21 Tareq, who was raised in the UK, asserted that being deceived by a jarya 
could be an embarrassing social experience in Libya, and one that diaspora youth, 
unaccustomed to informal conversational dynamics in the country, would easily fall 
victim to.22 If ‘turning a blind eye’ in the Jamahiriya indicates the ability to remain 
undetected, ‘running’ signals the capacity to detect and outwit others. Taken together, 
both allude to a state of hyper-vigilance cultivated by the coercive mechanisms of 
authoritarian regimes, and signal the way in which an institution’s material practices 
can shape the performance of dualism and contradiction. According to the dissident 
Fayez, the broader implication of such ingrained social practices is that ‘you don’t 
trust anybody. If anyone suggests something to you, you think about it twice. They 
might have a hidden motive for saying it’.23 
It is important to note the partial relaxation of the regime’s coercive strictures 
on political expression in the final decade of the Jamahiriya. Qadhafi’s son Saif al-
Islam, as part of the regime’s effort to internationally rebrand itself, introduced a 
reformist rhetoric that saw the opening up of Libyan media and broadcasting (Richter 
2013: 157). He oversaw the establishment of newspapers that ‘initiated a degree of 																																																								
20 Interview with Aisha, women’s rights activist, 6 April 2016. Skype.  
21 Interview with Salem, former economic analyst and anti-regime demonstrator, 10 December 2016. 
Birmingham. 
22 Interview with Tareq, social media activist and translator, 15 February 2015. Oxford.  
23 Interview with Fayez, exiled anti-regime dissident, 27 January 2016. London.		
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public debate on political issues’, and ‘offered alternatives to the stultifying media run 
by the Libyan state or by the Revolutionary Committees Movement’ (Joffé 2013: 34). 
However, even in these newspapers, Ouya and Quryna, writers exercised extreme 
care not to mention Qadhafi or his inner circle, and to restrict their criticism to 
bureaucrats at most.24 Moreover, there continued to be arrests, disappearances and 
murders of opposition writers (Diana 2014: 448). In particular, the persistence of the 
regime’s security sector was evident in the arrests of political activists in the months 
prior to the 2011 Libyan uprising (St. John 2014: 108).  
 
5.3 Material Control in the Jamahiriya: Political and Public Institutions  	
 
 
The Jamahiriya’s coercive practices, outlined above, closely resemble those of other 
Arab autocracies. Their purpose was to ensure the stability of the regime through a 
combination of co-optation, repression and symbolic intimidation, even if the 
‘revolutionary’ vehicles through which this coercion was exercised were distinctive in 
form. In contrast, the Jamahiriya’s system of political governance – the other 
component of its material technologies of control – was idiosyncratic in both form 
and purpose. Dismissing the party system as despotic, Qadhafi devised a novel system 
of political governance based on popular committees and congresses, which was 
perpetually fine-tuned in an appeal to popular mobilisation, and which purportedly 
comprised the ‘chief institutional embodiment of the sovereignty of Libyan 
individuals’ (Davis 1987: 20). 
The political sphere in the Jamahiriya can be bifurcated into two parallel 
structures: ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ authority (Mattes 2008: 70-76). Formal authority, 																																																								
24 Interview with Osama, reformist anti-regime demonstrator in Tripoli, 30 December 2015. Skype.  
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or the Jamahiriya’s system of ‘direct democracy’, centered on Basic Popular 
Congresses (BPCs): bodies of universal membership that delegated power to Basic 
Popular Committees, who in turn formulated policies that would be subsequently 
enacted at the national level (Vandewalle 1998: 95). The General People’s Congress 
(GPC), or the equivalent of a national parliament, was drawn from delegates of the 
BPCs. It met yearly and elected members of the General Popular Committee, which 
formulated policy in accordance with the GPC’s principles: policy that was 
subsequently transmitted to the popular committees accountable to the BPCs. The 
channelling of decisions from the base to the top underpinned the Jamahiriya’s claim 
to establishing direct democracy, and set in the motion ‘the bottom-up, top-down 
pattern of the circulation of power that was thoroughly unique to Libya’ (Joffé 2013: 
23). The counterpart to this system was informal authority, composed of Qadhafi, his 
inner circle, and the revolutionary committees, whose mandate was defined by 
Qadhafi himself.  
As a political decision-making mechanism, formal power carried little authority 
in the Jamahiriya. The GPC was reorganised or ‘reformed’ whenever its delegates 
contravened Qadhafi’s stipulations or made requests that were deemed inconsistent 
with the revolution, such as their calls for wage increases in the fourth session in 
December 1978, or their rejection of Qadhafi’s liberalised divorce laws in February 
1984 (St John 1987: 133). Foreign policy, the army, the country’s budget, and the 
petroleum sector were all beyond its remit of discussion (Vandewalle 2006: 105). 
Although discussion on the provision of goods and services was permitted - in this 
respect resembling the nominal role of parliaments in countries such as Egypt 
(Sassoon 2016: 58-59) – the voices in that debate were not accorded equal status. As 
minister himself, Qadhafi could ‘switch register at a moment’s notice to remind his 
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fellow-participants that he had special knowledge of the state of affairs’ (Davis 1987: 
73). Televised proceedings of the GPC have been described as useful principally for 
monitoring the impromptu pronouncements that Qadhafi himself might make, and 
which would subsequently be ratified as official ‘policy’.25   
The substantial gulf between the theoretical and practical authority of the 
congress system was further exacerbated by the informal, unregulated revolutionary 
sector. In 1978, Qadhafi gave revolutionary committees the power to ‘monitor’ – or in 
practice, to ultimately determine - the appointment of people to popular congresses: 
‘the people are the ones who formed popular congresses, and they are the ones who 
are now re-selecting their leaderships, and they are the ones who established 
revolutionary committees to supervise this work’.26 In his speeches, he increasingly 
distinguished between those theoretically in power (the people) and those who were 
more entitled to wield it (the revolutionaries), developing a slogan in 1979 mandating 
that ‘No one can be a revolutionary outside the revolutionary committees’ (la thawri 
karij al-lijan al-thawriyya) (Vandewalle 1998: 101). The definition and arbitration of 
‘power and interest’ (Friedland and Alford 1991: 250) in the Jamahiriya was thus 
dependent on the extent of one’s identification with and support of Qadhafi’s 
revolution. Because this categorisation of power was accompanied by semi-
unchecked political and coercive authority, it generated a common perception that the 
formal system was impotent in comparison with the revolutionary committees, and 
led to rapidly diminishing participation rates within a few years of the establishment 
of the Jamahiriya (El-Fathaly and Palmer 1980: 346). As a result, it is often asserted 
that, through mechanisms of control such as the revolutionary committees, Qadhafi 
																																																								
25 Interview with Hisham, pro-opposition medical doctor, 5 December 2016. Skype.  
26 Speech by Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, cited in Mohammed Magariaf, The Crimes of Libya’s 
Revolutionary Committees: Who is Responsible for Them? 32. 	
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ruled Libya with an iron first, making all decisions and setting all policies despite 
playing no official role in its political institutions (Pargeter 2006; Joffe 2013; El-
Khawas 2013).   
The literature on Middle East authoritarianism has increasingly stressed the 
need to pay attention to political institutions under dictatorship (Stacher 2012). 
However, because of the imposing authority of the ‘informal’ revolutionary sector, 
this analysis has not been extended to the Jamahiriya’s political institutions. The 
Jamahiriya has been described as ‘weakly institutionalized’ in general (Brown 2016), 
its governance system incomparable with the nominally democratic legislatures and 
political parties in ‘hybrid’ authoritarian regimes, which serve as a practical, 
negotiating tool with elites and opponents (Brownlee 2007; Gandhi 2008). As a result, 
political institutions in the Jamahiriya have often been viewed as an extension of the 
Jamahiriya’s coercive mechanisms of control (Sassoon 2016), an indication of 
‘sultanism’ (Chehabi and Linz 1998; Johnson 2015), or as simply redundant in 
practice (Vandewalle 1998).  
Assertions of Libya’s institutional incapacity would appear to be validated by 
the Jamahiriya’s practical distinction between formal and informal authority. 
However, despite its idiosyncrasy, the governance system in the Jamahiriya still 
possessed a material purpose: it established the ‘rules of the game’ (Polletta 2004) 
through which political and organisational activity operated, and could be 
manipulated, within Libya. The sheer multiplicity of institutions worked to tightly 
structure the terms of political engagement, preventing the emergence of organised 
opposition while acting as a distributive mechanism to those who occupied them. 
They also possessed a symbolic function, curtailing the emergence of representational 
capacity inside the Jamahiriya, and delimiting accountability – and therefore agency 
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(Kockleman 2007: 387). Taking the Jamahiriya’s political system seriously within an 
institutional framework is crucial to grasping its material and symbolic import.  
The Jamahiriya’s political system tightly delimited and weakened the 
‘systematic articulation of interests’ in the country (Vandewalle 1998: 133), in part 
through its very internal composition. All of the Jamahiriya’s political institutions, 
with their extensive sub-structures and overlapping mandates, were purportedly 
responsible for the establishment of the popular policy agenda. In practice, this meant 
that no one institution was accountable: the national level bodies were not accountable 
because of their reliance on consensus from BPCs, and the BPCs were not 
accountable because they were popular bodies with universal membership.27 Debates 
were rampant, but did not lead to tangible agendas or to implementation policies; 
issues could be discussed for years before they were resolved. This time-consuming 
and chaotic political system was designed to achieve little of practical impact, even in 
the most procedural areas of public policy, therefore creating an executive void that 
was occupied by Qadhafi and the revolutionary sector. This system has been 
extensively analysed and apolitically characterised by Adam Smith International as 
‘administrative decentralisation without authority’,28 but in reality, the Qadhafi 
regime generated authority through this systematic practice of disorganised, 
administrative decentralisation.  
Qadhafi further weakened the systematic articulation of interests in Libya by 
tinkering with and continuing to expand these existent political institutions. In 1998, 
he created regional bodies known as sha’abiyat, located between the basic and 
national levels of government; in 2006, he altered the number of sha’abiyat from 32 
to 20, and established the kumon structure: a sub-BPC body that selected leaders for 																																																								
27 Adam Smith International. 2007. “Document 5: Policy Development and Decision Making”: 11. 
28 Ibid. “Document 1: Civil Servants and Political Officials”: 8.	
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the BPCs and discussed the issues on which the BPCs took decisions.29 The 
parameters of the political system were thus continuously being shifted, fine-tuned 
and modified, with frequent changes in the design of executive institutions. The 
scholarly literature on Libya has indicated that the abundance of committees, 
congresses and supervisory bodies, and the frequent institutional changes they 
underwent, served as a tool of political control, preventing the building up of 
organisational strength and ensuring the dependency of the system on Qadhafi 
(Vandewalle 1998, 2016; Pargeter 2006). 
This analysis of the political system can be further expanded with reference to 
the proliferation of sub-committees within those institutions. One of the official 
slogans of the Jamahiriya, first featured in The Green Book, was ‘committees are 
everywhere’ (al-lijan fi kulli makan). This slogan has been analysed in relation to the 
revolutionary committees (Mattes 1995), because Qadhafi himself directly applied 
this slogan to the revolutionary committees movement in a speech in 1978.30 
However, the profusion of committees was also a central component of the formal 
political sphere. Within the Jamahiriya’s political institutions, any discussion of 
policy proposals would necessitate the establishment of temporary, ad hoc committees 
(lijan) comprised of public servants, experts and various secretaries.31 These 
committees were tasked with developing draft proposals and solutions to identified 
problems. However, their emergent proposals – which were worked on in isolation - 
would never constitute actual policy papers; indeed, they were never even archived. 
																																																								
29 Adam Smith International. 2007. “Document 5: Policy Development and Decision Making”: 10. 
30 Speech by Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, cited in Mohammed Magariaf, The Crimes of Libya’s 
Revolutionary Committees: Who is Responsible for Them? 31. 
31 Adam Smith International. 2007. “Document 5: Policy Development and Decision Making”: 49.	
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The consequence was that another committee would have to be formed when a similar 
agenda item was subsequently raised in future.32  
To a certain degree, the committee system can be construed as further evidence 
of Libya’s ‘weakly institutionalised’ character under Qadhafi. Salem, a former 
economic analyst within the Libyan NEDB, argued that the process of committee-
formation eroded institutional memory in Libya: ‘There was no transfer of 
knowledge. Anyone who wanted to do something had to start from scratch’.33 In this 
vein, the 2007 Adam Smith International project scrutinised the political system in 
Libya using a merit-based civil service framework, and made recommendations based 
on institutional reform and the creation of strong instruments of policymaking.34 
However, the Jamahiriya’s political system takes on an added significance if we 
begin from the premise that institutions are a material and symbolic ordering of 
reality, and that political agency rests on the ability to reclassify and reconstitute this 
institutional domain (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008: 84). The Jamahiriya’s political 
system permitted scope for the debate and discussion of policy proposals, but it 
prevented that process from shaping the material realities of everyday life in the 
Jamahiriya; in other words, it inhibited the emergence of political agency by stripping 
discourse of its constitutive and classificatory capacity.  
The Jamahiriya’s political system further curtailed political agency by being 
couched in Qadhafi’s ideological principle of societal self-supervision: the notion that 
‘the people are themselves the instrument of government’ (al-Qadhafi 1980: 33). 
Citing his absence from the Jamahiriya’s formal political structures, Qadhafi 
repeatedly denied his role in any decision-making process, and ascribed authority to 																																																								
32 Adam Smith International. 2007. “Document 5: Policy Development and Decision Making”: 48. 
33 Interview with Salem, former economic analyst and anti-regime demonstrator, 10 December 2016. 
Birmingham.  
34 Adam Smith International. 2007. “Document 1: Civil Servants and Political Officials”: 11.			
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Libyans for being ‘responsible for everything…they are the ones who monitor and 
supervise, they are the ones who come up with solutions, solve problems, do 
everything’.35 As the embodiment of this ideological precept, the committee system 
enabled Qadhafi to present himself as a voice of wisdom and calm within a chaotic 
system that he himself had orchestrated (Pargeter 2006: 225). Thus, while lacking in 
constitutive authority, Libyans were bestowed with political accountability.  
In some respect, Qadhafi’s rhetoric arguably echoes authoritarian ‘vocabularies 
of complicity’ (Wedeen 1999: 6). Such vocabularies emerge as a result of 
authoritarian practices that construct citizens as ‘accomplices’ who uphold the norms 
constitutive of domination (ibid). As indicated above, complicity was engendered 
through the co-optation of the public into the regime’s security apparatus, but for 
authoritarian regimes, vocabularies of complicity are also a valuable representational 
resource, enabling the regime to free itself from accountability for its actions (Makiya 
1993: 72). There is a parallel here with the Jamahiriya: in this instance, an 
ideologically accountable citizenry could be rendered responsible for the 
institutionalised inadequacies of political governance. However, Qadhafi went beyond 
‘complicity’ and ascribed sole accountability to the Libyan populace for the material 
realities of life in the Jamahiriya. For instance, he argued that the Cultural Revolution 
which he had called for, encouraged and rewarded in the 1970s, and which led to 
‘tyrannous’ behaviours under the mantra of ideological purification, from the 
expulsion of teachers to the takeover of private businesses, was ultimately the 
responsibility of the Libyan people: his own role was a corrective one, consisting only 
of ‘patching up this chaos’.36  
																																																								
35 Speech by Mu’ammar al-Qadhafi, cited in Mohammed Magariaf, The Crimes of Libya’s 
Revolutionary Committees: Who is Responsible for Them? 33. 
36 “Qadhafi admits to destroying Libya”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/9PBqqe			
	 122	
As part of Libya’s drive towards economic liberalisation, Qadhafi’s son, Saif al-
Islam, increasingly spoke of Libya’s institutional deficiencies, ascribing them to the 
‘absence of a constitution’ at an event by the Qadhafi International Development 
Foundation in 2006: 
 
Now, we have to admit that Libya, in the absence of a constitution, in the 
absence of a constitutional framework, and in the absence of constitutional 
laws, doesn’t have stable and recognised institutions. Nor are the 
relationships between these institutions governed by law and protected by a 
constitution. We don’t know how many regional organisations we need. We 
don’t know if we should go to a shaabiya committee secretary or to its 
conference secretary. We don’t know whether we should have five 
secretariats or ten secretariats, or whether the headquarters should be in Sirte 
or in Tripoli.37 
 
Despite Saif al-Islam’s attempt to redirect accountability towards the regime, Qadhafi 
himself continued to argue that it was Libyans, particularly those in managerial 
positions, who were responsible for disorder in Libya. In September 2008, he asserted 
that government ministries were ‘centres of mismanagement, graft and corruption’, 
and suggested that their funds should be distributed directly to the people (St. John 
2015: 92). In turn, he criticised Libyans for their own dependence on oil revenues and 
urged them to start manufacturing their required goods, ‘seemingly oblivious to what 
his own policies – or lack thereof – had meant for the productive capacities of Libya 
in all economic sectors’ (Vandewalle 2012b: 203). The Jamahiriya’s ideology of 
direct democracy, and the implementation of this ideology in a convoluted but 
powerless system of committees, congresses and sub-committees, thus constituted a 
																																																								
37 “Saif al-Islam admits to chaos in Libya”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/p4tNzv  
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contradictory ‘logic of practice’ that diminished political agency and situated Qadhafi 
as a vital but unaccountable political actor within it.  
In addition to operating according to an ideology of ‘direct democracy’, the 
system of governance could also be interpreted as an extension of the way in which 
public institutions in general functioned inside Libya. The seemingly ineffectual 
design of Libya’s public institutions was arguably enabled by, and reinforced, a 
system of ‘rentierism’. ‘Rentier states’ have been described as those in which income 
is generated from a non-productive economy, such as oil revenues, (Lecha and 
Zaccara 2013), and where the ‘primary internal economic function is to divide among 
their citizens revenues that accrue directly as rent’ (Vandewalle 1998: 21). Thus, it 
has been argued that, in an effort to sustain its authoritarian rule, the Jamahiriya 
transformed state institutions, ‘political’ and otherwise, into ‘intricate channels for 
economic largesse’ (Vandewalle 2012b: 189-190). 
Rentier State Theory (RST) has served as a prominent interpretive framework 
for understanding the longevity of authoritarian rule in Libya (Anderson 1986; 
Vandewalle 1998; Sandbakken 2006; Schwarz 2008; Brynen et al 2012). It can also 
consolidate an understanding of the Jamahiriya’s material technologies of control. 
The Jamahiriya harnessed the distributive potential of disorderly institutionalisation 
by mandating the establishment and disbursement of countless policymaking 
committees. As noted earlier, such committees attained very little in terms of tangible 
policy-making, or even knowledge transmission. However, the formation of 
committees has been described as a method of channelling resources to the populace, 
who in turn could redeploy committees as a mechanism of patronage: ‘committees 
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gave everyone a small fiefdom where they could place their own allies and people’.38 
Although Qadhafi verbally admonished Libyans for being responsible for the 
Jamahiriya’s failings, political institutions had no regularity capacity in practice; 
there was little oversight or accountability for the way in which public services were 
operated or mismanaged.39 The ‘rules of the game’ permitted a great of deal of 
financial latitude to those who operated within the Jamahiriya’s formal political 
sphere, so long as its central contradiction – its claim to being a ‘direct democracy’ 
with Qadhafi as Leader of the Revolution– was upheld.  
The operation of policymaking committees as a distributive channel can also be 
understood within the broader context of the Jamahiriya’s management of the public 
sector. For instance, it is commonly noted that public sector employment in the 
Jamahiriya comprised almost 80% of the working population (Herb 2014: 189); of 
this figure, 16% were employed in political institutions, compared to an average of 
6.3% in the Arab world.40 Sectors such as Education had budgets that were 
characterised as a ‘surrogate employment programmes’, with double the amount of 
required teachers on the payroll.41 Within every institution, there was a ‘General 
Department for Administrative and Financial Affairs’, which contained an ‘Inbox’ 
(al-waarid) and an ‘Outbox’ (al-saadir) functions: jobs involving the recording and 
transferral of all inbound and outbound correspondence. Thus, the Libyan public 
system did not use email, instead assigning employees exclusively to these roles.42 
																																																								
38 Interview with Salem, former economic analyst and anti-regime demonstrator, 10 December 2016. 
Birmingham.	
39 Adam Smith International. 2007. “Document 4: Executive Structures at Local and Regional Level”: 
61.  
40 Ibid. “Document 2: Reducing Rigidities in Civil Service Staffing”: 1.  
41 Ibid. “Document 3: Libyan Public Sector Administration: Development Programme”: 20.   
42 Interview with Salem, former economic analyst and anti-regime demonstrator, 10 December 2016. 
Birmingham. 
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This practice has been described as the ‘use of bureaucratic employment as a 
patronage resource’: another characteristic of rentierist economies (Hertog 2010: 5).  
The introduction of the ‘appointment’ (‘ta’yeen’) system in 1982, which has 
been described as a ‘form of rentier entitlements paid as wages’, further systemised 
the Jamahiriya’s distributive policies.43 Ta’yeen involved the permanent appointment 
of employees into public sector jobs, from which they could no longer be dislodged, 
only reshuffled. It nullified the need for job descriptions, qualifications or skills as the 
basis for employment. As one Libyan explained, tay’een was a safe form of job 
security that guaranteed a steady ‘living’ (‘m’aash’) however inadequate the salary 
actually was.44 Indeed, it was possible, after being appointed, to ‘play the system’ by 
collecting multiple paycheques for assorted public sectors jobs that one could get 
away with performing part-time.45 This need for manoeuvre and extraction within the 
public sector emerged as a result of Qadhafi’s complete abolition of private commerce 
in 1981 (Pargeter 2012: 109). 
The explanatory scope of RST is ambitious, with its proponents arguing that 
distributive policies sever the taxation/representation linkage necessary for political 
mobilisation, thereby accounting for a depoliticised populace (Vandewalle 1998). 
However, it must be applied with circumspection to Libya (Pargeter 2016: 184), 
particularly within an institutional interpretation of the Jamahiriya. The flow of local 
social benefits and the provision of social welfare – which is a central characteristic of 
distributive states  (Vandewalle 1998: 132; Davidson 2012: 49-50) - was 
compromised due to the lack of transparency over the delivery of public goods, and 
the lack of assigned responsibility for particular services to any government units. 																																																								
43 Interview with Salem, former economic analyst and anti-regime demonstrator, 10 December 2016. 
Birmingham. 
44 Interview with Aisha, women’s rights activist, 6 April 2016. Skype.  
45 Interview with Hisham, pro-opposition medical doctor, 5 December 2016. Skype.  
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This often led to a duplication or under-provision of public services.46 Thus, 
‘mechanisms of internal redistribution’ (Lecha and Zaccara 2013: 163) were weak in 
the Jamahiriya, embedded within a formal system of governance that undermined the 
organisational capacities of those within it. Moreover, these mechanisms were also 
offset by the Qadhafi regime’s costly personal expenditures and economic policies, 
such as the war in Chad (1980-87), bribes to African leaders, and ambitious, 
inefficient agricultural projects (Sassoon 2016: 183), in contrast to austere 
‘revolutionary policies’ that saw the freezing of government employees’ salaries for 
decades (Vandewalle 2008: 228).  
There also remains a need for nuance when interpreting RST’s understanding of 
the social dynamics engineered by distributive practices. It is often argued that 
rentierism in Libya generated a ‘culture of entitlement’ (St. John 2013: 95) and ‘kept 
citizens voiceless’ (Vandewalle 2012b: 190) by inhibiting their inclinations and 
capacities for political mobilisation. Despite this argument, a key tenet of multi-
institutional theory is that even the most fixed institutional routines are capable of 
being interpreted and re-performed in a multitude of ways (Sewell 1992: 19). In this 
view, the extraction of resources in pursuit of material interests arguably blurs the line 
between compliance with an institution’s logic of practice, while asserting agency in 
relation to it. Thus, the practice of ‘coping’ with the Jamahiriya’s political system 
(Vandewalle 2006: 129), and with widespread material and economic hardship (Joffé 
2016: 122) entailed practising survivalist strategies. For instance, increasingly, and 
following a degree of economic liberalisation in the 2000s, it was seen as 
commonplace for doctors to misuse public resources for private gain, in light of the 
																																																								
46 Adam Smith International. 2007. “Document 4: Executive Structures at Local and Regional Level”: 
61.		
	 127	
inadequacy of the state salary.47 The dialectical term affari (from the Italian word for 
‘business’) was commonly used by Libyans to refer to the kind of informal, crafty and 
often short-lived economic ventures that people would engage in to supplement their 
incomes.48  
Conversely, the process of ‘coping’ with a material system can be seen to 
further embed individuals within an institution’s logic of practice. This possible 
interpretation is missing from Joseph Sassoon’s description of administrative and 
bureaucratic corruption in the Arab republics, which, he argues, was fundamentally 
undertaken by ‘economic elites’ (2016: 177-183). According to one activist and later 
coordinator of the Libyan Prime Minister’s Office in 2011, abiding by the ‘rules of 
the games’ was built into the very act of co-existing with the Jamahiriya: ‘as soon as 
you accept the salary of the state, you are accepting the status quo’.49 However, he 
went to question the moral culpability of this, adding that ‘people had to accept it, 
otherwise they would starve’.50 The dissident Fayez has in turn contended that the 
political system in Libya ultimately worked to create an atmosphere of distrust. 
‘Qadhafi taught people to hate each other’: not simply by instilling an atmosphere of 
fear, but by institutionalising a suspicion of others’ material motives.51 Such zero-sum 
understandings point us again towards Lisa Wedeen’s  (1999: 6) concept of 
‘complicity’ as a formidable authoritarian strategy. Although these interpretations do 
not fully capture the agentive ambiguities of survivalist activities, what they do affirm 
is the notion that an institution’s material practices can constitute the social world by 
defining and sanctioning set rituals and patterns of behaviour.  
 																																																								
47 Interview with Hisham, pro-opposition medical doctor, 5 December 2016. Skype. 
48 Interview with Aisha, women’s rights activist, 6 April 2015. Skype.	
49 Interview with Yahya, activist and NTC coordinator, 29 November 2016. Skype. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Interview with Fayez, exiled anti-regime dissident, 27 January 2016. London.		
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The above discussion has sought to supplement the analysis of the Jamahiriya’s 
coercive apparatus by focusing on its system of political governance. Through its 
‘formal’ political system, the Jamahiriya functioned in a ‘supraorganizational’ way 
(Friedland and Alford 1991: 243), creating institutionalised disorder under the mantra 
of ‘committees everywhere’, and positioning this as a distributive mechanism through 
which people could reproduce their material subsistence, and as a justification for the 
interventions of ‘informal’ revolutionary authority. This bifurcation of formal and 
informal authority ultimately hinged on contradiction: while stripping discourse of its 
constitutive and representational function, Qadhafi continued to assert that the 
Jamahiriya was a ‘direct democracy’ and that Libyans themselves were accountable 
for the Jamahiriya’s limitations. Libyans were ambiguously positioned in relation to 
this system. They were established within its material practices, but also manoeuvred 
in and around them in furtherance of their own interests.   
 
5.4 The Symbolic Organisation of the Jamahiriya  	
 
Material technologies of domination constitute one element of an institution’s logic of 
practice. Dominant symbolic representations also impose meanings onto reality and 
contain mechanisms for ensuring their dissemination and re-performance within a 
particular social sphere. In this vein, the Jamahiriya’s system of symbolic 
organisation is a crucial complement to its material authority, comprising ‘a powerful 
combination of ideology, charisma, reliance on moral suasion and religious symbols, 
and invented national myths’ (Vandewalle 1998: 29). The symbolism of the 
Jamahiriya cluttered the public sphere and was unified around Qadhafi’s own 
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identity, representing him as the personification of Libyan nationhood, and defining 
national citizenship as allegiance to Qadhafi’s revolution.     
The Jamahiriya’s system of symbolic organisation was initially premised on the 
propagation of Nasserite pan-Arabism and a defiant anti-colonial rhetoric. In his 
speech on 1 September 1969, Qadhafi declared colonialist forces to be ‘the enemy of 
the Arab ummah and the enemy of Islam’ (St. John 1987: 27), following up the 
pronouncement with a series of religious and nationalistic policies that were framed as 
a rejection of Western imperialism. This included the termination of the military-base 
agreements with the United States and Britain and the expulsion of twenty thousand 
Italian residents from Libya (El-Kikhia 1998: 40). Other ‘acts of national 
independence’ instated by Qadhafi signalled a dedication to Islam, such as the 
mandatory translation of signs, tickets and passports into Arabic, the banning of 
alcohol consumption, and the closure of nightclubs (Vandewalle 2006: 87). Such acts 
have been described as ‘largely symbolic’ gestures that were nevertheless popular due 
to their rejection of foreign values and promotion of Arab unity (St. John 1987: 27).  
As argued by Scott (1990: 47), the ability to crowd out alternative actions from 
the public stage is a characteristic of dominant political and symbolic practices. 
Qadhafi claimed to further his commitment to the Arabization of the Libyan polity by 
marginalising the Amazigh, or Berbers of Libya. He banned the use of the Tamazight 
language in public and prohibited the display of the Amazigh flag (Schnelzer 2016: 
50), justifying these policies by arguing that the encouragement of minority practices 
would sow further division in Libya, which he described as a ‘homogenous Muslim 
Arabic society in culture, language and belief’ (Joffé 2013: 38). Under the banner of 
anti-colonialism, Qadhafi also rejected the Sanusiyya or Sanusi Order, a revivalist 
Islamic movement established in the eastern Libyan region of Cyrenaica, and that had 
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ultimately led to the political ascendency of King Idris al-Sanusi, the heir to the 
Sanusiyya Order (Vandewalle 2006: 31). The Sanusiyya possessed a prominent 
Islamic, Sufi ethos, embodied in and disseminated through religious lodges 
(‘zuwaya’), and had even developed a basic structure of governance that supplied 
social services through tax collection (Vandewalle 2006: 19). Moreover, the Sanusi 
Order had been the focal point of Cyrenaican resistance to the Italian invasion of 
Libya, famously led by the tribal leader Omar al-Mukhtar from 1928 until his capture 
and execution in 1931.  
With its own narratives of anti-colonial struggle, the Sanusiyya was sufficiently 
threatening and influential to be both rejected and appropriated by turns. Qadhafi 
denigrated the monarchy’s long association with the British, including its dependence 
on income from British and American air bases, and contrasted its lip service towards 
Libyan-Arab brotherhood with its quiescence towards the events of the Middle East 
(Davis 1987: 33). In 1984, Qadhafi ordered the destruction of the tomb of Sayyid 
Muhammad ibn Ali al-Sanussi, the founder of the Sanussi Order (Benotman, Pack and 
Brandon 2013: 194). By delegitimising the Sanusiyya, Qadhafi was able to present 
himself as the heir of Omar al-Mukhtar’s legacy, asserting that the 1969 revolution 
was the fulfilment of a decades-long struggle against Italian colonialism (St. John 
1987: 28). The legacy of Omar al-Mukhtar was celebrated in street names and 
currency notes, and symbolically alluded to in Qadhafi’s first public speech in 1969, 
which was delivered next to Mukhtar’s tomb in Benghazi (McGregor 2011). 
Qadhafi’s attempts to firmly associate himself with Omar al-Mukhtar would continue 
unabated: a photograph of a chained and captured Mukhtar was attached to the lapel 
of his military uniform during his visit to Italy in 2009 (BBC 2009). The Jamahiriya’s 
valorisation of Omar al-Mukhtar absorbed his anti-colonial credentials while 
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discounting his association with the Sanusiyya. Qadhafi’s appropriation of Mukhtar 
thus functioned in a similar manner to the nationalist narratives perpetuated by 
President Hafiz al-Asad’s regime, blending ‘consensual understandings with 
obviously false statements’ (Wedeen 1999: 7). In this way, the Jamahiriya could be 
packaged as both the fulfilment of a nation’s historical aspirations, and as an original, 
founding movement. 
The initial symbolic configuration proposed by Qadhafi was not particularly 
contentious, premised as it was on the re-articulation of the Nasserite values that had 
underpinned the rhetoric of the 1969 Free Officers movement. It has also been noted 
that Qadhafi’s nominal instatement of Islamic legislation and sharia principles in 
Libya in 1971 was popularly well-received, and presented as further indication of the 
regime’s anti-Western orientation (St John 1987: 31). However, and with the 
establishment of the Jamahiriya, Qadhafi was to construct an alternative Islamic 
framework based on his own interpretive religious jurisdiction. Thus, he increasingly 
rejected the orthodox sources of theological authority, such as the four schools of 
Islamic jurisprudence, arguing that they were the product of political struggles; in 
their stead, he declared the Qu’ran to be the sole source of Islamic justice (St John 
1987: 32). In place of the sayings of the Islamic prophet Muhammad (hadith) and 
religious commentaries and exegetical texts (tafseer), Qadhafi was to describe The 
Green Book as ‘the gospel of the new era, the era of the masses’ (Takeyh 2003: 156). 
By marginalising the arbitrative power of scholars, and imposing himself as the 
principal mediator of Qur’anic doctrine, Qadhafi established a separate interpretive 
monopoly over Islam that translated into a practical refashioning of the religious 
landscape in Libya. In 1977, he altered the calendar to count the Muslim era from 
Muhammad’s death; the following year, mosques were ‘purified’ as a way of 
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silencing prominent religious figures and expropriating religious endowments (Davis 
1987: 57). Qadhafi continued to contravene the religious establishment, propagating a 
separate system for moon sightings during Islamic festivals that would often see 
Libyans celebrating on different days to the rest of the Arab world, thereby ensuring 
that Libyans themselves upheld Qadhafi’s violation of religious orthodoxy.52 This 
flurry of theological innovations would earn Qadhafi condemnation from religious 
leaders such as the Egyptian preacher Abdel-Hamid Kishk, who satirised him as the 
‘Prophet of the Desert, Owner of the Green Book’, and claimed that his flawed 
Qur’anic recitations were evidence of his malicious intent to destroy the orthodoxies 
of the faith.53 In turn, Qadhafi imposed a ban on Kishk’s sermons, which were widely 
distributed in cassette tapes throughout the Arab world.54 
The ideological foundations of the Jamahiriya thus rested on a combination of 
pan-Arab nationalism, anti-imperialism and Islamic legitimacy, embodied in the 
adoption of a green flag – a colour long associated with Islam - and the anti-colonial 
national anthem ‘Allahu Akbar’ in 1977. Such symbols would come to literally 
dominate the physical landscape of Libya, when Qadhafi mandated that the metal 
shutters of all shop fronts be painted green (Jawad 2012). However, this ideological 
formulation soon coalesced into a specific panegyric vocabulary, centred principally 
on Qadhafi himself as the embodiment of the Jamahiriya’s revolutionary spirit. In this 
vein, it has been argued that it is customary in authoritarian regimes to see a gradual 
blurring of ideology and personality cult, the former gradually being replaced by the 
latter in cases such as Iraq and Syria (Sasoon 2016: 49). People in Tripoli ‘lived in a 
space saturated with the symbolic and visual presence of Qadhafi’ (Cherstich 2014: 
																																																								
52 Interview with Hisham, pro-opposition medical doctor, 5 December 2016. Skype. 
53 “Qadhafi mocks Islam”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/pdmkFh  
54 Interview with Aisha, women’s rights activist, 6 April 2016. Skype.	
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102). Posters and pictures of Qadhafi were abundant, found in public offices, schools, 
and hospitals, and in the main intersection point in the capital, the Green Square. In 
such images, Qadhafi was depicted as superhuman, even divine, and fashioned as the 
disembodied symbol of the Libyan state (Khatib 2013b: 185). Images of Qadhafi were 
often accompanied, in writing, by the brief, utopian slogans which had become part of 
the Jamahiriya’s rhetorical formulae: ‘With you we will embrace glory’ (‘ma’aka 
nuanik ul-majd’), ‘Al-Fateh: the dawn of freedom’ (al-fateh fajr al-hurriyah’), ‘All 
loyalty is to you, leader of the revolution’ (‘kul al-wafaa’ laka ya qaid al-thuwra’). 
The visual symbolism surrounding Qadhafi shifted regularly: he was illustrated 
as a revolutionary warrior in 1970s, an authentically Bedouin figure during the 1980s, 
and a sub-Saharan African ‘King of Kings’ in the 2000s (Cherstich 2014: 99-100). 
These changes reflected Qadhafi’s own fluctuating political and ideological leanings, 
particularly the redirection of his foreign policy efforts from the Arab world to Africa. 
What remained consistent was the imposition of this imagery onto public space. The 
yearly celebrations of the 1969 coup were a lavish public spectacle that was broadcast 
on Libyan television, and that would see the showcasing of new billboards, designed 
by foreign PR agencies, centring on the figure of Qadhafi (Noueihed and Warren 
2012: 1). Such occasions ultimately marked a dissonance between the regime’s self-
presentation and the social reality of the everyday: in Tripoli, the yearly anniversaries 
were defined by zealous clean-up campaigns and public works initiatives that would 
often be abandoned as soon as the event came to a close.55 
The Jamahiriya’s symbolism also came to dominate cultural terrains such as 
education. Again, this partly involved a process of visual affirmation: Qadhafi’s 
shifting self-representation was imposed onto school uniforms, which variously 
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required the donning of traditional Libyan dress in the 1970s and the wearing of 
military uniforms thereafter.56 In turn, revolutionary committees transformed schools 
and universities, and even children’s theatres and arts halls, into military barracks.57 
However, symbolic dominance was also pursued through the public affirmation of the 
Jamahiriya’s ideology, from a young age. Schools mandated the study and 
examination of The Green Book and its philosophy, in a subject titled ‘The 
Community of the Masses’ (al-mujtama al-jamahiri). As argued by dissident 
Mustafa, schools were presented as rife with ‘political education’ (al-taleem al-
siyasi), but this focused purely on the discussion, replication and re-performance of 
the slogans and ideas put forward by Qadhafi.58 Libyan universities were devoid of 
academic resources on human rights and political pluralism, even within the faculties 
of Political Science and Law.59  
Dominant institutional meanings have been understood as powerful principally 
for their capacity to be rendered ‘invisible’, commonplace and accepted within a 
social sphere (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008: 83). Libyan activists have argued that, 
to some extent, the populace absorbed Qadhafi’s refashioning of Libya’s historical, 
ideological and political landscape in the 1980s. According to the opposition figure 
Hussein, Qadhafi’s approach to education comprised a form of ‘social and cultural 
conditioning’, which ‘had its largest influence on the younger generation…there were 
youngsters who genuinely thought that the “Independence” of Libya came with 
Qadhafi in 1969’.60  The opposition figure Fayez concurs, asserting that adults had 
some understanding of political pluralism, and of the reality of ‘Libya’ before 1969, 																																																								
56 Ibid.	
57 El-Feitouri, Ahmed. “The people demand the fall of the regime” (al-sha’b yureed isqat al-nitham). 
Mayadeen. 22 May 2011. Issue 3: 2.  
58 Interview with Mustafa, anti-regime dissident and human rights campaigner, 4 March 2015. London.  
59 al-Deghali, Salwa. “When the bloodshed began, we called for an end to the regime” (heyna sal al-
dam asbaha al-matlab isqat al-nitham). Mayadeen. 1 May 2011. Issue 1: 16. 
60 Interview with Hussein, NTC representative, 7 November 2016. London. 
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but that those who grew up in the 1980s ‘knew nothing of the world except what 
Qadhafi told them’.61 This claim that the younger generation of Libyans were entirely 
indoctrinated into the Jamahiriya’s ideology is contested by the activist Osama, who 
argues that many could see past its self-aggrandising rhetoric, even if they weren’t 
‘politically educated’.62 According to Aisha, what remained the case, however, was 
the absence of a palpable reference point as to what life in Libya was like prior to the 
Qadhafi regime:  
 
My generation could remember how things were before Qadhafi. The mail 
would be delivered to our house every single day, on time. The litter was 
collected not once, but twice a day. At that time, our schoolteachers were 
Egyptians and Syrians, and they were excellent. The education system was still 
respectable until the early 1980s, before it was taken over by cheating and 
corruption.63  
 
In this view, even if the Jamahiriya’s symbolism wasn’t believed in by the younger 
generation, it still couldn’t be contextualised or compared to an alternative ordering of 
reality in Libya.  
The Jamahiriya’s symbolism was further entrenched in the ideological 
appropriation of musical art forms, such that, according to Libyan journalist Ahmed 
El-Feitouri, the role of culture was turned into ‘something resembling military 
propaganda’.64 Joseph Sassoon (2016: 204) has argued that, within authoritarian 
regimes, the creative arts play a key role in ‘expressing the systematic adulation of the 
leaders and presenting their heroic deeds and wise policies’, both to the populace and 																																																								
61 Interview with Fayez, exiled anti-regime dissident, 27 January 2016. London.		
62 Interview with Osama, reformist anti-regime demonstrator in Tripoli, 30 December 2015. Skype. 
63 Interview with Aisha, women’s rights activist, 6 April 2015. Skype. 
64 El-Feitouri, Ahmed. “The people demand the fall of the regime”. Mayadeen. 22 May 2011. Issue 3: 
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to the outside world. The 1969 coup was represented, from the outset, as the 
expression of popular political will. Songs such as ‘Oh First of September’ (Ya 
aw’wal September) and ‘Celebrations (Afrah) praise the ‘dawn of the Revolution’, 
with the latter valorising its populist spirit: ‘It revolted against sick hearts, and is the 
prosperity of the worker and the farmer’.65 
Increasingly – and again signifying the identification of the Jamahiriya with 
Qadhafi - regime-commissioned music would focus on the proclaimed domestic and 
foreign achievements of Qadhafi himself, such as the construction of the US$20 
billion irrigation project The Great Man-Made River in 1983, hailed by Qadhafi as 
‘the Eighth Wonder of the World’. In the music video for ‘He Brought the River’ 
(Jaab al-nahr), images of the construction project are accompanied by traditional 
Libyan zokra (bagpipes) and religious praise: ‘From the depths of the desert, he 
brought it to our homes; if not for him, we would never have lived this blessed 
moment’.66 Other songs valorise Qadhafi’s accomplishments without offering a 
tangible material referent. ‘Beloved by Millions’ (Habib al-malayeen) praises Qadhafi 
for ‘sowing prosperity and goodness’ in the abstract.67 ‘O’ Leader of Our Revolution’ 
(Ya qaid thawrenta) - one of the most famous Jamahiriya anthems – lauds the 
Jamahiriya’s notional claim to have cultivated direct democracy: ‘We are living in 
freedom, ruled by popular authority’.68  
The concept of ‘clutter’ is used by Wedeen (1999: 6) to describe the way in 
which authoritarian cults deploy the arts as a way of imposing monotonous slogans 
and empty gestures onto public space, thereby serving to ‘tire the minds and bodies of 
producers and consumers alike’. Libyan music ushered in an extensive, affective 																																																								
65 “O’ First of September”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/sh3WUw ; “Celebrations”, YouTube. 
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vocabulary surrounding Qadhafi that was re-performed and chanted on public 
occasions: ‘beloved by revolutionaries’, ‘our leader’, ‘our protector’, ‘the eagle’, ‘the 
knight’, and so on. The Jamahiriya’s ideas, signs and images, were, according to the 
Libyan academic Nizar Krekish, simply inescapable, and led to demoralising cultural 
stagnation: ‘even Libyan singing took on one rhythm, one structure, one tenor’.69 The 
singer Mohammed Najem’s monarchical-era anthem, ‘Libya, a Melody in My Heart’ 
(Libya, ya naghaman fi khatri) was prohibited by the regime: not because it explicitly 
mentioned the monarchy, but because it celebrated ‘Libya’, and not Qadhafi’s 
‘Jamahiriya’.70 Najem goes on to argue that Qadhafi replaced inclusive, nationalistic 
anthems, such as his own, with songs exclusively devoted to ‘glorifying the 
illusionary success’ of the Qadhafi regime; in the process, he undermined creativity 
and established ‘phony, fearful rituals’ in the sphere of the arts.  
Moreover, and as noted by Wedeen, authoritarian regimes can prolong the 
longevity of their spectacles and images by repeatedly representing them on television 
over many years (1999: 24). In the official state television channel, Al-Jamahiriya TV, 
panegyric music was a regular part of its broadcasting schedule, customarily plugging 
in any gaps between other programmes.71 It has been argued that ‘the songs were 
played day and night on official Libyan television and radio…and there was no way 
to escape from this media of “the Jamahiriya’s heaven on earth” except by snatching 
glances at the television channels of other neighbouring countries’.72 
Above all, and in line with an institutional interpretation of the Jamahiriya, this 
iconography can be seen as powerful principally for its capacity to shape the symbolic 
																																																								
69 Agela, Awad. “There is a difference” (tham’mata farq). Al-Manarah, 29 July 2011. Issue 6: 8. 
70 Najem, Mohammed. “Even the air is different…and nature also” (hatta al-hawa 
mukhtalif…waltabe’aa aydan). Mayadeen. 1 May 2011. Issue 1: 18. 
71 Interview with Tareq, social media activist and translator, 14 February 2015. Oxford 
72 Burawi, Intissar. “The nationalistic song…a missing melody” (al-nasheed al-watani…nagham 
mukhtafee). Mayadeen, 2 August 2011. Issue 12: 8.	
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landscape of social life, and for its ability to concretise that system of meaning by 
mandating its ritualistic, public re-performance across multiple cultural spheres. 
Indeed, the very act of public speaking on state television necessitated the 
performance of obedience: greetings and praise for the ‘Brother Leader’, and the 
offering of good wishes for whichever festive occasion that was occurring at the time. 
Guests appearing on television programmes were careful to say ‘the Jamahiriya’ as 
often as possible, instead of ‘Libya’.73 More formally, and from the 1990s, tribes, 
communities and organisations increasingly proffered ‘loyalty contracts’ (wathiqat 
‘ahd wa muba’ya) towards Qadhafi. Such oaths were underpinned by Islamic rhetoric, 
and have been interpreted as signalling a strong, public endorsement of Qadhafi’s rule 
(Sadiki 2014: 20). In reality, it has been argued by the Tripoli-based activist Reem 
that such oaths of allegiance were understood to be a transactional mechanism for 
gaining support from the regime, and were undertaken by a host of community 
organisations in need of financial backing.74 
 As with oaths to Hafiz al-Asad, such proclamations rivalled the regime’s own 
panegyrics by ‘upping the rhetorical ante’ with increasingly ‘outlandish’ statements of 
loyalty (Wedeen 1999: 34-35). An oath of allegiance by ‘The International 
Association of Qadhafi Supporters’, hosted by the Libyan Medical University in 
Benghazi in April 2010, declared Qadhafi to be ‘the bearer of green hope and green 
thought…ushering forth a society of eternal happiness above the earth and under the 
sun’.75 The rhetoric is indiscriminate, deploying assorted formulae, images and 
symbols in an interchangeable and incongruous manner. As with the music of the 
Jamahiriya, the sentiment is a utopian one, and is not supported by references to 																																																								
73 Interview with Osama, reformist anti-regime demonstrator in Tripoli, 30 December 2015. Skype.  
74 Interview with Reem, women’s rights activist in Tripoli, 15 March 2015. Skype. 
75 “A declaration of loyalty to the brother leader of the revolution”. Libya Watanona, Available at: 
https://goo.gl/G5ryBV		
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tangible material practices. The significance here is not in its content, but in the act of 
its performance. As argued by Scott (1990: 4) the act of compliance within the public 
domain demonstrates and reinforces the existence of power relations, even if it does 
not arise from willing consent. 
There are undoubtedly commonalities between the Jamahiriya’s iconography 
and that of other Arab authoritarian regimes. For instance, Qadhafi repeatedly equated 
his political mission with the popular will of the Libyan people. In this, he arguably 
mirrored the personality cult of Saddam Hussein, which presented Saddam as 
embodying the aspirations of his people, and as the product of destiny (Sassoon 2016: 
207). The image of Qadhafi as ruler was also superimposed onto the nation through 
the use of familial metaphors. Songs such ‘We are a family, and the leader is our 
father’ (ihna eyla wil qa’id buna) represent Qadhafi as both the nation’s father and 
son.76 This is a characteristic of authoritarian symbolism that was deployed in Syria, 
Tunisia, and Iraq (Sassoon 2016: 204). Libyan stamps in 1983 and 1984 also 
deployed paternal imagery, depicting Qadhafi as a champion of World Heath Day and 
African Children’s Day respectively, surrounded by beaming children in traditional 
Libyan dress.77 
Despite these commonalities, the Jamahiriya’s symbolism was channelled 
towards different ends from that of the Arab republics. Qadhafi did not deploy 
symbolism as a part of an attempt to undertake ‘symbolic nation building’, as was the 
case in Syria and other post-colonial Arab states (Wedeen 1999: 14-17). The 
cultivated linkage between ruler and ruled, in the Jamahiriya, sought not to absorb the 
latter, but to displace it. While representing Qadhafi as the origin, representative and 
focal point of the Jamahiriya, the regime anonymised individuals within the public 																																																								
76 “We are a family and the leader is our father”.YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/84LebM  
77 Appendix: Figure 1 and 2. Stuart Aitken.		
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sphere. Citing the policy of referring to GPC delegates using numbers, rather than 
their names, a Libyan activist asserted that ‘nobody was allowed to appear to shine, to 
become well-known or successful, under Qadhafi. Even if someone said something 
sensible, we wouldn’t know who he or she was. And as soon as that happened, they 
had to be removed’.78 The activist Ahmed recalled his refusal to support the Libyan 
national football team prior to the 2011 uprising: the anonymity of the players (who 
were once again referred to using their squad numbers) and the exaggerated centrality 
of Qadhafi’s son, Al-Saadi, rendered it impossible to identify with the team.79 This 
phenomenon is further elaborated upon by the Libyan dissident Idris al-Tayyeb: 
 
The word ‘diversity’, which connotes the very essence of human life, was 
completely absent in Libyan political life for over four decades. Only one 
voice dominated all manifestations of life in Libya…and he sought to 
dissolve the identities of Libyan citizens into his own, in one of the most 
brutal acts of repression in modern history. Any attempt by a Libyan citizen 
to express his or her individuality was criminalised. This started from the 
suppression of footballers’ names, and continued with the suppression of the 
names of political officials.80 
 
Many of the Libyans interviewed for this research spoke of the way in which Qadhafi 
had so imposed his own identity onto the country that he inevitably dominated – and 
even tarnished - the act of publically identifying oneself as a ‘Libyan’ to outsiders. 
The Jamahiriya’s symbolic displacement of the populace functioned alongside its 
material technologies of control, which undermined the organisational and 
																																																								
78 Interview with Aisha, women’s rights activist, 6 April 2016. Skype.  
79 Interview with Ahmed, social media activist, 25 February 2015. London. 
80 al-Tayyeb, Idris. “Contexts of diversity in the transitional period” (seyaq al-tanawwu fil marhala al-
haleyya). Mayadeen. 14 June 2011. Issue 6: 18.			
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representational capacity of Libyans. Together, they indicate Qadhafi’s fragmentation 
and domination of the Libyan body politic.  
 
The Jamahiriya created a system of signification that attempted to define and 
monopolise cultural meanings for its observers. It shaped the visual, symbolic and 
even temporal realities of Libyan society, cluttering public space with its meanings 
and demanding their replication, while ideologically freeing itself of any 
accountability to live up to this self-presentation. Central to the Jamahiriya’s system 
of meaning was not, contrary to the regime’s ideology, the concepts of pan-Arab 
nationalism, anti-colonialism, or religion, but the eulogised image of Qadhafi himself, 
who in turn became a metonym for the nation. This system of symbolic organisation 
perpetuated the Jamahiriya’s internal contradictions: its enforcement of what it 
claimed to be a vocabulary of popular will; its creation of narratives that were 
presented as immutable, historical truths; and the palpable gap between its idealised 
self-presentation and the political and material reality inside Libya. 
 
5.5 Polysemy and Tolerated Transgression in the Jamahiriya  	
 
The Jamahiriya contained a symbolic system that classified social and political 
reality, and that propagated those meanings by ritualising their performance in the 
public sphere. Nevertheless, and despite acknowledging the dominant presence of this 
symbolism, I diverge from the multi-institutional politics literature, which argues that 
institutional classifications come to be seen as a ‘common sense’ and accepted way of 
doing things (Zucker 1977; Dimaggio and Powell 1991), thereby reproducing ‘belief’ 
in the institution (Friedland and Alford 1991: 250). In the following, and in line with 
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Sewell’s concept of ‘polysemy’ as an empowering resource, I explore the way in 
which the multiple meanings present within the Jamahiriya’s logic of practice were 
variously reinterpreted, mobilised and subverted by Libyans (Sewell 1992: 19) in 
ways that enabled them to signal their disbelief in the system while abiding by its 
‘guidelines for acceptable speech and behaviour’ (Wedeen 1999: 6). Libyans were not 
bereft of agency in relation to this system of meaning: once again, and as with its 
material technologies of control, they were situated within, and manoeuvred around, 
the Jamahiriya’s contradictory logic. 
One of the central ‘intra-institutional contradictions’ (Jackall 1988) in the 
Jamahiriya, that Libyans recognised and exploited, was the tension between the 
regime’s idealised self-presentation and the palpable reality of everyday life in Libya. 
This tension was visible in the Jamahiriya’s inadequacies as a ‘distributive state’: for 
instance, its freezing of public sector wages for decades, and its abandonment of the 
Italian fascist standards of municipal cleaning that had persisted in the 1960s, and that 
were recalled by most Libyans living in cities (Wright 2010: 218). However, the gap 
between ideology and reality became further apparent in the context of unilateral 
sanctions by the United States in the 1980s and multilateral United Nations sanctions 
in 1992, which led Libyan people to experience declining living standards, material 
deprivation and social and economic hardship (Joffé 2016: 122). The Jamahiriya’s 
claim to have delivered ‘prosperity’ for all Libyans was palpably at odds with reality.  
The self-image of the Jamahiriya was contested through what have been 
described as ‘methods of disguised expression’ inside the country (Al-Werfalli 2011: 
32), or what Scott has referred to as ‘the world of rumor, gossip, disguises’ (1990: 
137). According to Scott, this form of expression enables subjugated groups to contest 
domination and to signal their agency in relation to it, albeit in a concealed manner. 
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Tareq, an activist who was raised between the UK and Libya, outlined the use of the 
term ‘the situation’ (al-wada) to describe the reality of life in the Jamahiriya: ‘there 
was always a strong tendency to just shy away from speaking about anything political, 
but there were instances where people would express their displeasure about the state 
of the country without mentioning the regime’.81 Thus, to complain about ‘the 
situation we’re in’ would be to evoke the context of the Qadhafi regime without 
implicating it directly.  
A central method of disguised expression in Libya was the circulation of covert 
political jokes between confidantes, which constituted a form of social commentary 
about the Jamahiriya and its practices. In the process of narrating jokes, the grandiose 
rhetoric and image of the regime would be transposed into a series of miniaturised, 
derisory sketches that both satirised the regime and affirmed its dominance over the 
public sphere. Humour has also been described as a way of ameliorating the 
difficulties of everyday life, and as affirming an alternative basis for Libyan 
collectivity, giving rise to the popular expression: ‘Anyone who wasn’t born a Libyan 
has missed out on all the fun’ (il-lee ma jash leebee faatah el-jaw kullah).82  
One series of jokes referenced the economic crisis and ubiquitous food 
shortages in the 1980s: 
 
One day a man complained that there was no more flour, so security forces 
quickly arrested him. There took him somewhere were there was a basin full of 
flour. They dunked his head in it over and over again, asking him, ‘Is there flour 
or not?’ until he confirmed that there was plenty of flour. He left delighted. 
People asked him why he was happy, and he said ‘I’m glad I didn’t complain 
about the shortage in chilli powder!’  																																																								
81 Interview with Tareq, social media activist and translator, 14 February 2015. Oxford.  
82 Interview with Salem, former economic analyst and anti-regime demonstrator, 10 December 2016. 
Birmingham.		
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The joke signals that the Jamahiriya’s assertions of material prosperity are patently 
untrue, and that this constitutes widespread knowledge among Libyans. It also 
explicates the regime’s tactic of domination: what it requires is the public 
performance of compliance, or the acting ‘as if’ everything is acceptable, even if that 
means the denial of one’s own subjective experiences. Above all, the joke both 
affirms the strength of the security sector, while suggesting, in the punch line, that 
ingenuity can help one avoid the worst of its excesses.  
Other jokes played on the exaggerated, public declarations of allegiance to 
Qadhafi: 
 
One day Qadhafi went out hunting. He shot a bird, but he didn’t manage to kill 
it and it escaped. People around him immediately started clapping and 
chanting, ‘It’s dead but still flying! al-Fateh! It’s dead but still flying! al-
Fateh!’  
 
The joke satirises the unspoken directive that all of Qadhafi’s actions, however 
inconsequential or unimpressive, had to be celebrated and ascribed back to the al-
Fateh (1 September) revolution, even when such celebrations clearly constituted an 
insincere performance. It mocks the familiar, sycophantic chant al-Fateh, which was 
intermittently uttered during Qadhafi’s lengthy public speeches. Again, and similar to 
the joke about the food shortages, it also signifies the absence of ‘belief’ in the 
Jamahiriya’s symbolism. The joke also boldly depicts Qadhafi as a tangible and 
flawed person. In this vein, Igor Cherstich has also argued that Libyans didn’t 
‘passively accept the view of Gaddafi as a “disembodied symbol” put forward by the 
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propaganda of the regime, but critically engaged with it by questioning it and by 
creating their own narratives around it’ (2014: 95). 
Another extensive genre of jokes centred on caricaturing the relationship 
between Qadhafi and Prime Minister Abdel Salam Jalloud, one of the 1969 Free 
Officers:  
 
Qadhafi and Jalloud went to the Kremlin, where everything was made of gold. 
They were sitting in front of a banquet, with gold cutlery laid out. Jalloud 
sneakily took a golden spoon and put it in his pocket, thinking that nobody had 
noticed. Qadhafi suddenly stood up and said, ‘Now everyone, I’m going to 
perform a magic feat. I’m going to take this gold spoon, and put it in my 
pocket…and now Jalloud, take the spoon out of your own pocket!’ 
 
The joke reveals that Jalloud was commonly seen as attempting to ‘outsmart’ 
Qadhafi, but perpetually failing in his attempts to do so. In this genre of jokes, 
Qadhafi not only emerges as omniscient, but also as cunning, able to discretely secure 
his personal wealth in a subtle manner. However, and according to its narrator, the 
joke is also a covert social commentary on Libyans themselves, demonstrating the 
opportunistic tendency to ‘steal whenever there’s a chance’ that underpinned the 
operation of the public sphere.83 
Politically themed jokes, particularly those that mentioned Qadhafi, were 
narrated with circumspection, in the privacy of homes, because of their clearly 
subversive qualities. However, there was also a more implicit form of humorous, 
political commentary, exemplified in the entertainment programmes that were 
broadcast on Libyan state television during the late 1990s onwards, the most famous 
of which were broadcast during Ramadan. Shows such They Said It (Galooha), 																																																								
83 Interview with Aisha, women’s rights activist, 6 April 2016. Skype.  
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Spreading It (Eysarha) and At the End of the Day (Min el-Akhir) played on the 
material inadequacies of life in the Jamahiriya, and on the dishonesty and corruption 
endemic within the public sphere. They also contained mechanisms for tempering the 
subversive implications of the comedy, in particular, by manipulating the regime’s 
logic of practice in order to avoid implicating it directly. In this respect, they 
demonstrate that an institution’s ‘array of resources is capable of being interpreted in 
varying ways’ (Sewell 1992: 19), in ways that signal the presence of agency.   
Every episode of They Said It would feature a whispering sketch (‘Haven’t you 
Heard?’) in which mock-rumours were exchanged and pondered between two elderly 
men over tea. One such rumour focused on the finiteness of the Great Man-Made 
River:   
 
Didn’t you hear about the Man-Made River? Didn’t they say that the River’s 
water would satisfy our needs for more than 50 years…between drinking, and 
agriculture, and industry and everything else? Well, they’re now saying it’s 
draining away, and soon they won’t find a single drop left.84 
 
As noted in the previous section, the Great Man-Made River was an important point 
of adulation in the regime’s arsenal of accomplishments. The rumour itself mocks the 
effusive rhetoric surrounding the irrigation project, while using the third-person 
pronoun ‘they’ to avoid explicit reference to Qadhafi himself. Another series of 
rumours absurdly exaggerates the quality of public services in Libya, from healthcare 
provision to firefighting: 
 
																																																								
84 “The River’s Waters are Draining” (meyah al-nahr bitanzah). YouTube. Available at: 
https://goo.gl/8fRTzm  
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Didn’t you hear about the man who was hit by a bus on the highway? What, you 
think he died? Don’t be silly. When the passengers came to check up on him, 
they found him standing and arguing with the driver – nothing was wrong with 
him at all. Apparently, and here’s the secret, when the bus hit him, the 
ambulance came, took him, treated him, and returned him to his spot straight 
away. All before the passengers had even left the bus.85 
 
By pointing towards the palpable infrastructural deficiencies inside Libya, such 
rumours indicate a clear collapse in the so-called ‘material legitimacy’ (Schwarz 
2008: 607) of rentier authoritarian regimes. Although, as noted previously, the 
Jamahiriya did not strictly function in a distributive manner, its self-applauding 
rhetoric certainly drew on its claim to have fulfilled the material needs of Libyan 
society. Nevertheless, the incendiary potential of such rumours is well contained. The 
conclusion of each rumour sketch directs attention away from its content and 
emphasises its unsubstantiated and dubious source: ‘So what you’re telling me here - 
did you see it with your own eyes?’ Any hint of culpability is shifted away from the 
regime and towards the indulgent practice of rumour dissemination. 
The redirection of accountability away from the Qadhafi regime, and towards 
the Libyan public, is a central tenet in the Jamahiriya’s logic of practice that was 
exploited within comedy shows. Sketches in They Said It often drew attention to the 
mismanagement, nepotism and corruption within the Libyan public sector, while 
affirming the responsibility of Libyans for its operation. One particular sketch, ‘Ms. 
Suheya’ (abla Subheya), focuses on the superfluity of the many teaching staff in the 
Education sector, and the short-lived attempt to remedy this, in 2006, through the 
compilation of staff members deemed ‘Surplus to school needs’, as part of Saif al-
																																																								
85 “Ambulances” (sayyarat al-isaf). YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/Uf7rjA See also “Fire 
Engines” (al-matafi), a similarly structured sketch. Available at: https://goo.gl/GPkvZQ  
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Islam’s drive towards institutional reform. The sketch showcases the virulent, 
aggressive reactions to what it presents as an eminently sensible policy. One teacher 
rejects her inclusion on the list on nepotistic grounds: ‘How could you place me on the 
list of surplus teachers, when I was the one who managed your son’s wedding from 
start to finish?’86  
Comedy shows in the Jamahiriya identify societal and administrative problems, 
but affix the responsibility for them onto the Libyan people. For this reason, one 
activist explained, such shows were not simply ‘tolerated’, but permitted and indulged 
in Libya.87 According to the ideology of the Jamahiriya, popular self-criticism is a 
vital component of a direct democracy, and such shows embodied The Green Book’s 
mantra that ‘society alone supervises itself’ (al-Qadhafi 1980: 31). In turn, Qadhafi 
remained outside of the formal system, and could not therefore be held responsible for 
the misgovernment of Libyans: a principle that television comedy abided with. In 
addition to this internal-proofing of each sketch, the conclusion of each season of 
They Said It overtly accounted for any slippages in the rhetoric of compliance. The 
final episode would see the cast and crew reiterating their allegiance to Qadhafi and 
apologising for any untoward offense caused, thereby signalling their adherence to a 
politically correct mode of behaviour.   
Satirical comedy demonstrates Sewell’s argument that, within a dominant 
configuration of meaning, ‘knowledge of cultural schemas (in this case of interaction 
rituals) implies the ability to act creatively’ (1992: 20). By exploiting the 
contradiction between the Jamahiriya’s material weaknesses and the formal political 
power accorded to Libyans, comedy could carefully skirt the boundary between 
compliance and dissent. As an institution, the Jamahiriya both supplied the logic 																																																								
86 “Ms. Subheya” (‘abla subheya’). YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/N52Raj  
87 Interview with Aisha, women’s rights activist, 6 April 2016. Skype.		
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underpinning the dominant symbolic order, and contained the contradiction through 
which that logic could be exposed. As a result, the agency manifested in the 
Jamahiriya’s tolerated transgressions can be described as ‘embedded’ or ‘partial 
autonomy’ (Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 104) in that it was ultimately imbricated with 
the reproduction of its symbolic system.  
Tolerated transgressions in the online sphere further demonstrate the exploitable 
polysemy of institutional meaning. The popular Facebook page ‘It Happens Only in 
Libya’ (Yahduth faqat fe leebya) was created by the young engineer Osama, prior to 
the Libyan uprising, as a way of displaying humorous images of Libya’s social, 
infrastructural and bureaucratic failings. He argues that his objective was to 
undermine Qadhafi, but that at the time, ‘you had to know the rules to play the 
game…don’t mention Qadhafi, his family, or his closest associates, and you could 
criticise the system as much as you wanted to’.88 In an interview with Al-Jamahiriya 
TV in November 2010, in which he was quizzed about the Facebook page by the 
anchor Hala Misrati, he asserted that the page had sensible, reformist intentions: 
‘there are red lines we can’t cross…Libyan citizens and state institutions must 
ultimately take responsibility for this chaos’.89 Indeed, Osamaeven justified the 
propriety of the page to Misrati by explicitly quoting Qadhafi’s saying that ‘in a direct 
democracy, society alone supervises itself’.90  
Housam’s Facebook page and Libyan television comedies evince the assertion 
that acts of subversion within a repressive system ‘will largely observe the “rules” 
even if their objective is to undermine them’ (Scott 1990: 93). Outside of Libya, 
symbolic contestation was not so deferential. Websites such as Libya Al-Mostakbal, 																																																								
88 Interview with Osama, reformist anti-regime demonstrator in Tripoli, 30 December 2015. Skype.  
89 “It Happens Only in Libya…On Air” (‘yahdoth faqat fe Libya…ala al-hawa). YouTube. Available 
at: https://goo.gl/4zzBSs  
90 Ibid.	
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Libya Watanona, Al-Manarah Media, and Akhbar Libya, established in the late 1990s 
and early 2000s by UK-based dissidents, attempted to ‘destabilise the regime, confuse 
it…chip at it from all directions’.91 They challenged Qadhafi’s monopoly over public 
meaning, supplying alternative historical narratives of the country, and exhibiting 
Libyan artwork, music and folk poetry that were disconnected from the image of the 
Jamahiriya.92 The opposition writer Fathi el-Fadhli published a short book on Libya 
Al-Mostakbal in which he envisaged an alternative political system for the country 
post-Qadhafi.93 Such websites also undermined the self-aggrandising representational 
practices of the regime by mocking its rhetoric and by displaying satirical caricatures 
of Qadhafi and his family (York 2012). One Canadian-based Libyan rapper created 
anti-Qadhafi music and disseminated it online, through such websites and in Arab and 
Libyan forums, with the purpose of undermining the regime, arguing that ‘even if it 
was only Qadhafi’s security forces, I knew there was an audience’.94 However, 
although these forms of symbolic contestation did not abide with the regime’s logic of 
practice, affixing the blame principally on Qadhafi and his inner circle, it has been 
conceded that such challenges had little hope of shaping the discursive realities inside 
Libya. Many of the opposition’s websites were blocked (OpenNet 2009); when they 
were periodically unblocked, ‘they would still be monitoring them…not many people 
would risk accessing Libya Al-Mostakbal in an Internet café’.95 
There were a few instances in which a visible breakdown of the Jamahiriya’s 
symbolic authority occurred inside Libya. In those moments, public events ostensibly 																																																								
91 Interview with Fayez, exiled anti-regime dissident, 27 January 2016. London.  
92 An extended 25 page ‘alternative history’ of Benghazi by Libyan journalist Fathalla Ibzewu, 
published on Libya Al-Mostakbal, describes the toleration of ideological pluralism under the 
monarchy, extensively ridicules the Qadhafi regime’s laws and newspapers, and attacks the Libyan 
leader’s closest aides. Available at: https://goo.gl/Vy55kj    
93 el-Fadhli, Fathi. “The Political Alternative in Libya…and the post-Revolution State” (al-badeel al 
seyasi fe Libya…wa dawlat ma ba’d al thawra). Libya Watanona. 26 August 2006. Available at: 
https://goo.gl/Tu55NR  
94 Interview with Fawzi. 29 December 2015. Skype.  
95 Interview with Osama, reformist anti-regime demonstrator in Tripoli, 30 December 2015. Skype.		
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convened for one purpose ‘serve as opportunities to briefly and quickly assert broad 
oppositional claims’ (Johnston 2015: 630). Football-related protests broke out in 
Tripoli in 1989, and in Benghazi in 2000, and were transformed into riots against the 
Qadhafi regime that were swiftly and brutally suppressed (Hilsum 2012: 84). 
Similarly, a large demonstration took place in front of the Italian consulate in 
Benghazi on 17 February 2006, initially against the publication of the Prophet 
Muhammad cartoons; however, it escalated into an anti-regime protest that was 
violently quashed over a period of days (BBC 2006). Such events were explained 
away by the regime as acts of hooliganism and opportunism, and Libyan activists 
continue to disagree over their long-term symbolic significance.96  
The most prominent protests in Libya, prior to the 2011 uprising, were those 
undertaken by families of the men killed in the 1996 Abu Slim massacre. Represented 
by the young lawyer Fathi Terbil, a large number of families refused to accept 
financial compensation from the Qadhafi regime for the deaths, and protested outside 
the Benghazi Courthouse every Saturday from 2007 until the onset of the uprising in 
2011 (Khalil 2014: 97). In many respects, these demonstrations were a striking and 
disarming visual spectacle, comprised largely of elderly women, widows and 
children: a far sight from the occasional football riot in Libya.97 However, the Abu 
Slim justice movement continued to operate under the mantle of Saif al-Islam 
Qadhafi’s International Charity and Development Foundation (Hilsum 2012: 104). As 																																																								
96 George Joffé (2016: 124) has argued that the 2006 Benghazi demonstration engendered a spirit of 
public protest in the city and undermined the regime’s sense of invulnerability. Libyan activists such as 
Ahmed and Fawzi affirmed this interpretation of the event’s significance, and deployed the date of 17 
February as a symbolic marker in their mobilisation efforts. According to Fawzi, it was a ‘defining 
point for the city of Benghazi’. Other activists inside Benghazi, such as Marwa and Mansour, saw the 
riots as the work of disruptive individuals, rather than as the empowering act of a whole city, and 
claimed that most people simply wanted them to be over.  
97 According to the Libyan politician Hussein, videos of the protests were filmed by demonstrators 
inside Benghazi before being uploaded onto YouTube and disseminated online by exiled dissidents, in 
what was a coordinated effort to undermine the regime. For footage of the protests from 2008 and 
2009, see: https://goo.gl/BJXcm1 and https://goo.gl/bx2Lg6 	
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a result, it upheld the regime’s unspoken logic of practice: protesters demanded 
accountability and punishment for ‘the executors’, but without ever naming Qadhafi’s 
head of internal security, Abdullah al-Sanussi, who was widely held to be responsible 
for the massacre.98   
 
5.6 Conclusion 	
 
This chapter has analysed the Jamahiriya as an institution possessive of material and 
symbolic technologies of domination, which together constituted an ordering of 
reality, or ‘institutional logic’. Its material practices of domination centred on an 
extensive coercive apparatus and a system of governance that undermined the 
organisational and representational capacities of Libyan society. In turn, symbolic 
practices situated Qadhafi as a metonym for the ‘Jamahiriya’, cluttering public space 
and compelling Libyans, through an assortment of ritualised practices, to reproduce 
the symbolic order of the institution (Friedland and Alford 1991: 250). This symbolic 
order was ultimately an exclusionary one: it defined the Libyan nation as a collective 
principally devoted to sustaining Qadhafi’s 1969 ‘Al-Fateh Revolution’, and 
actualised this definition of power and prestige, within its material landscape, by 
rewarding political commitment and obedience to Qadhafi’s revolution through 
mechanisms of patronage. I argue that the Jamahiriya’s logic of practice 
fundamentally involved the upholding of contradictory and incommensurate claims, 
particularly regarding the bifurcation of ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ authority that saw 
Libyans saddled with political accountability with no corresponding political 
representation.      																																																								
98 Interview with Hussein, NTC representative, 7 November 2016. London.  
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As argued within the multi-institutional politics literature, all institutions, 
however dominant, not only regularise behaviour but supply opportunities for agency 
(Thornton and Occasio 2008: 102). This chapter has stressed that the ‘polysemy of 
resources’ within an institution provide room for semiotic manoeuvre, or the ‘creative 
transposition’ of existent meanings’ (Sewell 1992: 18-21). Libyans could exploit the 
internal contradictions within this authoritarian logic of practice; materially, through 
extractive practices, and symbolically, by cloaking potentially subversive claims in 
the Jamahiriya’s own rhetoric of popular accountability. As a result, it was not the 
case that Libyan society was ‘unable to contemplate or express any ideas beyond 
those espoused by Qadhafi’ (Vandewalle 2015: 23). Nevertheless, although the 
Jamahiriya’s institutional hold ‘on our processes of classifying and recognizing’ 
(Douglas 1986: 3) may have been weak, its capacity to impose publically political 
representations remained strong.  
Having supplied an account of the structural status quo prior to the Libyan 
uprising, the following two chapters will examine the emergence of political agency 
during the 2011 Libyan uprising in relation to the Jamahiriya’s logic of practice. 
Political agency will be analysed as a form of open, contentious articulation that was 
both strategic, seeking to encourage political mobilisation, and symbolic, seeking the 
creation of alternative political subjectivities.  
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6 
Agency as Strategic Articulation: ‘Framing’ the 
Libyan Uprising 
 
 
6.1 Introduction  
 
The former chapter argued that Muammar al-Qadhafi anchored popular political 
agency within the Libyan Jamahiriya’s ‘institutional logic’. Libyans demonstrated 
what can be described as ‘embedded’ autonomy (Thornton and Occasio 2008: 104): 
they were compelled to publically reproduce the Jamahiriya’s material and symbolic 
technologies of control, while manoeuvring within its inconsistencies in order to both 
sustain their material interests and to signal their private eschewal of its symbolic 
order. This chapter will counterpoise this structural interpretation by focusing on the 
emergence of political agency as an openly articulated, contentious and strategic 
phenomenon during the 2011 Libyan uprising. It is grounded in the theoretical 
premise that ‘historical watershed’ events (Sewell 1999: 52) create political actors 
who are capable of producing new, social constructions of reality.  
The following discussion deploys social movement framing theory (Snow et al 
1986; Snow and Benford 1988) in order to investigate agency as a meaning making 
practice, and meaning making as strategic in intent: in this instance, directed towards 
political mobilisation against the Qadhafi regime. The first section of this chapter 
outlines the organisational vehicles and networks that emerged within the Libyan 
opposition movement in 2011, and which facilitated the dissemination of strategic 
representations, or ‘framings’, of social reality. It emphasises the way in which these 
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networks were comprised of a mixture of pre-existent and emergent clusters of 
political activists, or ‘social movement entrepreneurs’. As a result, the legitimacy and 
reach of their representational practices derived from the collaboration of an 
assortment of geographically, ideologically and generationally diverse political 
activists and opposition figures.  
The subsequent, and central, section of this chapter outlines the collective action 
frames that Libyan activists produced and promulgated during the course of the 
Libyan uprising, and which offered ‘strategic interpretations of issues with the 
intention of mobilizing people to act’ (Noakes and Johnston 2015: 5). These framings 
strategically packaged the empirical sequence of anti-regime protests, regime violence 
and military conflict as a seamless narrative of popular, emancipatory revolt. In 
addition, these emergent understandings also existed in a ‘dialogic’ (Steinberg 2002: 
208) relation with the Jamahiriya’s institutional logic. In particular, diagnostic 
framing exposed Qadhafi’s incongruous attribution of political agency to the Libyan 
people. As a result, the Libyan opposition movement referenced a discourse that it 
broadly sought to refute, while also amplifying values – such as ‘freedom’ and ‘self-
determination’ – that were common in the Jamahiriya’s terrain of meaning. 
The chapter concludes by engaging reflexively with the framing perspective, 
problematising the relationship between strategy and meaning making practices that it 
presents. Social movement theory has customarily presented these as complementary 
and mutually reinforcing dimensions of political agency (Benford and Snow 2000: 
614). However, and drawing on the preceding discussion, I indicate the ways in which 
a strategic orientation towards mobilisation occasionally undercut Libyan activists’ 
attempts to articulate and reconstitute social reality as they experienced it during the 
uprising. 
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6.2 Networks of Framing in the Libyan Uprising  
 
The sporadic outbreak of the first anti-regime protests in Libya, from 15 to 25 
February 2011, suggests that the uprising was decentralised in nature. Across Libya, 
demonstrations varied in location and in form. Rippling outwards from the East to the 
West, they were at times peaceful, but occasionally spiralled into violent 
confrontations with the regime (Sawani 2014: 78). In Benghazi, small groups of 
university students had agreed to protest on 17 February, in accordance with the 
directives issued on multiple Facebook groups, but adjusted their protest plans 
following the arrest of the lawyer for the Abu Slim families, Fathi Terbil, on 15 
February.99 Such was the radical impact of the arrest that according to the Libyan 
Youth Movement’s Ahmed, who had helped issue those Facebook directives, ‘if it 
wasn’t for the Abu Slim guys, I don’t think anything would have ever happened’.100 
In Tripoli, protests first broke out in earnest on 20 February, and even then came as a 
surprise to those who had called for them.101 The unpredictable nature of the 
demonstrations appears to validate the assessment of the Arab uprisings as 
‘horizontal’, devoid of clearly identifiable or hierarchically positioned leaders 
(Bamyeh 2011a; Korany 2014; Sutherland et al 2014; Esposito et al 2016).  
However, even if protests in Libya emerged without an overarching leadership 
or organisational structure, they were swiftly interpreted, packaged and framed in 
increasingly systematic ways. Political actors who construct and disseminate 
collective action frames in such a way have been described as ‘social movement 
entrepreneurs’ (Noakes and Johnston 2005). The term is arguably an imperfect one – 
it unintentionally connotes a drive towards personal gain, for instance (ibid: 7) – but it 																																																								
99 Interview with Hamza, anti-regime demonstrator and civil society activist, 4 April 2015. London.  
100 Interview with Ahmed, social media activist, 25 February 2015. London.  
101 Interview with Ali, rebel coordinator and fighter in Tripoli, 9 February 2015. Skype.		
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does capture the notion that promoting a message and a cause necessitates a degree of 
strategic initiative. The Libyan uprising saw the emergence of social movement 
entrepreneurs: clusters of political activists, principally in the diaspora, and political 
figures, belonging to the National Transitional Council (NTC), who comprised a 
‘partially organized order’ (Den Hon et al 2015) of collaborative groups and 
networks. Together, they framed the revolutionary cause to foreign audiences, 
bystanders, and Libyans residing inside the country.   
The Libyan NTC, which convened its first meeting in Benghazi on 27 February 
2011, and was formally established on 5 March, characterised itself in its founding 
declaration as the ‘only legitimate body representing the Libyan people and the 
Libyan state’,102  possessing a form of sovereign authority that was sufficient to 
administer and manage the Libyan revolution and its post-Qadhafi transitional phase 
(Sawani and Pack 2013: 523). Its stated aim was to ‘steer Libya during the interim 
period that will come after its complete liberation and the destruction of the Gaddafi 
regime’.103 During the course of the uprising, it effectively formed an interim 
transitional government. As argued by Mezran and Knecht (2015: 86), ‘the rapid 
formation of the NTC was a stroke of public diplomacy genius with profound 
implications for the rebel war effort’. Its framing of the protests, and the subsequent 
military conflict in Libya, as the expression of a collective, popular struggle for 
democracy in the country, was ultimately geared towards the attainment of strategic 
goals: the acquisition of Western military, financial and diplomatic support for the 
uprising, the mobilisation of tribes and revolutionary fighters in the military conflict, 
and economic assistance in the unfreezing of Libyan assets abroad (Bartu 2015).  
																																																								
102 The Interim Transitional National Council. “Introducing the Council”. Available at: 
https://goo.gl/zyzERX  
103 Ibid. 
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The NTC’s claim to possessing both popular credibility and ‘professional 
expertise’ (Noakes and Johnston 2005: 13) partly rested on its diverse internal 
composition. It drew together a range of figures - exiled regime opponents, political 
reformists, technocrats, academics, journalists and lawyers – with varying 
proficiencies, histories of political engagement with the regime, and complementary 
public images. The interim Prime Minister, Mahmoud Jibril, head of the NEDB under 
Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, was able to draw on the connections he established at the time 
in his attempts to persuade Western countries to recognise and support the NTC 
(Mezran and Knecht 2015: 82). Mahmoud Shammam and Ali Tarhouni, the NTC’s 
information minister and finance minister respectively, were credible and 
longstanding opponents of the Qadhafi regime,104 whereas the NTC’s official 
spokesman, Abdul Hafiz Ghoga, was a prominent reformist lawyer for the Abu Slim 
movement for victims’ families. In turn, where Jibril and Shammam were noted for 
their secular leanings (Dawisha 2013: 156), Mustafa Abdul Jalil, Libya’s former 
minister of justice and the NTC’s chairman, was described as a religiously devout and 
uncontroversial figure, on whom everyone could agree to unite: ‘the lowest common 
denominator’.105 
The NTC’s retroactive narrative of the protests was authoritatively addressed to 
a diverse array of audiences: from foreign governments, to the European Parliament, 
to tribes affiliated with the Qadhafi regime. According to the NTC member Hussein, 
‘one of our main responsibilities during the revolution was to spread a positive, united 
message about Libya’, and to do so through multiple appearances and interviews on 
satellite television across the world, particularly in the first month of the uprising.106 																																																								
104 Interview with Mustafa, anti-regime dissident and human rights campaigner, 4 March 2015. 
London.  
105 Interview with Hussein, NTC representative, 7 November 2016. London.		
106 Interview with Hussein, NTC representative, 7 November 2016. London. 
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To some extent, the NTC’s  ‘united’ message reshaped and even homogenised the 
existent political rhetoric circling in Benghazi, the principal opposition stronghold, 
particularly by rescinding a statement by the lawyer-led 17 February Coalition in 
which the group had warned off outside intervention (Mezran and Knecht 2015: 86).  
Nevertheless, the NTC argued that its legitimacy ultimately derived from the 
revolution itself, and from ‘the decisions of local councils set up by the revolutionary 
people of Libya on the 17th of February…the Council consists of thirty one members 
representing the various cities of Libya from the east to the west and from the north to 
the south’.107 Its founding statement on 5 March 2011 emphasised ‘that the most 
important role is the one played by the youth…they were the base of foundation of the 
revolution’.108 Abdul Jalil stressed that its very formation was a bottom-up and 
inclusive process,109 and Shammam emphasised their connection to the ‘battalion of 
forward-thinking youth’ who had called for and instigated the protests.110 In turn, the 
ability to ‘communicate’ cogently the organic, youth-generated goals of the uprising 
was, according to a number of activists, the central responsibility that they expected 
the NTC to fulfil.111 
The NTC formally emerged as an authoritative player almost two weeks after 
the first protests erupted in Libya. Its presence was thus preceded by a dynamic 
network of young activists in the diaspora, who played an equally prominent – if 
distinct - role in propounding a narrative of revolution to participants, bystanders and 
outsiders. The phenomenon of tech-savvy youth deploying digital technologies for 																																																								
107 The Interim Transitional National Council. “Introducing the Council”. Available at: 
https://goo.gl/zyzERX 
108 National Transitional Council. “Founding Statement of the Interim Transitional Council (TNC)”. 5 
March 2011. Archived at: https://goo.gl/2j2igw  
109 “Interview with Mustafa Abdul Jalil”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/qZ7LJk  
110 “Interview with Mahmud Shammam”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/u4uCdP  
111 Interview with Maryam, social media activist, 3 February 2015. Skype; Interview with Abdullah, 
civil society activist in Zawiya, 28 March 2015. Tunisia; Interview with Hisham, pro-opposition 
medical doctor, 5 December 2016. Skype. 
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radical political ends was, in some ways, as present in the contentious Libyan 
landscape as it was in Egypt and Tunisia (Lindgren 2013; Biswas and Sipes 2014). 
Between the end of January and 15 February 2011, there was a rapid increase in the 
number of Facebook pages and social media platforms calling for protests, preparing 
and disseminating chants, and framing symbolic dates of significance, such as the 17 
February 2006 demonstrations in Benghazi (Strakes 2016: 152). Marwa, who 
protested in Benghazi, noted her familiarity with the existence of these pages, but 
argued that knowledge of them was not necessarily widespread and that their 
determining influence was difficult to gauge.112 This sentiment was also repeated by 
Ali, who protested in Tripoli.113 Ultimately, I concur with Hasan and Staggenborg 
(2015: 350) who highlight the importance of youth using digital technologies, not as 
the central factor in mobilising citizens, but as helping to sustain the goals of political 
activists. Indeed, this function came to prominence following, and not prior to, the 
emergence of the first protests in Libya.  
Online activist networks differed in the communicative tools they chose to 
deploy in order to sustain the momentum of the protests. The Libyan Youth 
Movement (LYM), also known as ‘Shabab Libya’, was the largest and most 
prominent group, with around 30 activists supporting its Twitter and Facebook 
operations around the world. Its Twitter account accumulated over 50 thousand 
followers over the course of the uprising (Biswas and Sipes 2014: 6). Established in 
January 2011 by Ayat Mneina and Omar Amer, from Canada and the UK 
respectively, its initial purpose was to mobilise for protests across Libya, and it 
modelled itself on Egypt’s April 6 Movement, which it perceived to be inclusive and 
																																																								
112 Interview with Marwa, civil society activist in Benghazi, 23 January 2016. London.  
113 Interview with Abdullah, civil society activist in Zawiya, 28 March 2015. Tunisia.	
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without a specific political affiliation.114 LibyaFeb17 was an independent website 
created by the UK-based activist Tareq on 15 February, and which garnered over one 
million hits in its first month.115 Also inspired by the events of Egypt and Tunisia, it 
was established with the specific purpose, not of mobilising for protests, but of 
providing real-time coverage of them should they occur. On Facebook, the largest 
anti-regime page, ‘The Uprising of 17 February 2011 – Let Us Make It a Day of Rage 
in Libya’ was created on 28 January by Hassan al-Jahmi, an exiled dissident based in 
Switzerland, with extensive connections to the political opposition group the NFSL.116 
These activist networks collectively adopted what has been described as a 
‘strategic or marketing orientation’ (Noakes and Johnston 2005: 13) towards the 
materials they sourced. Hassan al-Jahmi corresponded directly with broadcasters such 
as CNN and Al Jazeera in order to amplify the reach of the videos, images and 
recordings that he had obtained from inside Libya.117 In this sense, social media pages 
were not a challenger to traditional media outlets, but a tactical collaborator, 
supplying information and contacts to traditional media in exchange for the 
publicisation of their message.118 Demonstrators such as Maryam al-Ageli were 
emboldened to send video footage to Al-Jazeera ‘after we saw how keen they were to 
publish those clips’.119 Similarly, LYM had prepared a database of contacts in Libya 
from which to transmit information to satellite television channels, should a media 
blackout occur (Lindgren 2013: 221).  
																																																								
114 Interview with Ahmed, social media activist, 25 February 2015. London. 
115 Interview with Tareq, social media activist and translator, 14 February 2015. Oxford. 
116 “Interview with Hassan al-Jahmi, Al-Hurra TV”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/GUrz85  
117 “Interview with Hassan al-Jahmi, Al-Jazeera”. YouTube. https://goo.gl/YsGwWJ  
118 “Omar Amer interview with ABC News”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/c72n9T		
119 al-Ageli, Maryam “What happened” (matha hadath). Mayadeen. 8 May 2011. Issue 1: 7.  
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Social media activists also displayed a strong degree of collaboration with each 
other, ‘sharing different strategies on how to promote each others’ work’.120 In order 
to further emphasise their credibility, LYM implemented advice on how to come 
across as objective and dispassionate in their Tweets, abandoning the ‘panicky, all 
caps’ mode of communication that they had adopted in the initial days of protests.121 
Both LibyaFeb17 and LYM argued that they had no option but to approach their 
communicative tasks with a strategic mind-set, asserting that they ‘didn’t have time to 
stress, or the luxury to rant at someone’,122 and that ‘there was an unspoken 
assumption that we were there just to push information out…we didn’t even react’.123 
Indeed, LYM even organised its activists into ‘shifts’ corresponding with their time-
zones, ‘recruiting’ further volunteers and assistance via its private Facebook group, 
and allocating specific tasks to its members depending on their respective skillsets.124  
Social media activists stressed the credibility and salience of their reporting by 
pointing towards the veracity of their ‘vetted’ sources,125 but like the NTC, they also 
represented this as the foundation of their discursive legitimacy. Tareq of LibyaFeb17 
argued that he did not seek to impose his own understandings or political inclinations 
onto the Libyan uprising, but to broadcast ‘the authentic voices of Libyans…to 
facilitate understanding but also ease of comprehension because of my knowledge of 
the Libyan dialect’.126 Another activist, Huda, asserted that because of their relative 
position of privilege – residing in the West yet closely connected to the happenings 
inside the country– they had a pronounced ‘responsibility’ to speak and to advocate 
																																																								
120 Interview with Tareq, social media activist and translator, 14 February 2015. Oxford. 
121 Interview with Maryam, social media activist, 3 February 2011. Skype.  
122 Interview with Tareq, social media activist and translator, 14 February 2015. Oxford. 
123 Interview with Maryam, social media activist, 3 February 2011. Skype. 
124 Interview with Ahmed, social media activist, 25 February 2015. London. 
125 Interview with Maryam, social media activist, 3 February 2011. Skype. 
126 Interview with Tareq, social media activist and translator, 14 February 2015. Oxford.	
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for the Libyan uprising.127 Moreover, as the war in Libya turned into a military 
stalemate, a number of diaspora activists travelled to the country, due to be a need to 
be more strategically relevant to the happenings on the ground. Ahmed and Tareq 
travelled to Benghazi and Zintan respectively in order to report on the uprising, noting 
the frustrating sense of distance and stagnancy that came with remaining in the UK. 
Yahya collaborated with LYM in the initial stages of the uprising, before travelling to 
report on the humanitarian situation in Misrata, then ultimately working with the NTC 
as a tactical coordinator.128 The rapper Fawzi initially mobilised for protests from 
Canada, but travelled to fight in the western mountains region of Libya in June 2011, 
providing updates and blog posts that were then republished by other social media 
activists.129 Young activists thus occupied shifting positions of proximity in relation 
to the uprising, alternately shaping both the content and the reach of revolutionary 
messaging.   
The final, central sources of collective action framing in the Libyan uprising 
were the Arabic language media outlets that were rapidly established inside and 
outside the country (Strakes 2016: 148). The most prominent was the satellite media 
channel Libya Al-Ahrar (‘Libya of the Free’), established by the NTC’s information 
minister Mahmud Shammam on March 2011, with its studio in Doha and with Qatar 
transmitting its signal (Nardulli 2015: 342). Positioning itself as a counterweight to 
the propaganda of Al-Jamahiriya TV, Libya Al-Ahrar served as a central proselytising 
outlet for the uprising and for ‘the revolutionaries fighting in Libya’.130 It supplied on-
going political commentary and news updates on the progress of the military conflict, 
in addition to a host of television programmes, from talk shows to comedy series, that 																																																								
127 Interview with Huda, Libyan-American social media activist, 9 June 2016. Skype. 
128 Interview with Yahya, activist and NTC coordinator, 29 November 2016. Skype. 
129 Interview with Fawzi, revolutionary fighter in western Libya, 29 December 2015. Skype. 
130 @libyaalahrartv, 12 June 2011. 4.50pm. Tweet.		
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suggested the diversity and vibrancy of Libya’s newly-fashioned discursive sphere. In 
a later vindication of the channel, the presenter Mahmoud al-Werfalli argued that 
‘Libya Al-Ahrar emerged from the heart of the revolution…Qadhafi had five, six, 
channels, and we had one, but we managed to completely transform public opinion 
inside Libya’.131 
What was distinctive about Libya Al-Ahrar was not only its reach and 
viewership inside Libya itself (unlike social media activity on Twitter), but the fact 
that its collectivist rhetoric was grounded in and legitimated through its recruitment of 
presenters, technicians, and managers from across the Libyan revolutionary spectrum. 
Mohammed Ismail, who photographed the demonstrations outside the Libyan 
embassy in London, was actively sought out to work on Libya Al-Ahrar’s website, 
and flown out to Qatar within 10 days.132 Similarly, Tareq was contacted directly by 
Shammam, and offered a permanent position to work as a web-developer for Libya 
Al-Ahrar within two weeks.133 In addition to recruiting journalists, activists and 
academics residing outside Libya, Libya Al-Ahrar hired defected presenters from the 
Libyan Youth Channel (Al-Shababiya), which was part of the Jamahiriya 
Broadcasting Authority. Despite Shammam’s secularist leanings, Libya Al-Ahrar also 
promoted religious sermons and rulings from clerics such as Sadeq al-Ghariani. Thus, 
the channel had an accelerated and avowedly inclusive recruitment drive, attempting 
to ‘promote the diversity agenda’.134 This supplied it with a basis on which it could 
credibly claim to ‘work with Libyan abilities and intellects, to address all Libyans 
with a language that is close to their hearts’.135 
																																																								
131 “A Discussion between Mahmoud al-Werfalli and Mohammed Mhsen on Libya Al-Ahrar”. 
YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/u8sBH6   
132 Interview with Umar, journalist and photographer, 14 January 2016. Skype. 
133 Interview with Tareq, social media activist and translator, 14 February 2015. Oxford.  
134 Interview with Hussein, NTC representative, 7 November 2016. London.		
135 “The opening of Libya Al-Ahrar”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/LNQErm  
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In some respects, the print-based counterparts to Libya Al-Ahrar – in terms of 
its reach – were the Arabic-language newspapers Al-Manarah and Mayadeen. Al-
Manarah was established in 2002 by exiled Libyan dissidents in the UK, initially as 
an online news platform.136 It intensified its online reporting during the uprising (on 
its own website, and on a newly-created Facebook page), but also published a print 
edition from June 2011, that was subsequently distributed across all opposition-
controlled territories in Libya. Mayadeen, established in Benghazi in May 2011, 
described itself as ‘the first independent newspaper in Libya for four decades’, and 
was also supported by opposition figures abroad and by the NTC.137 As with Libya 
Al-Ahrar, the legitimacy of these newspapers as framing outlets rested on their 
assimilation and broadcast of a diverse range of revolutionary voices - from NTC 
members, to civil society activists, to leaders of military battalions across the country 
– which were wrapped around the central objective of liberating Libya from the 
Qadhafi regime. On occasion, both Al-Manarah and Mayadeen were more outwardly 
critical of the NTC’s activities, and of the trajectory of the uprising as a whole, than 
Libya Al-Ahrar. 
As argued by Meyer (2002: 19), the ‘structural accommodation’ of diversity can 
enable a particular movement to thrive and increase its following. Collective action 
framing during the Libyan uprising was undertaken, not simply by Arab media outlets 
such as Al-Jazeera (Bebawai and Bossio 2014), but by Libyans themselves, and 
structurally accommodated a range of actors from disparate political, ideological and 
generational backgrounds. Such actors deployed strategic initiative in the ways in 
which they communicated and coordinated their discursive activities, both internally 																																																								
136 Al-Manarah on Twitter: https://goo.gl/HiFkAx, and on its website: https://goo.gl/bY62t8  
137 “Mayadeen…Libya’s first independent newspaper in four decades” (Mayadeen…awwal jareeda 
mustaqila fil leebya munth arbaat uqood). Al-Sharq Al-Awsat. 4 May 2011. Available at: 
https://goo.gl/MbUrkN  
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amongst themselves, and externally, to the international community and other 
outsiders. Although the ‘Libyan story’ has been described as ‘one of disparate, loosely 
connected domestic and foreign actors, linking up harmoniously like the unlikeliest of 
symphony orchestras’ (Mezran and Knecht 2015: 81), this linkage was not arbitrary 
but to some extent cultivated by the actors themselves. 
 
6.3 Collective Action Framing  	
 
The collective action frames produced by Libyan opposition actors and networks were 
overwhelmingly cohesive in nature, and directed towards enabling the overthrow of 
the Qadhafi regime. The following section will outline the understandings supplied by 
this ‘partially organized’ order of activists, signalling the way in which they resonated 
with the unfolding political reality on the ground, and with the meanings - and 
contradictions - present within the Jamahiriya’s institutional logic.  
 
6.3.1 Diagnostic Framing 	
 
 
‘Diagnostic framing’ has been identified as a central framing task that anchors the 
mobilising rhetoric and meaning making practices of social movement actors. 
Involving the ‘identification of the source(s) of causality, blame and/or culpable 
action’ (Benford and Snow 2000: 615), diagnostic framing customarily negotiates a 
shared understanding of what needs to be changed within a particular socio-political 
context. It is a powerful rhetorical mechanism, potentially redefining the way in 
which people conceptualise ‘injustice’ (Snow et al 1986: 475), and re-evoking 
suppressed contentious meanings into new grievances (Gamson 1992). In the framing 
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of the Libyan uprising, ultimate culpability for a range of injustices, exemplified in 
but not restricted to violence against Libyan protesters, consistently rested on Qadhafi 
himself. According to one activist, the claim that ‘Qadhafi was the devil’ underpinned 
the entire thrust of the revolutionary narrative in 2011.138 Jason Pack (2013b) has 
argued that the Libyan uprising, in a similar manner to other protests in the Arab 
world, was most cogent in articulating a negative vision of what it stood against, i.e. 
the Qadhafi regime. 
A collective consensus on Qadhafi’s culpability did not precede the protests, but 
emerged due to their unfolding political dynamics, and as a result of the regime’s use 
of violence against protestors. The Abu Slim lawyers’ movement in Benghazi, which 
initiated the first protests on 15 February, refrained from explicitly identifying 
Qadhafi as the source of Libya’s problems. Where other Facebook pages were calling 
for a ‘day of rage’, the lawyer Abdelsalam al-Mismari had been in contact with youth 
activists on Facebook throughout February 2011, advising them instead to pursue a 
‘gradual trajectory…the demands must begin with reform, a constitution and social 
justice’.139 Once protests began, the lawyers outside the Benghazi courthouse directed 
their ire at financial corruption and underdevelopment, with Abdul Hafiz Ghoga 
asserting on 16 February that ‘the administrative structure of the state’ should be 
responsible for solving these issues.140 This was a familiar refrain in reformist 
political rhetoric under Qadhafi.141 The movement of lawyers and academics would 
finally embrace the calls to topple the regime after Saif al-Islam Qadhafi’s 
																																																								
138 Interview with Yahya, activist and NTC coordinator, 29 November 2016. Skype.  
139 al-Mismari, Abdelsalam. “The goodness of Libyans was the main factor in the success of the 
revolution” (inbiath al-fadail dakhil al-Leebiyeen amil najah al-thawra). Mayadeen. 22 May 2011. 
Issue 3: 6.  
140 “Abdul Hafiz Ghoga supports the tyrant’s regime”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/8qDz8i  
141 Interview with Osama, reformist anti-regime demonstrator in Tripoli, 30 December 2015. Skype. 	
	 168	
representative, Bashir Harir, ignored their calls for a ceasefire on 17 February.142 
According to the lawyer Salwa al-Deghali, ‘it was when the bloodshed began that we 
called for an end to the regime’.143 
Diagnostic framing in the Libyan uprising was distilled into two distinctive 
narratives of culpability. The first was urgent and immediate, framing Qadhafi as 
criminally responsible for the brutality committed by security services towards 
civilian protesters in Benghazi and other cities. In the first week of protests, reports 
extensively circled in the media of Qadhafi’s forces opening fire with live 
ammunition, and killing at least 1000 unarmed protesters (Lynch 2012: 112), with 
later reports by the International Criminal Court (ICC) estimating this to be between 
500-700 people (Simons and MacFarquhar 2011). Libyan activists framed this as an 
escalating sequence of consecutive massacres, deploying emotive rhetoric, graphic 
footage from the attacks, and interlacing their reports with fearful eyewitness 
statements from residents and protesters. Within the first week of protests, 
LibyaFeb17 reported massacres taking place in different cities: in Benghazi, with over 
50 killed in a mortar attack and 200 dead in Al-Jala Hospital,144 massacres of soldiers 
in Derna for not firing on protesters,145 and ‘eyewitness accounts of Tripoli massacres 
after Friday Prayer’.146 From the inception of the protests, LYM described the assault 
on Benghazi as a massacre, with reference to footage from CNN: ‘200 died in one 
hospital in Benghazi…there is no question now it was a massacre’.147  
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The concept of a Qadhafi-instigated massacre was central to the urgent 
diagnostic framing of the Libyan uprising, and was amplified by reports of Qadhafi 
deploying mercenaries from Sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe in an attempt to 
crush the protests (Smith 2011). On 16 February 2011, LYM tweeted of ‘increasing 
reports of mercenaries from Chad who are being well paid #Libya #Feb17 if so, then 
we are at war’.148 This was corroborated by Al-Manarah Media, which claimed 
confirmation of the presence of African mercenaries in Western Libya,149 and by 
Hassan al-Jahmi’s Facebook page, which uploaded videos of ‘children killed by 
mercenaries and snipers’ onto YouTube.150 Activists not only framed existent regime 
violence as evidence of a massacre, and even, on one instance, as ‘genocide’;151 they 
also warned of imminent massacres on 21 March: ‘Breaking: Two busloads of 
Gaddafi forces & 11 Tanks enter Misratah preparing for massacre tomorrow’.152 
Qadhafi’s threats against protesters on 22 February were highlighted as firm evidence 
of the regime’s culpability and willingness to commit further atrocities (Achcar 2013: 
242).  
The NTC also participated in framing Qadhafi’s criminality as diabolical in 
scale, even going beyond official figures and reports. Mahmoud Jibril described it as 
unprecedented ‘manslaughter and genocide’ in Libya,153 and Mustafa Abdul Jalil 
asserted that by 24 February 2011, 2000 people had been killed in Benghazi, and 5000 
people had been killed in Tripoli under Qadhafi’s orders,154 declaring that ‘Qadhafi is 
behind all terrorist acts in the world…all that is happening in Libya and outside Libya 																																																								
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is due to Qadhafi’s commands’.155 The Libyan League of Human Rights (LLHR), led 
by its Secretary General Souleimen Bouchuiguir, addressed the United Nations 
Human Rights Council (UNHRC) on February 25, in turn describing the actions of 
the Qadhafi regime as a ‘genocide and a crime against humanity’.156 
The diagnostic framing was in many ways consistent in tone, and supported by 
an assortment of reliable testimonies, according to LYM. However, and by the 
retroactive admission of some of those who participated in or witnessed this framing 
process, there was a substantive embellishment of figures and reports by witnesses on 
the ground. According to Salem, who was present in Tripoli at the time, the figures 
were incongruous with the reality on the ground: ‘we would hear reports coming out 
on the basis that Qadhafi killed 30 people, then 250 people…and after that, the figure 
suddenly rose to 6000’.157 Hamza, who was based in Benghazi and parsing 
information to diaspora activists and journalists, states: 
 
I remember I exaggerated a couple of deaths in my tweets…the more 
vicious it sounded, the more horrific it sounded, the better. We were all 
thinking, just get out as much as you can, as much as possible. Libyan 
rumours – three died, but then we heard 13 died, and then it became 30. It 
had to be done though, because there was no other way… the killing was 
real, the use of anti-aircraft guns was real.158 
 
In turn, the NTC member Hussein, and the dissident and journalist Mustafa, noted the 
tendency to exaggerate the civilian death toll, but justified its occurrence by arguing 
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that this was a necessary part of the media war against the Qadhafi regime.159 The 
British-Libyan activist Yahya argued that even humanitarian organisations in Libya, 
such as those based in the besieged city of Misrata, amplified the threat against 
civilian lives in order to hasten the arrival of international aid.160 Amnesty 
International later questioned reports of the Qadhafi regime deploying foreign 
mercenaries, arguing in June 2011 that ‘most were sub-Saharan migrants working in 
Libya without documents’ (Cockburn 2011). However, the initial, almost apocalyptic 
narrative of culpability was unanimous in its condemnation and convincing in its 
reliance on grassroots testimonies. 
The second strand of diagnostic framing repeatedly emphasised that Libyans 
had been ‘governed by Qadhafi with an iron first for 42 years’.161 This framed 
Qadhafi’s culpability through a longer-term rhetoric of injustice, casting Libyan 
history as a seamless period of political oppression. Social media activists, in order to 
illustrate this claim, evoked historic instances of regime violence such as the 1996 
Abu Slim massacre, publishing interviews with victims’ families,162 and citing the 
massacre as evidence of Qadhafi’s ‘insanity’ and scant regard for the civilian cost of 
staying in power.163 Activists sought to erode the image of Qadhafi as humorous 
eccentric, and to demonstrate instead that ‘the citizens of Libya, home to the largest 
oil reserves in Africa, were reduced to near beggars’.164 Mahmoud Jibril argued that 
there was ‘mass deprivation’ of the people in Libya, with unemployment exceeding 																																																								
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30% despite the presence of mass oil wealth,165 and pointed out that ‘Libyans have 
been going to Tunis or Jordan for their healthcare needs’ due to a lack of basic public 
services.166 
Tareq of LibyaFeb17 argued that the phrase ‘42 years’ was one of the most 
ubiquitous expressions deployed by Libyans in 2011: ‘the first thing I noticed about 
conversations when I got there’, jokingly commenting that ‘I quickly became sick of 
hearing it’.167 I would argue that this particular expression served to ‘crystallize the 
essential components of the frame in an easily recalled clip’ (Noakes and Johnston 
2005: 8). It acted as a scaffold on which to hang an array of historical grievances and 
suppressed narratives of political oppression, supplied by Libyans themselves and 
broadcast by frame disseminators. Libya Al-Ahrar devoted a substantial amount of its 
programming to exposing the Qadhafi regime’s criminality. Shows such as In a 
Libyan Dialect (Bil Leebee), hosted by the journalist Mahmoud al-Werfalli in July 
and August 2011, constructed thematic episodes analysing the ‘42 years in which we 
experienced nothing by suffering’, from an episode focusing on the loss of Libyan 
lives in the Chadian-Libyan conflict (1978-1987), to another discussing Qadhafi’s 
destruction of religious values in Libya.168 
The criminalisation of the Qadhafi regime was a strategic, representational 
practice that served the Libyan opposition’s political objectives. The combination of 
ratcheted rhetoric and graphic imagery was designed to mobilise further popular 
participation in the protests, and to garner the support of the international community 
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for the Libyan revolutionary cause.169 Jasper and Poulsen (1999: 556) have argued 
that drastic images are crucial for invoking a ‘moral shock’ that is capable of 
engaging even uninvolved or disconnected political actors, and Doerr et al (2015: 
561-563) have described this as a pragmatic, ‘mediatized aspect of mobilization’. The 
disseminators of graphic images and videos, such as the Libyan Youth Movement, 
spoke of the powerful impact of such media in strengthening their own commitment 
to the revolutionary cause, and in generating a further slew of protests, across Libya, 
that affirmed solidarity and sacrifice for Benghazi.170 The activist Yahya described 
viewing videos by opposition activists as a process of ‘consumption’: one that 
generated an understanding of the scale of the Qadhafi regime’s atrocities, and 
triggered a concomitant anger and need to act in relation.171  
The Libyan opposition’s framing of an existent (and impending) massacre was 
also significant for the political delegitimisation of the Qadhafi regime by the 
international community. Indeed, the suspension of Libya from the UNHRC on 1 
March 2011, due to the Qadhafi regime’s ‘flagrant human rights violations’, was 
based on the multiple reports and allegations disseminated by the Libyan opposition 
movement.172 The LLHR, which addressed the UNHRC on 25 February 2011 and 
confirmed that genocide was taking place inside Libya, asserted that its own presence 
at the assembly was crucial in bringing about the ‘suspension of the Gadhafi regime 
from the UN Council for Human Rights’.173 And yet it is important to note that the 
humanitarian narratives and political objectives of the Libyan opposition movement 
were intertwined and mutually reinforcing. Ali Zeidan was both the official 																																																								
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spokesman of the LLHR,174 and subsequently the NTC’s Europe envoy from March 
2011, playing a key role in convincing the ex-French President, Nicolas Sarkozy, to 
support the Libyan uprising.175 Mark Kersten (2016: 125) has argued that the ICC’s 
indictment of Qadhafi on 27 June 2011 for crimes against humanity emerged due to 
this overwhelming ‘morality tale of a “good” opposition opposed to an “evil” regime’ 
communicated by Libyan political figures and activists, but that such decisions also 
served to reinforce the international credibility of the Libyan opposition.   
A further, strategic function of diagnostic framing was that it rhetorically 
absolved reformists and political figures previously connected to the Qadhafi regime, 
and categorised them as legitimate Libyan opposition. According to Al-Manarah, 
Qadhafi-era figures should be parsed into two categories: those who participated in 
killing and financial corruption, and those technocrats who were not practically 
implicated in Qadhafi’s actions, and whose competencies were important for the 
revolution.176 During the uprising, NTC members who had defected from the Qadhafi 
regime would rationalise their political participation within the Jamahiriya with 
reference to its coercive and symbolic technologies of control, stressing they had 
functioned ‘as if’ in relation to its system of domination. Abdul Jalil argued that he 
took up his position as Justice Minister in order to prevent ‘a bloodthirsty person’ 
accepting the position in his stead, stressing that he was not ‘internally’ committed to 
the regime: ‘I was ambivalent when it came to clapping, or saying ‘Jamahiriya’ and 
‘The Leader’, and even in saluting Muammar al-Qadhafi during public meetings. I 
held to my principles’.177 Mahmud Jibril stated that he offered his resignation in 2009, 
as soon as he realised that ‘there was no real desire, either for reform or for change’, 																																																								
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and ‘joined the revolutionaries who have expressed my own will for quite some 
time’.178 The NTC’s first defence minister, Abdel Fattah Younes, whose defection on 
22 February enabled the East of the country to serve as the rebel safe zone during the 
military conflict (Mezran and Knecht 2015: 85), claimed that he was assigned to the 
General People’s Committee for Public Security unwillingly and directly by Qadhafi, 
had never fired a gun at any Libyan civilian, and refused to attend the General 
People’s Committee meetings out of principle.179   
The tight restriction of culpability to Qadhafi and his inner circle was also 
deployed in order to encourage further defections towards the opposition ranks. Abdul 
Jalil declared in February 2011 that ‘Every action that stems from him is not ascribed 
to any of his allies, or his people, or tribes supportive of him’, in an explicit attempt to 
encourage popular mobilisation against the Qadhafi regime.180 At one point, he even 
went so far as to exculpate anyone but Qadhafi and his son Khamis from 
responsibility for the killing of Libyan civilians.181 Shammam addressed Qadhafi’s 
own tribe, the Qadhadhfa, informing them that they were welcomed by the 
opposition, who would not ‘take Qadhafi’s crimes as a sign of guilt for this great 
tribe’.182 Abdel Fattah Younes described the residents of Qadhafi’s stronghold city of 
Sirte as ‘Libya’s sons, like you and me, but their bad luck has brought them under 
Qadhafi’s hand’.183 
The self-vindicating discourse deployed by the Libyan opposition – in which 
Qadhafi alone was criminally culpable - was extended more broadly towards the 
Libyan populace, and resonated palpably with key contradictions within the 
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Jamahiriya’s institutional logic. One of the tensions that the revolutionary rhetoric 
sought to expose was that between the public re-performance of the Jamahiriya’s 
rituals, and the widespread absence of belief in their veracity. By unearthing this 
contradiction, it strengthened the dichotomous narrative of the uprising. This type of 
messaging appears, not so much in the concise, targeted framing of social media 
platforms, but on the television channel Libya al-Ahrar, which addressed the nature of 
the Qadhafi regime at length. Mahmoud al-Werfalli’s show ‘Bil Leebee’ evoked 
Libyans’ shared understanding of the way in which the Jamahiriya operated in 
practice: 
 
The regime created a system of orchestrated fear. Even when we grew up, 
this fear kept growing inside of us. And everyone knows that you can do 
whatever you want to someone who is scared. For instance, who would have 
thought that one Libyan would ‘notify’ on another Libyan, and write 
‘reports’ on him? Qadhafi did this. Qadhafi created so many security 
instruments, until you didn’t know your friend from your enemy…I’m not 
blaming anyone here. A person who is shackled can’t do anything…can’t 
produce, can’t create, can’t innovate.184 
 
Despite acknowledging that there was some popular involvement within the 
Jamahiriya’s security apparatus, Werfalli frames the regime as principally culpable 
for its co-optation of the populace, and presents Libyans as devoid of political agency, 
and therefore of accountability. He goes on to comment explicitly on the shared 
condition of unbelief, or acting ‘as if’, that guided behaviour in the Libyan public 
sphere: ‘You’ll go to visit someone, and find him hanging a picture of Qadhafi in his 
living room. You know he absolutely hates him! But you also know he’s just doing it 
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because he’s scared’.185 This type of rhetoric closely mirrors the statement by Abdul 
Jalil in which he insisted that he abided by his own principles despite occupying a 
formal political position in the Jamahiriya. Such rhetoric, whether self-referential by 
NTC members or directed at Libyans in general, absolved Libyans of political 
responsibility by signalling that they did not believe in, and were not morally 
committed to, the Qadhafi regime’s symbolism. 
The opposition’s diagnostic framing also publically exposed and refuted the 
Jamahiriya’s incongruous attribution of formal political authority to the Libyan 
people. The shift in the Benghazi lawyers’ rhetoric (from reform to revolution) signals 
a break away from the regime’s long-honoured terms of debate, in which ‘state 
institutions’, purportedly run by the people, were portrayed as the panacea to Libya’s 
problems. According to the Benghazi lawyer Salwa al-Deghali, they initially abided 
by a rhetoric of reform from 15 to 17 February because their ‘ceiling of expectations 
was so low’ due to their previous dealings with the regime, that even a call for a 
constitution was a radical demand.186 More generally, it has been argued that the first 
week of protests across the country saw the Libyan ‘problem’ be redefined from 
socioeconomic issues, such as the shortage of housing and limited social services, to a 
call for regime change (St. John 2013: 93). The lawyer Bashir Sefaw, who protested 
in the western city of Zawiya, described the ‘shocking moment’ in which chants 
shifted being about corruption to ‘the people demand the fall of the regime’.187 Very 
rapidly, the condensed expression ‘he ruled us for 42 years’ came to expose Qadhafi’s 
pretence at abdicating political authority in a way that the Jamahiriya’s tolerated 
political dissent could not. As argued by Scott (1990: 51) it is ‘only when 																																																								
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contradictions are publicly declared do they have to publicly accounted for’, attaining 
a new rhetorical significance and practical import in the process. 
 
6.3.2 Prognostic Framing 	
 
In collective episodes of contention, the function of prognostic framing is to ‘present a 
solution to the problem suggested in the diagnosis’ (Noakes and Johnston 2005: 5). In 
the following, I outline the way in which the Libyan uprising contained both short-
term and long-term prognostic vocabularies: the former centred on the ‘liberation of 
Libya’ from Qadhafi,188 and the need for military intervention in order to realise this 
prognosis, while the latter advocated the notion of ‘democracy’ – at times loosely-
defined, at others imbued with specificity - as solution. The notion that prognosis 
commonly follows diagnosis in social movements (Benford and Snow 2000: 616) has 
been questioned in the case of the Arab uprisings, with the common argument that 
positive messages of what the populace was ‘rebelling for’ did not materialise in the 
popular opposition’s rhetoric (Pack 2013b: 1 – author’s emphasis), or were difficult to 
sustain when they did (Alterman 2011: 113). However, I would argue that there was a 
complexity to the opposition’s prognostic framing; for instance, in the rhetorical 
insistence on the compatibility of military intervention with popular revolt, and in the 
opposition’s differentiated framings of ‘democracy’, depending on its recipient 
audience.  
In some respects, it borders on truism to assert that the prognosis of the Libyan 
uprising was the removal of Qadhafi. Chants of ‘the people demand the fall of the 
regime’ (at times altered to ‘the fall of the Colonel’), and a range of slogans 																																																								
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instructing Qadhafi to ‘leave Libya’, ‘go to Jeddah’, or stating that it was ‘his turn’ to 
fall, following Mubarak and Ben Ali, were a central feature of demonstrations 
throughout the entire period of conflict.189 In turn, and from its formation, the NTC 
dismissed the prospect of negotiating with the Qadhafi regime,190 stating that its 
objective was to ‘plan and work towards liberating the remaining cities still kidnapped 
by the tyrant Mu’ammar Gaddafi and his gang’.191 NTC members continued to affirm, 
periodically, their rejection of a political settlement with the regime. In April 2011, 
the Council spokesman, Abdul Hafiz Ghoga, asserted that ‘we will not accept Gadhafi 
or any of his sons or aides ruling us ever again for even one hour. This is impossible. 
We will never accept that. We said it clearly. We will not accept any compromise, any 
negotiation, any solution with the current regime’.192 
Beyond this direct, overarching prognosis, the Libyan opposition also advocated 
for a series of short-term solutions to the escalating conflict with the regime. Most 
prominently, the portrayal of Qadhafi as the embodiment of ‘evil’ due to his brutal 
suppression of protests (Kersten 2016: 125) was accompanied by the opposition’s 
sustained advocacy for the imposition of a no-fly zone over Libyan soil to prevent the 
aerial bombings of civilians. This soon culminated in the UN Security Council 
Resolution (UNSCR) 1973, which authorised a no-fly zone on 17 March 2011, and 
was followed by the onset of NATO airstrikes against Libyan government forces on 
19 March.  
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LYM began to call for a no-fly zone from 25 February 2011, while 
distinguishing between the military protection of Libyan civilians and the presence of 
‘boots on the ground’.193 A no-fly zone was of paramount military importance, but 
‘foreign intervention’ would ‘turn Libyan into a Somalia or Iraq’.194 This framing 
exploited the ambiguity over what constitutes military force in a specific conflict. 
Ahmed conceded that this was a ‘sensitive issue…Libyans are completely against 
foreign intervention in terms of military aid,’195 using the term ‘military aid’ to refer 
to the deployment of foreign troops inside Libya. Ahmed Sawalem of LYM argued in 
an interview that ‘What we don’t want is for Libya to become like Iraq…we don’t 
want foreign intervention after this regime collapses’, but that a no-fly zone was 
nonetheless crucial in preventing foreign mercenaries from entering the country.196 
Similarly, LibyaFeb17 affirmed that the aim of the no-fly zone would be ‘to 
PROTECT the people and NOT to conduct any unnecessary military actions in 
Libya’.197  
The implicit assumption in this framing is that a no-fly zone does not comprise 
‘military aid’ or ‘foreign intervention’. In fact, although policymakers have previously 
viewed no-fly zones as closing the gap between sanctions and military force, no-fly 
zones do involve the direct application of military force through the preventative 
destruction of equipment and forces (Meibauer 2016). Nevertheless, the attraction of a 
no-fly zone in 2011, for the Libyan opposition, was in the way in which it preserved 
the political agency of the Libyan opposition while distinguishing between foreign 
intervention and the minimal protection of civilians: a distinction that would 																																																								
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ultimately be undermined as a very result of the Libyan uprising (ibid). The NTC, 
which began to undertake talks with the international community in March 2011, also 
emphasised this distinction in their simultaneous demand for a no-fly zone and 
insistence that it would amplify, rather than diminish, the popular will of the Libyan 
people. Mustafa Abdul Jalil argued that a refusal to implement a no-fly zone would 
lead to ‘catastrophe in Libya’,198 and that it would be ‘restricted’ in scope, only 
entailing ‘the lifting of the siege on Libya’s cities…so that people can continue to 
express their desire for freedom’.199 
It has been argued that the primary role of armed violence and external 
intervention in the collapse of the Qadhafi regime distinguishes the Libyan uprising 
from the popular democratic revolts that took place in Egypt and Tunisia (Strakes 
2016: 154). Although it has been noted that foreign states such as France and Qatar 
did not actually initiate the uprising (Khalil 2014: 119), Chalcraft (2016: 4) draws a 
dichotomy between popular emancipation and foreign intervention, citing the NATO 
military intervention as a complicating factor in the uprising’s narrative of progress 
and liberation. However, the acceptance – even active embrace – of this contradiction 
underpinned the Libyan opposition’s justification of foreign intervention in the 
country. The no-fly zone was framed as the expression of national, popular 
sovereignty. LYM cited eyewitness statements from Tripoli which claimed that a no-
fly zone was needed in order to ‘level the playing field’, asserting that it was not they, 
but Libyans inside the country who ‘demand a no-fly zone over Libya now!’200 It 
posted video footage showing the support for a no-fly zone inside both regime-
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controlled cities such as Tripoli,201 and opposition-controlled territories alike: 
‘Protests continue in Benghazi, asking NATO to do more for Western Libya #Libya 
#Feb17 as many more civilians die at the hands of Gaddafi’.202 
Other activists who participated in calling for the no-fly zone, such as the 
Libyan journalist and photographer Dania, argued that ‘we were campaigning for it 
because the Libyans it…we weren’t there, so we had to amplify what the people on 
the ground wanted’.203 In response to criticisms of the no-fly zone, particularly by the 
Arab journalist Abdel Bari Atwan, the activist Tasbeeh Herwees tweeted that 
‘Libyans in #Libya want a no-fly zone and that’s all that matters’.204 Benghazi-based 
activists such as Layal concurred with this assessment, arguing that support for the 
no-fly zone was unanimous throughout the city, fuelled by fears of further regime 
violence.205 The Tripoli-based activist Reem also described a celebratory atmosphere 
among close friends and family, following the announcement of the no-fly zone.206 
While affirming their support for a no-fly zone in Libya, activists refuted Saif al-Islam 
Qadhafi’s description of the opposition as ‘NATO revolutionaries’ who had 
reintroduced colonialism into the country, asserting that it was Qadhafi himself who 
had ‘brought mercenaries (invasion) and the war to us’.207 The Jamahiriya’s anti-
imperialist rhetoric was redirected at the Qadhafi regime in the argument that Qadhafi 
himself, by massacring his own people, had become a foreign aggressor.208 
Following the imposition of the no-fly zone, Libyan activists and members of 
the opposition continued to support NATO’s military mission in Libya by asserting 																																																								
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the primacy of the grassroots armed struggle on the ground. LYM portrayed the 
NATO mission as a merely supporting act: ‘Calling on NATO to help Libyans in 
#Nafusa mountains to free the region from G forces and allow desperately needed aim 
to reach them’.209 The NTC’s first defence minister, Abdel Fattah Younes represented 
the collaboration as a tactical one that ultimately affirmed Libyan agency: ‘There is of 
course coordination between us and NATO, but the decisions of the battlefield are 
solely down to the chief of staff, not to NATO or anyone else’.210 Layal described the 
no-fly zone as a necessity, and not an event to be valorised: ‘I remember refusing to 
carry any Western flags during protests…at the end of the day it wasn’t their 
revolution, it was the Libyan revolution’.211 The activist and doctor Mounir, who 
travelled to the east of Libya in April 2011, argued that Libyans were aware of, and 
accepted, any potential political repercussions from the intervention: ‘of course we 
know that other countries have their interests…but we would have allied with the 
devil at the time, if it meant getting rid of Qadhafi’.212 In this way, the diagnostic 
framing of military intervention was underpinned by references to the agency of 
Libyans themselves: as the principal decision-makers behind the no-fly zone, and as 
the key players in the NATO-Libyan military relationship.  
In addition to the short-term prognosis of liberation from Qadhafi, there was a 
longer-term prognostic rhetoric that was democracy-centric, identifying the solution 
to Libya’s ‘42 years’ of oppression as residing in democracy and in the latent 
potential of the democratically inclined, modern youth who had ushered in the 
protests. This rhetoric was most pronounced when it was addressed towards the 
international community and foreign media outlets. In an interview with the German 																																																								
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broadcaster Duetsche Welle, Mahmoud Jibril described this as a shared aspiration in 
the country:  
 
All Libyans want to build a free, democratic country that respects human 
rights, participates positively and constructively in international relations 
and contributes to the security, stability and interests of other Mediterranean 
countries. This is what the simple Libyan man on the street wants…he will 
use this vocabulary with complete freedom and frankness, even if he is not 
fully aware of what it actually means.213  
 
Jibril further argued, in May 2011, that ‘freedom of expression’ and ‘participatory 
democracy’ had been central tenets of Libyan protesters’ demands from the outset.214 
Similarly, social media activists also depicted democracy as a widely embraced, 
popular prognosis. LibyaFeb17 asserted that ‘Arabs are democracy’s new 
pioneers’,215 while LYM argued that the ‘Libyan struggle for democracy’ was already 
leading to an increased prominence and role for women in Libyan political life,216 
imbuing this struggle with a progressive slant. In August 2011, a speaker on behalf of 
the Muslim Brotherhood in Libya argued that ‘I do not think we will disagree in 
future, because everyone is agreed on democracy, on the separation of powers and a 
constitution, and on the importance of civil society’.217  
This pro-democracy prognostic framing was to become an integral part of the 
NTC’s roadmap to democracy that was unveiled in May 2011, and that would 
culminate in the Temporary Constitutional Declaration (TCD) that was issued in 																																																								
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August 2011, towards the end of the conflict. Prior to this, the framing was aimed at 
persuading international policymakers that the Libyan uprising was congenial to their 
interests. One NTC member described the success of the uprising as hinging on this 
rhetorical diplomacy: they were responsible for tailoring their message to different 
audiences, distinguishing between their addresses to tribal leaders and those to 
western diplomats and politicians in a bid to establish a wide revolutionary 
consensus.218 The NTC’s foreign affairs minister, Ali al-Issawi, affirmed that the 
uprising was successful precisely because of this messaging: ‘we proved to the world 
that we are a people who want freedom, and who want democracy, and who want a 
ruler to come via ballot boxes and not via tanks’.219  
In framing democracy as a collective revolutionary objective, the Libyan 
opposition demarcated correspondingly democratic and progressive identities for the 
revolutionaries. Al-Manarah newspaper argued that Libyan protesters and fighters 
were ‘defenders of human rights in Libya’,220 and Jibril stridently denied allegations 
made by Human Rights Watch of war violations conducted by revolutionaries, only 
conceding that ‘some incidents’ took place in the first two weeks of protests (BBC 
2011). LYM tweeted on more than one occasion that  ‘We would urge the media not 
to refer to the protesters as rebels, but as the pro democracy or simply Libyan 
people’.221 The NTC even underscored that democracy would be brought to fruition 
by a generation of young, Libyan activists who were modern in outlook, and shared in 
the liberal, secular values of the West. In an interview in March 2011, Mahmud 
Shammam made reference to the vitality of the second and third generations of 
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Libyans who had mobilised for the uprising, and who were ‘raised in your living 
rooms and in your universities and in your institutions’.222 Mahmoud Jibril, in an 
address to the European Parliament on 8 March 2011, argued that the pro-democracy 
Libyan protesters embodied ‘our shared humanity’, and described the NTC as 
engendering principles of equality by being formed ‘without discrimination, based on 
gender, religion, or ethnicity’.223 In his speech, Jibril situated this endorsement of 
Libya’s revolutionaries within the broader context of the Arab Spring, which, he 
argued, was an indication of the democratic inclinations of all Arab youth. 
To some extent, there was a concerted effort by the Libyan opposition to ensure 
that these representations of Libyan revolutionaries were reflected on the ground. 
Elham Saudi, the director of Lawyers for Justice in Libya, described the 
organisation’s dissemination of rules of conflict to anti-regime combatants in Libya as 
particularly successful, arguing that there was a ‘genuine desire to not commit any 
atrocities’.224 Yet, contrary to Jibril’s assertions, the pro-democracy frame was only 
loosely articulated in the initial weeks of protest. It was present in the pro-
revolutionary statement by the lawyer-led 17 February Coalition in Benghazi, but the 
actual term ‘democracy’ did not feature in the early protests and demonstrations. The 
activist and fighter Fawzi argues that the two most prominent chants of the uprising 
avoided this type of specificity, instead deploying very general or affective rhetoric: 
‘the people demand the fall of the regime’ and ‘with our blood and souls, we will 
sacrifice for Benghazi’.225 The tribal declarations (‘bayans’) issued in support of the 
uprising between February and March 2011 principally mentioned ‘freedom’ and 
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‘equality’ as aspirational values; where ‘democracy’ was evoked, it functioned as an 
empty signifier, deployed interchangeably with a myriad of other values such as 
‘freedom and justice’.226  
In addition, and in place of or alongside ‘democracy’, prognostic framings often 
mentioned ‘a country of institutions’: a term that makes reference to the disorderly 
operation of Libya’s administrative-bureaucratic system.227 Noting the ubiquity of 
these terms, Ali, who was based in Tripoli during the uprising, argued that, as the 
uprising progressed, ‘people did say they wanted democracy, but you’d have had to 
ask every single person what their idea of democracy and freedom was, because it 
was obvious that everyone had a different understanding of what those words 
meant’.228  
Although in some ways, the success of the Libyan uprising hinged on what can 
be described as a ‘negative’ (Alterman 2011) prognosis – the toppling of the Qadhafi 
regime – the rhetoric surrounding this objective was more complex in its content. As 
argued by the NTC’s foreign minister, Ali al-Issawi, removing Qadhafi was the 
‘starting point’ in a longer list of demands, including ‘freedom, democracy, and the 
right to choose who rules us’.229 Terms such as ‘freedom’, ‘liberty’ and ‘justice’ were 
sufficiently resonant to have elicited a wide range of support. In early appeals for 
mobilisation, which were disseminated in opposition websites, Qadhafi’s own words 
were used against him: ‘Qadhafi has always said in his speeches that we are a nation 
who decides its fate by itself, and so here we have decided to go down to the streets 
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and express our destiny in our own way’.230 However, the Libyan opposition’s 
prognostic framing went further, strategically redefining the protests as stemming 
from a collective democratic will and lending them a coherence and complexity that 
they had initially lacked. Framing the necessity of foreign military intervention also 
involved carefully balancing and furthering both the uprising’s popular legitimacy and 
its instrumental political objectives. 
 
6.3.3 Motivational Framing  	
 
The final component of collective action framing involves the generation of 
‘vocabularies of motive’, which ‘give people a reason to join collective action’ 
(Noakes and Johnston 2005: 56), and serve as a ‘prod to action’ (Snow and Benford 
1988: 202) where diagnostic and prognostic vocabularies may be insufficient. The 
Libyan uprising generated collectivist and religious vocabularies of motive that 
functioned as a dichotomous counter-narrative to the Qadhafi regime’s framing of the 
uprising as separatist and irreligious in nature. Such vocabularies explicitly sought to 
mobilise the Libyan populace against the Qadhafi regime, both in protest and in 
military struggle.  
On 22 February, Qadhafi delivered a speech in which he warned of tribal and 
regional disintegration if demonstrations did not cease: a speech that generated a 
sequence of angry protests affirming the contrary (Sawani 2013: 61). Collectivist 
motivational frames stressed the existent national unity of the ‘Libyan people’ and of 
‘Libyan soil’ as a motivator to action, but also represented unity as a necessary means 
to overthrowing the Qadhafi regime. The NTC’s foreign minister Ali al-Issawi argued 																																																								
230 “Statement regarding the Day of Rage in Libya”. Al-Satur. 31 January 2011. Available at: 
https://goo.gl/Y2ybFX  
	 189	
that mobilising in a unified manner was a way of defying the regime’s propaganda 
and attempts at generating ‘inter-Libyan’ conflict.231  
In the opposition’s rhetoric, unity was framed in two distinctive, arguably 
contradictory, ways. Firstly, political figures and activists frequently addressed their 
rhetorical appeals for revolutionary participation along tribal lines, to which tribal 
figures and representatives responded by speaking on behalf of their constituencies in 
support of the protests (Lacher 2013b: 151). This deliberately sought to offset the 
Qadhafi regime’s deployment of financial incentives and organisation of conferences 
in a bid to mobilise tribal support (Boudreaux 2011). The NTC’s media minister 
Mahmud Shammam actively addressed the loyalist Qadhadhfa tribe in a bid to 
encourage their defection. He reminded them of Qadhafi’s treacherous killing of his 
cousin, Hassan Shkal, and referenced historical networks of tribal allegiance that now 
mandated loyalty to the uprising: ‘When you sought refuge in the past, the people of 
Qadhafi, where did you go? You went to Sabha with Saif Al-Nasr…who announced 
not long ago that he is with the uprising’.232 In the same address, Shammam even 
mentioned his own tribe, the Magharba, as a way of asserting his own affinity to the 
Qadhadhfa tribe. 
In strategic terms, it has been argued that ‘tribal loyalties helped ensure that the 
entire north-east and much of Jabul Nafusa sided with the revolution’, through the rise 
of the Zintan and Rajban, two large Arab tribes, alongside predominantly Berber 
towns (Lacher 2013b: 156). Moreover, the NTC’s encouragement of tribal rhetoric 
allowed it to consolidate its legitimacy and to discredit Qadhafi’s claim to enjoy 
overwhelming tribal support (Sawani 2013: 61). However, collectivist framings in the 																																																								
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uprising also involved the tactical underplaying of the role of tribalism inside Libya. 
In an early interview with Al-Jazeera, the NTC’s Mahmoud Jibril insisted that ‘we do 
not recognise the tribe as a political body…the discourse of the tribe as a security and 
political device is a backward discourse that was used by the regime from 1975’.233 
The activist Alaa al-Ameri argued, in a post that was subsequently re-tweeted by 
LibyaFeb17, that the notion of ‘tribal Libya’ was a myth’: ‘by labeling us as “tribal”, 
you effectively dismiss the notion that our uprising has anything to do with freedom, 
democracy or human dignity’.234 In turn, LYM declared that in Libya, there was ‘no 
tribal rivalry, every revolutionary in Libya is fighting for the same cause, flag and 
country’.235  
As with the Libyan opposition’s framing of ‘democracy’, unity served as a 
flexible marker, at times built on the salience of regional and tribal identities, and at 
others premised on stressing their insignificance. This rhetorical disavowal of 
tribalism, accompanied by the practical instrumentalisation of tribal allegiances, 
arguably resonated with existent political dynamics in the Jamahiriya. Qadhafi had 
also argued that tribalism was harmful to national unity, while exploiting tribal 
allegiances in order to consolidate his own power base (Joffé 2013: 27-30). The 
controversial killing of Abdul Fattah Younes on 28 July 2011, under the summons of 
an investigation by the NTC’s executive committee, threatened to bring this 
contradiction to the fore, particularly when Libyan media outlets such as Al-Manarah 
began to engage in speculation that latent tribal divisions had motivated the killing.236 
However, the NTC continued to deny the presence of tribal motivations in order to a 
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bid to preserve the unity of the opposition (Pack 2013b: 7), with Libya Al-Ahrar’s 
presenter, journalist Mahmoud al-Werfalli, arguing that the killing may well have 
been part of a Qadhafi-led conspiracy to divide the revolutionary ranks.237 Social 
media activists also rallied against the repeated use of the phrase ‘tribalism’ by 
journalists without a context in which Qadhafi himself was once again culpable for 
engendering tribal division,238 affirming the argument by Mohammed Bamyeh 
(2011b) that the word ‘tribal’ in Libya is less a descriptor of an empirical reality than 
a reflection of the regime’s ‘retrograde organizational apparatus’. 
Another potent motivational vocabulary that emerged during the uprising 
involved statements of Islamic religious obligations (fatawa) issued by Muslim clerics 
and endorsed by the Libyan opposition. These characterised the military conflict 
against the Qadhafi regime as a form of struggle (jihad) that was incumbent (fard ayn) 
upon all Libyans. Sheikh Sadeq al-Ghariani, a prominent religious leader who was 
later appointed head of the NTC’s Supreme Fatwa Council, declared on 20 February 
that protesting against Qadhafi, and deploying ‘self-defence’ to that end, was 
obligatory for the Libyan people ‘according to sharia…whoever neglects this has 
erred’.239 A corresponding fatwa was issued by the Egyptian cleric Yusuf al-
Qaradawi, immediately following the arrest of Ghariani, characterising the uprising as 
a ‘blessed intifada’, describing rebellion against the Qadhafi regime as ‘a sharia 
obligation and an Islamic obligation upon everyone’, and one that would bring about a 
return to Libya’s ‘true Arab and Islamic nature’.240 Social media activists immediately 
endorsed the fatwas issued by Ghariani and Qaradawi. On 21 February, LYM 
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tweeted: ‘Qaradawi asks any soldier or libyan who can kill gaddafi should do (issued 
a fatwa) we need an end to this and quickly’.241 LibyaFeb17 translated a text of Sadeq 
al-Ghariani’s speech in which he called for jihad against Qadhafi, placing it on their 
own website and sending it to LYM for the latter to broadcast to its more extensive 
network of Twitter contacts.242   
Over the course of the Libyan conflict, the fatawa issued against the Qadhafi 
regime by Ghariani shifted from sanctioning protest, to mandating the taking up of 
arms, while also endorsing the NTC’s sovereign authority over the Libyan people. 
Using the religious rhetoric of ‘oaths of allegiance’ (‘bay’a’), which, as noted in the 
previous chapter, had been deployed by the Qadhafi regime in upholding its own 
claims to legitimacy, Ghariani presented a fatwa in August 2011 declaring the 
following: 
 
All Libyans, at this current moment, must accept the authority of the 
National Transitional Council, under the leadership of Mustafa Abdul Jalil. 
Everyone must give bay’a to the NTC. The NTC is currently the legal 
guardian of Muslims of this country, and so it is incumbent on people to 
give bay’a to it…The NTC does not want to stay in power, but will hand 
over its authority following the holding of democratic elections. At that 
point, people can choose who governs them, but in this current climate, it is 
impermissible for us to disagree on this, in any shape or form.243  
 
Meanwhile, the figureheads and proponents of secular democracy in the country, such 
as the NTC’s media minister Mahmud Shammam, both affirmed and supplied a 
platform for Ghariani’s Islamic legal opinions. The religious television programme 																																																								
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Issues and Rulings (Qadaya wa Fatawa) was aired on Libya al-Ahrar during July and 
August 2011, and gave a prominent role to Ghariani as the authoritative Islamic voice 
of the uprising. On this programme, Ghariani continued to urge Libyans, including 
those residing in the diaspora, to participate in the military overthrow of the Qadhafi 
regime, describing this as an act of ‘supporting God, and supporting truth, and 
supporting justice…and establishing God’s doctrine on earth’.244 
The Libyan opposition’s fatawa were premised on the effective 
excommunication (takfir) of Qadhafi. Ghariani argued that Qadhafi had directly 
relinquished his religious and political authority over the Libyan people, both as a 
result of ’42 years’ of nefarious attacks on Islamic orthodoxy, and because his 
suppression of protests revealed that he could not be depended upon for the good 
governance of his subjects. As a result, he could no longer be termed a ‘legal 
guardian’ (wali), over whom rebellion is normally impermissible.245 This rhetoric 
resonates with, and shares in, the Qadhafi regime’s own conceptual system. Anti-
Qadhafi fatawa delegitimised the regime’s own religious scholars (ulema), who 
themselves had issued fatawa on the impermissibility of protest against Qadhafi. 
During the conflict, Qadhafi encouraged local Salafi leaders, especially in Tripoli, to 
give speeches in mosques against the on-going rebellion; some, such as Abu Hudaifa, 
denounced the rebels for ‘causing fitna and for opening the country to Western 
invasion’ (Benotman, Pack, and Brandon 2013: 220). The pro-opposition cleric 
Sheikh Muhammad al-Dokali, in an appearance on Libya Al-Ahrar, responded by 
describing pro-Qadhafi religious clerics as ‘preachers on the gates of hell,’ and argued 
that ‘even listening to them is Islamically forbidden’.246  																																																								
244 “Issues and Rulings, 20 August”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/JoUhM1  
245 Ibid.		
246 “Libya Al-Ahrar: Sheikh al-Dokali’s intervention on Skype”. YouTube. Available at: 
https://goo.gl/dbs84D   
	 194	
The fatawa mandating jihad against the Qadhafi regime lent the entire conflict a 
strong, religious undertone. The NTC coordinator Yahya argued that the 
excommunication of Qadhafi by religious clerics was a critical development in the 
uprising:  
 
They directly called for jihad, and this encouraged many people to come 
out. I travelled to the south of Libya, to Misrata, and to the Jabal 
[mountains] area. The fight was always about jihad and martyrdom…but 
the jihadi narrative was also convenient for the objectives of the 
revolution, hence why it was embraced by non-Islamists.247 
 
This religious undertone was reflected in the motivational vocabulary deployed by the 
opposition’s military leaders on the battlefield. In the east of Libya, the defence 
minister Abdul Fattah Younes declared to his fighters that the conflict against 
Qadhafi’s forces was a ‘battle of martyrdom’ against unbelievers’.248 In the west of 
Libya, the commander Abu Bakr al-Rabuub, whose battalion was affiliated with the 
Tripoli Brigade, described the assault on Qadhafi’s Azizyah compound as part of a 
‘godly revolution, a blessed revolution…we don’t want any violations of sharia 
during fighting. Our goal is jihad, and to topple the biggest tyrant the world has ever 
seen’.249 Rabuub, like Ghariani, frames the entire military mission in religious terms, 
from the motivations underpinning the combat to the protocols of warfare and post-
conflict demobilisation, such as the necessity of gathering up and returning weapons 
to the NTC as a trust to God.250  
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While deploying religious rhetoric in their internal motivational framing, the 
Libyan opposition consistently denied the Qadhafi regime’s argument that extreme 
jihadists were the central actors in the uprising. Initially, this denial was on the basis 
that the anti-regime protests were not Islamist in their composition or in their 
demands.251 The ‘Declaration of the Success of the Revolution’, issued by a cohort of 
anti-regime lawyers and activists in Benghazi on 22 February, denied the presence of 
al-Qaeda in Libya by asserting that this was a ‘civil revolution’ from the outset, 
peaceful in its advocacy for the rights and freedoms of all Libyans.252 In turn, and 
prior to the militarisation of the conflict, LYM also attacked Qadhafi’s baseless ‘al-
Qaeda lies,’253 arguing that ‘there is no such thing as al-Qaeda in Libya’.254 As the 
conflict continued, and the Western media began to propound the notion of a unified 
Islamist movement hijacking the popular uprisings (Benotman, Pack and Brandon 
2013: 192), Mahmoud Jibril conceded that ‘there may be Islamist currents…but they 
do not represent the prevailing view in Libya’.255 
 
One of the most striking characteristics of collective action framing in the Libyan 
uprising is the way in which it was affirmed across the different sites of messaging 
outlined at the outset of this chapter. Religious motivational frames were issued by 
Libyan clerics and endorsed by representatives from the political opposition; the 
prognosis of international military intervention was propounded by the political 
opposition and social media activists, and subsequently legitimated by religious 																																																								
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figures. The sequential framing of Qadhafi as problem, regime overthrow as solution, 
and religious collectivity as motivation was actively articulated by the opposition, and 
‘resonated’ with the Jamahiriya’s institutional logic in different ways.  
Such framings partly sought to expose the contradictions inherent within the 
Jamahiriya’s system of meaning and practice, especially in the reattribution of 
political culpability to Qadhafi. However, prognostic and motivational framings also 
rechanneled some of the regime’s rhetorical content – its vocabularies of freedom and 
anti-imperialism, tribalism and religious authenticity  - for revolutionary ends. As 
argued by Vandewalle (2012b: 192), ‘some of what Qadhafi once stood for – his 
suspicions of the West, his wish to renew Arab grandeur, his initial quest for dignity 
and self-determination’ resonated within the Libyan political imagination in 2011. 
The opposition’s frames also responded to and corroborated the rhetoric surrounding 
the ‘Arab Spring’ in their affirmation of a positive, democratic conceptualisation of 
who Libya’s revolutionaries were, particularly to the international community. 
 
6.4 Strategic Framing as a Meaning Making Practice  	
 
This chapter has sought to describe some of the ways in which meanings were 
actively constructed and strategically disseminated by the Libyan opposition 
movement in 2011. However, this discussion also highlights a central tension within 
framing theory that has customarily gone unremarked. To what extent can framing be 
a strategic activity, involving the tactical selection of resonant meanings (and the 
dismissal of inconvenient meanings) while also bringing to the forefront ‘the role of 
human agency in contentious action? (Noakes and Johnston 2005: 4) Some of the 
frames outlined above are incommensurate in their meanings, either contradicting co-
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existent frames, or not necessarily cohering with the political reality on the Libyan 
ground. It has been argued that contradictions among a movement’s beliefs or claims 
can lead to ‘problematic’ or limited mobilisation (Benford and Snow 2000: 620), but 
in fact, the existence of contradiction can also undermine the capacity for agentive 
articulation that the framing process purportedly engenders.  
One of the potentially incongruent sets of frames in the Libyan uprising is the 
propounding of liberal democracy as prognosis and the collective advocacy of a 
fatwa-based motivational rhetoric. According to the NTC coordinator Yahya, they 
were mutually exclusive on the battlefield, where discussions of jihad sidelined the 
broader democratic discourse of the NTC: ‘the people on the ground were only 
concerned about the fight and the jihad, not with questions of democracy’.256 The 
distinction between an ‘Arab Spring’ and ‘Islamist Winter’ (Totten et al 2012), which 
describes the hijacking of a youth led sequence of pro-democracy protests by well-
coordinated Islamist groups, also appears to suggest the incommensurability of two 
distinctive political visions. It is thus argued that it was ‘peaceful (and often secularly 
motivated)’ crowds who rose up in Libya (Byman 2011: 76) and that ‘Arab youth 
want democracy, not theocracy’ (Esposito 2011). 
Similarly, there is a tension between collectivist motivational frames that 
‘referred to the positions of tribes rather than any other social category’ (Lacher 
2013b: 156), and the concurrent positioning of the Libyan uprising as a fundamentally 
non-tribal form of political action, particularly to outsiders. However, these frames 
were co-existent during the period of mobilisation itself, and did not emerge during 
the aftermath of an initial revolutionary consensus, as implied by the Arab Spring-
Islamist dichotomy.  
																																																								
256 Interview, 29 November 2011. Skype.  
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I would argue that one way in which these framings were permitted to co-exist 
was due to the lack of an elaboration upon, or confrontation of, potential differences 
within the anti-Qadhafi movement. LYM’s co-founder Maryam described their 
discursive activities as fundamentally ‘short-sighted’ in nature – targeted towards 
facilitating the overthrow of Qadhafi – but as also limited in their dialogic impact: ‘It 
was very much tunnel vision…I’d go on to Twitter, put out the information and just 
wouldn’t look back’.257 The intense focus on strategically messaging the uprising 
meant that it was increasingly uncommon to ‘venture out or talk to strangers’ on the 
ground in Libya, or indeed, to address other Libyans with whom she had 
disagreements about the political future of Libya.258 Asef Bayat (2005: 901) has 
argued that ‘unity of purpose is the hallmark, indeed a defining feature, of a social 
movement’, but LYM’s social movement operations suggest that unity of purpose can 
be imagined as much as it can be actively articulated. One activist, writing in Al-
Manarah, celebrated the fact the consensus did not emerge from dialogue, but from 
the absence of it: Libyans ‘agreed to protest against the regime, agreed to come out at 
the same time, supported military intervention, all without having to come to an 
agreement...have you ever seen a people agree as expertly as we have done?’259 
Ali, who participated in the capture of Qadhafi’s military compound, Bab Al-
Aziziya, in August 2011, affirmed that there was a strong sense of collectivity among 
anti-regime activists and combatants, but that this stemmed from the shared 
experience of surreptitiously resisting the regime inside its own stronghold, and was 
not due to an agreement over what form of governance would succeed the Qadhafi 
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259 al-Ajnaf, Alaa. “A letter to the dear reader” (resala li azizi al-qari). Al-Manarah. 5 August 2011. 
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regime. Discussions of this sort were very rare.260 Indeed, he suggested that the clear 
and at times seemingly unattainable target - that ‘the regime needed to go’ - left little 
room for the discussion of political specifics. The exiled dissident Mustafa, who 
travelled to Misrata in May 2011, also argued that ‘Everybody was united. There was 
no talk about divisions, about problems or issues. It was all to do with getting rid of 
Qadhafi’.261 The absence of ‘talk about divisions’ suggests that divisions may well 
have existed, but that they were insufficiently articulated, or resolved, because their 
latent existence did not undermine collective political mobilisation.  
Libyan activists also sustained the co-existence of potentially incommensurate 
frames by actively flouting what Hank Johnston (2005: 15) has described as the 
‘empirical credibility’ of the framing process. Hamza, who was based in Benghazi, 
argued that: 
 
The Christian Science Monitor and other papers tried to propagate the whole 
story of Islamists being around. We were like ‘no, they don’t exist’. That was 
the narrative amongst activists then and people in the Court - that Islamists just 
don’t exist. There are no militants… When a journalist with a camera went to 
the front lines, one of the lawyers from the Courthouse came up with the bright 
idea of bringing a barber. And they were shaving all their beards and cutting 
their hair and stuff, for free…we kind of downplayed that narrative.262 
 
The activists I interviewed disagreed on the extent to which such contentious aspects 
of the uprising were obfuscated, and on the rationales underpinnings practices of 
concealment. The Benghazi-based activist Nada said that she subconsciously 
‘ignored’ the increased presence of Islamist fighters in Benghazi in 2011, principally 																																																								
260 Interview with Ali, rebel coordinator and fighter in Tripoli, 9 February 2015. Skype. 
261 Interview with Mustafa, anti-regime dissident and human rights campaigner, 4 March 2015. 
London. 
262 Interview with Hamza, anti-regime demonstrator and civil society activist, 4 April 2015. London.	
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because many Islamists were undertaking or supporting civil society activities at the 
time.263 The US-based activist Huda argued that her denial of the prevalence of 
Islamism and tribalism inside Libya was principally borne out her (and other Libyan 
diaspora activists’) ‘lack of knowledge’ about the country itself.264 
In other instances, it was conceded that concealment was a deliberate strategy. 
The NTC member Hussein argued that ‘there were only 20 or so al-Qaeda fighters in 
Libya’, and that camouflaging their presence was a necessary move on behalf of those 
representing the uprising: ‘if I’d mentioned them, I would have damaged the Libyan 
cause’.265 In contrast, the NTC coordinator Yahya bluntly depicted this process of 
misrepresentation as more ubiquitous among Libyan activists: ‘that was the lie we 
used in 2011, to say that there’s no al-Qaeda. In fact, in some areas, Islamists 
comprised the majority of fighters’.266 The fighter Fawzi concurred, arguing that the 
concealment of the views of Islamist-inclined fighters was a deliberate media strategy, 
pursued in particular by Libya Al-Ahrar, which refused to give coverage to frontline 
Islamist-leaning fighters with non-congenial political opinions.267 Ahmed of LYM 
argued that the rise in the number of Islamist fighters, and other problematic aspects 
of the uprising, such as the presence of opportunism on the battlefields, became 
increasingly apparent as the uprising progressed, but he ‘ignored it, glossed over it. I 
ignored the bad things and I said no, we’re going to overcome this…And if I’d said 
any of those things out loud, I would have been a ‘fattan’ [troublemaker]. I would 
have been instigating something’.268 
																																																								
263 Interview with Haleema, civil society activist in Benghazi, 29 March 2015. Tunisia.  
264 Interview with Huda, Libyan-American social media activist, 9 June 2016. Skype. 
265 Interview with Hussein, NTC representative, 7 November 2016, London.  
266 Interview with Yahya, activist and NTC coordinator, 29 November 2016, Skype.  
267 Interview with Fawzi, revolutionary fighter in western Libya, 29 December 2015. Skype. 
268 Interview with Ahmed, social media activist, 25 February 2015, London.		
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The presence of discord within a social movement narrative has been interpreted 
as a limitation that necessitates articulated ‘frame alignment processes,’ or the 
rhetorical reconciliation of tensions, in order for political mobilisation to occur (Snow 
et al 1986). However, the framing process in the Libyan uprising suggests that the 
concealment or deferral of difference did not hinder the mobilisation process, but may 
have even served to prolong it. In addressing the Libyan populace in 2011, 
particularly within opposition-controlled territories, NTC members such as the Oil 
and Finance minister Ali Tarhouni argued that ‘this is not the time for change’, or a 
time to air contentious issues, such as the emergence of criminal behaviours on the 
military frontlines: ‘the country needs to be liberated…this right now is the main 
battle’.269 Hussein concedes that even within the NTC, ‘the differences were clear and 
existent back them…I know I disagreed with Muslim Brotherhood members as well 
as extreme secularists, but these were brushed under the carpet’.270  
The act of concealing discord does not appear to have been a limitation for the 
uprising’s immediate, instrumental goals. The dissident Fayez, however, emphasised 
that this was problematic from a long-term political perspective: 
 
The mistake that people made back then was to lump them [the NTC] all 
together as ‘opposition’…they were different, and their attitude towards the 
change that was happening in Libya was different as well. There were fights 
in the transitional council between the Islamists and liberals. They were 
arguing about everything, from laws to the direction of the revolution. Even 
the Islamists didn’t form just one group, but were different too.271 
 																																																								
269 “Ali al-Tarhouni”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/m8i5Jn. A similar sentiment was reiterated 
by the foreign minister Ali al-Issawi in an interview with Al-Manarah, in which he declared that ‘the 
issue of liberation’ should be the central priority for all involved in the uprising. Issue 5: 4-5. 
270 Interview with Hussein. 7 November 2016, London.  
271 Interview with Fayez. 27 January 2016, London.	
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Fayez describes the popular perception of the NTC’s homogeneity as a ‘mistake’ 
because it gave the false impression that the uprising stood for near-universally shared 
values and ideals: an illusion that would be detrimental when the Qadhafi regime 
came to an end. Neither, he asserts, did the NTC clearly articulate an understanding of 
what terms such as ‘freedom’ and ‘democracy’ meant to Libyans themselves.272 The 
prominent Libyan journalist Hisham al-Shewli also argued that the NTC – and in 
particular, Mahmoud Jibril - had so focused on obtaining legitimacy from the 
international community, that it had failed to discursively reflect, or even engage 
with, the heterogeneity in the Libyan populace’s political hopes and aspirations.273 I 
would argue that this lack of discursive engagement permitted the existence of 
convenient contradictions, within the NTC’s own internal composition, but also 
within the broader political discourse of the uprising as developed by Libyan activists. 
The implication here is that strategic framing was a short-term, mobilising procedure, 
instead of a clearly-articulated practice.  
Despite their criticisms of revolutionary discourses in 2011, it is striking that 
Libyan activists’ appraisal of their own activities challenges a central characteristic of 
the framing process: the emergence of choice. Noakes and Johnston (2005: 8) 
describe framing as a ‘selective choice’, and Jasper (2004: 2) has argued that ‘if 
agency means anything, it would seem to involve choices’, describing social 
movement decision-making as ‘the act of selecting and applying tactics’. However, by 
drawing attention to their relative political insularity, or even to the imperative goal of 
toppling the Qadhafi regime and preventing further casualties, Libyan activists 
suggest that their strategic choices were conditioned by circumstances beyond their 
																																																								
272 Interview with Fayez. 27 January 2016, London. 
273 al-Shelwi, Hisham. “A state or a company?” (dawla am shareka?) Al-Manarah. 29 July 2011. Issue 
6: 12.	
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control. As indicated above, this rationale was deployed for a variety of ends: to 
justify the exaggeration of the opposition’s casualty figures in the initial few weeks of 
protests, to advocate for a no-fly zone, and to override potentially troubling 
differences between Libyans themselves. Activists ‘had to’ frame the Libyan uprising 
in the most politically effective way possible: ‘that was a requirement, it was a 
must’.274 
Activists’ evaluation of their rhetorical practices as an unavoidable response to 
the Libyan crisis, or as not comprising an informed choice at all, must be understood 
within the context of Libya’s post-revolutionary transitional collapse. Although social 
movement framing has been presented as an agentive practice that potentially 
empowers both activists and constituents (Snow et al 1986: 475), the post-uprising 
political landscape in Libya has in fact disempowered civilian actors, from the rival 
militia infighting that led to the collapse of central government in 2014 (Ciampi 2016: 
30), to the assassination of human rights lawyers and political activists in Benghazi 
(Prashad 2016: 151), and the way in which Islamists have increasingly taken 
advantage of the political environment in the country (Benotman, Pack and Brandon 
2013: 209).  
As a result of these developments, some of the activists interviewed for this 
research questioned whether it was prudent for them to have supported the 
militarisation of the uprising, particularly in light of their lack of awareness about the 
nature of Islamist militancy inside Libya. 275 Others argued that, in retrospect, the 
entire uprising may have been a ‘conspiracy’ against the Libyan people, either by 
intervening foreign powers such as Qatar,276 or by the NTC itself.277 According to 																																																								
274 Interview with Hussein, NTC representative, 7 November 2016. London.  
275 Interview with Haleema, civil society activist in Benghazi, 29 March 2015. Tunisia; Interview with 
Muna, civil society activist in Benghazi, 20 August 2011, Bristol.	
276 Interview with Yasmin, women’s rights activist, 11 March 2015. Essex. 
	 204	
Mansour, a member of the Benghazi Revolutionary Youth Commission (RYC), many 
activists in the group began to feel that Saif al-Islam al-Qadhafi, in his speech on 21 
February, ‘was telling us the truth’ about the presence of Islamist extremists inside 
Libya, and that they had dismissed his words at their peril.278 In the context of such 
assessments, perceptions of political agency are not only enabled by the framing 
process, but may be undermined as a result of insincere or misinformed, but 
politically effective, framing practices. In turn, perceptions of agency are also shaped 
by the long-term political consequences of contentious activism.  
Collective action framing in the Libyan uprising, by responding to and refuting 
the messaging of the Qadhafi regime, also positioned itself within the regime’s 
restrictive discursive parameters. This flags up the tension, noted in Chapter 3, with 
the way in which ‘frame resonance’ may ultimately undermine the contentious impact 
of representational activity. For instance, the opposition’s diagnostic framing reversed 
Qadhafi’s familiar rhetoric by positioning him as the solely culpable and agentive 
actor in the Jamahiriya, without broaching the more problematic ways in which the 
Jamahiriya had engendered popular complicity within its material and symbolic 
practices. This also meant that ex-regime figures were swiftly framed as having been 
internally ‘uncommitted’ to the Qadhafi regime, sidestepping the real tensions that 
existed on the battlefield over the complicity of some figures – such as Abdul Fattah 
Younes – in overseeing the detention of political dissidents (Fitzgerald 2015: 192). In 
turn, and during the uprising itself, Qadhafi’s early allegation that protesters were 
manipulated by al-Qaeda extremists spawned a competing denial of Islamist activity, 
while his warnings of impending tribal conflict shaped the way in which the NTC 
both mobilised along tribal lines, organising parallel conferences to the Qadhafi 																																																																																																																																																														
277 Interview with Khaled, pro-opposition lawyer in Zawiya, 26 March 2015. Tunisia. 
278 Interview with Mansour, demonstrator and civil society activist, 24 April 2016. Skype.		
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regime, while simultaneously denying that tribalism was a relevant mode of political 
organisation in Libya.  
It has been argued that the construction and dissemination of meanings, even for 
strategic ends, is not a boundless activity. Steinberg (2002: 210) has cautioned against 
‘excessive voluntarism’ when analysing framing practices, arguing that such activity 
is shaped by ‘cultural meanings’ structural characteristics independent of actors’ 
control’. In this instance, the ‘cultural meanings’ that shaped the logics of activism 
were the symbolic and material practices undertaken by the Jamahiriya. Moreover, 
framing was also shaped by the short-term instrumental goals adopted by activists, 
which may not always reinforce – and may even undermine - the agentive, meaning 
making component of framing practices. 
It is important to note that the tensions that were sidelined or concealed by the 
Libyan opposition increasingly began to emerge near the conclusion of the military 
campaign in August 2011, signaling a move away from revolutionary consensus, and 
towards attempts to shape the post-Qadhafi political environment. Benghazi’s 
Mayadeen newspaper began to attack the heightened Islamist discourse in the 
constitutional consultation process, arguing that ‘we do not want to replace Qadhafi 
with Khomeini’,279 whereas Al-Manarah claimed that ‘secularist factions are now 
undertaking a campaign to undermine the entire Islamist current’.280 On the military 
front, commanders such as Mohammed Sheiter from the Union of Revolutionary 
Brigades argued in August 2011 for the pre-eminence of fighters in post-Qadhafi 
Libya: ‘this is not a peaceful revolution, and this is not the revolution of the 
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courthouse…this is an armed revolution’.281 Conversely, journalists writing in the 
same newspaper began to note the risks of vigilantism and militia autonomy after the 
overthrow of the Qadhafi regime.282 However, the mobilising rhetoric throughout the 
preceding revolutionary period had actively denied the existence of such political 
differences, instead of confronting or reconciling them.    
Within the social movement literature, omission is seen as a conventional 
element of collective action framing. Noakes and Johnston (2005: 7) state that all 
interpretive packages must ‘highlight some issues, and ignore others’, and even go on 
to argue that a degree of ‘cynicism’ by movement entrepreneurs is actually positive, 
enabling strategic marketing pitches to bring on board different audiences (ibid: 14). 
However, although this assessment elaborates upon the causal impact of framing on 
political mobilisation, it once again says little about the way in which rhetorical 
obfuscation, and movement cynicism in general, can impact upon the agentive 
dimensions of the framing process. The preceding discussion has sought to reverse the 
assumptions within the social movement literature, indicating the way in which the 
acceptance of contradictory frames helped to sustain participation in the Libyan 
uprising, and effectively enabled the co-existence of incommensurate interpretive 
packages with compatible political objectives. However, the pursuit of such strategic 
objectives by the Libyan opposition arguably undermined the extent to which the 
framing process facilitated the active articulation and clarification of collective 
political understandings. As a result, assessing framing principally on the degree to 
which it can mobilise and recruit participants (Johnston 2009: 6) neglect some of the 
agentive dimensions of meaning making practices.  																																																								
281 “Interview with Mohammed Sheiter” (muqabala ma’aa Mohammed Sheiter). Al- Manarah. 12 
August 2011. Issue 8: 7. 
282 al-Raedh, Mustafa. “The motivations of a revolution and the demands of a state” (hawafiz al-thawra 
wa-mutatallabat al-dawla). Al- Manarah 15 July 2011. Issue 4: 8.	
	 207	
6.5 Conclusion  
 
This chapter centres on the conceptualisation of political agency as a strategic, 
representational practice, and has analysed this representational activity using social 
movement framing theory. It has demonstrated the way in which members of the 
Libyan opposition crafted a series of interpretive packages, or collective action 
frames, in an effort to topple the Qadhafi regime, collaborating across a range of 
emergent organisational networks in the process, and generating meanings that 
publically exposed and even undermined the contradictions present in the 
Jamahiriya’s institutional logic. This emergence of contentious representational 
activity signified a radical shift from the delimitation and cooptation of political 
agency under Qadhafi’s rule.  
However, this chapter has also sought to approach the social movement 
framework reflexively and critically. By re-centering the element of ‘agency’ in its 
analysis, it has argued that there is a tension between the strategic use of framing for 
mobilisation purposes, and framing theory’s nominal emphasis on actors’ social 
construction of reality. Although the Libyan uprising’s framing process was in many 
respects well-coordinated, at times ‘cynical’ (Noakes and Johnston 2005: 13) in its 
marketing orientation, and politically successful by the standards embraced by social 
movement practitioners, political actors maintained and even instrumentalised the 
presence of internal contradictions within the interpretive packages they produced. 
Tensions within collective action frames were occasionally concealed, obfuscated or 
insufficiently articulated in the pursuit of the uprising’s short-term political 
objectives. Understanding obfuscation as a limitation, rather than as strength, 
problematises the broader premise that contestation in the Arab uprisings involved a 
people saying ‘what it wants, whenever it wants’ (Bell 2013). This view of agency 
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overlooks the way in which representations are shaped by existent, institutional 
contexts of meaning, as well as by the emergent discursive and material landscape of 
a particular contentious moment.  
Where this chapter has explored the emergence of political agency as a strategic 
practice, the following chapter will examine political agency in the Libyan uprising as 
a symbolic, representational practice. This shift in focus is partly empirical, turning 
from away strategic, discursive frames towards an analysis of cultural productions 
during the uprising, but it is also grounded in the theoretical premise that symbolic 
contestation does not simply seek ‘resonance’ with a set of meanings, but potentially, 
a more radical transformation of them.   
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7 
Symbolic Contestation in the Libyan Uprising 		
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter investigated the emergence of political agency in the Libyan 
uprising by unpacking the strategic representational practices undertaken by the 
opposition movement. In the process, it underscored the tension between meaning 
making as an agentive activity and strategy as a political imperative. This chapter, in 
line with a theoretical framework that conceives of agency as both strategic and 
symbolic, will shift its conceptual focus towards understanding the symbolic 
dimensions of representational practices during moments of open political 
contestation. It is premised on the argument, contained with the resistance literature, 
that the definitional practices of a marginalised group can overturn dominant 
symbolic classifications of the social world, and in doing so ‘construct alternative 
forms of subjectivity and sociality’ (Juris and Sitrin 2006: 32), for bystanders as well 
as participants (Scott 1990: 226).  
The first section of this chapter will delineate the way in which Libyan actors 
sought to overturn the Jamahiriya’s symbolic order by repudiating its ideological 
content and its pervasive, iconographic presence. This builds on the discussion in 
Chapter 5 of this thesis, which described the way in which public space was cluttered 
with valorising representations of Qadhafi, and ideology was publically re-performed 
according to the strictures of the Jamahiriya’s ‘rhetorical universe’ (Wedeen 1999: 
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25). Repudiation of the Jamahiriya’s symbolic order, by departing from the 
‘disingenuous reproduction of state propaganda’ (Cherstich 2014: 95-97) reconfigured 
the established conventions on publically political expression. However, subversion 
alone is not sufficient for the transformation of a dominant system of meaning 
(Jefferess 2008: 14-15) but must be accompanied by the establishment of an 
alternative set of meanings, relationships and even practices (Juris and Sitrin 2016: 
40). This insight is also affirmed in the understanding of institutions, and institutional 
change, as comprised of interrelated symbolic and material practices (Armstrong and 
Bernstein 2008). The second section of this chapter will thus outline the content of the 
Libyan uprising’s alternative symbolic order, and indicate the ways in which its 
redefinition of Libyan national identity partially materialised in the emergence of new 
forms of collective, civic activity during the uprising itself. 
Studies of resistance have cautioned against romanticising the struggles of 
subordinate groups, noting the intersectionality and entanglement of power and 
resistance (Abu-Lughod 1990; Wedeen 1999; Sharp et al 2000) and the fact that acts 
of critique generate their own exclusions, hierarchies and dominations (Veeser 1989; 
Juris and Sirtrin 2016). The final section of the chapter will therefore critically 
analyse the hierarchies generated within the Libyan revolutionary symbolic order, and 
interpret the extent to which these generated an exclusionary ‘routinization of 
interests’ (Friedland and Alford 1991: 245) in the material sphere. Although agency is 
implicit in the very emergence of representational practices (Khatib 2013b), the 
agentive transformation of dominant ‘cultural schemas’ (Sewell 1992: 19) is a far 
more challenging undertaking, and can only be assessed through a reflexive 
engagement with the Libyan uprising’s newly-established symbolic order.   
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7.2 The Subversion of the Jamahiriya’s Symbolic Order  
 
 
Institutional struggle, according to Friedland and Alford (1991: 250), is not simply 
about effecting material change, but involves a contestation over the symbols and 
categorical structures that all institutions engender and sustain: in particular, the way 
in which ‘power and interest’ are defined. Although this claim is extended towards all 
institutions, this conflict arguably takes on a heightened significance in authoritarian 
contexts. Authoritarian regimes overemploy symbolic displays of power in their 
attempts to manipulate and manage systems of signification (Wedeen 1999: 5). As a 
result, the cultural terrain is transformed into a site of ‘struggle over presence, over 
visibility’ that effectively represents the broader conflict between authoritarian 
political power and popular political agency (Khatib 2013b: 1).  
During the Libyan uprising, the ‘struggle over presence’ was an emergent 
phenomenon that differed in form and intensity depending on the location of its 
production. For instance, where anti-regime graffiti was surreptitiously produced and 
swiftly erased in regime-controlled cities such as Tripoli throughout the uprising 
(Abushagur 2011), opposition-controlled territories saw the emergence of specifically 
designated creative spaces, from the music studios inside the 17 February Media 
Centre in Benghazi,283 to the ‘revolutionary museums’ that showcased anti-regime 
artwork in Yefren and Misrata,284 and to newspapers such as Mayadeen, which 
dedicated columns to the display of revolutionary fiction, artwork and poetry from its 
first issue.285 The Jamahiriya’s ‘visibility’ was more publically compromised in some 
places than in others, and the cultural productions that emerged in opposition-
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controlled territories, from artwork and graffiti to planned demonstrations, were more 
visually sophisticated and even distinctly celebratory in tone.286  
Nevertheless, cultural productions across Libya were comparable in two 
respects. Firstly, they possessed strongly subversive representational content: in 
particular, they sought to unmask the carefully-cultivated image of the ‘Brother 
Leader’ – the locus of political authority in the Jamahiriya - and to re-represent him 
in a parodied and chastened form. In addition, they can also be described as part of the 
‘collective elaboration of meaning’ (Doerr et al 2015: 556) in that they borrowed 
from, and contributed to, an emergent anti-regime aesthetic that was mirrored in 
different cities inside Libya, and that intersected across different genres of cultural 
production.  
At the very outset of protests in Libya, Qadhafi’s visual presence was literally 
erased through the public demolition of billboards featuring his image, and the private 
destruction of portraits of the Libyan leader that had formerly populated Libyan 
households and businesses.287 Very quickly, however, crowds went beyond such acts 
of destruction, and actively turned Qadhafi into an object of ridicule, chanting slogans 
and carrying placards and cartoons that mocked his physical appearance (Khalil 2014: 
99). These productions immediately revoked the established terms of public address 
for Qadhafi: in place of ‘the leader’ there was now simply ‘Muammar’; in place of 
Qadhafi’s middle name ‘Abu Minyar’, there emerged the term ‘Bu Shafshufa’ (the 
one with frizzy hair), a nickname that lampooned Qadhafi’s unruly hair and unkempt 
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cities that elaborated satirical anti-regime slogans at length, displayed posters and artwork, and were 
often participated in or even led by children. See this demonstration in Zintan as one such instance: 
https://goo.gl/LnG3ud  
287 “Tearing images of Qadhafi”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/QGjTpX		
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appearance.288 The adulatory terms previously adopted by Qadhafi – ‘king of kings’, 
‘the only falcon’, ‘the warrior’ – were undercut by being scrawled next to mocking 
cartoons of a dishevelled Qadhafi,289 or by being followed up with assertions such as 
‘you’ve been toppled by the Facebook generation’ in revolutionary music.290  
Libyans thus contested what James Scott (1989: 57) has described as the ‘norms 
of law, custom, politeness, deference, loyalty’ that had previously sustained the 
Jamahiriya’s symbolic order. They dispensed with its obsequious conversational 
strictures, addressing Qadhafi casually and dismissively during celebratory gatherings 
in eastern Libya: ‘Shafshufa, no hard feelings!’291 In addition, they publically derided 
Qadhafi’s eccentric remarks and rhetorical mannerisms, thereby abandoning the 
former mock deference towards Qadhafi’s speeches prior to the uprising, and 
signalling the breach of the frontier between ‘public acts of compliance and ‘hidden 
transcripts’ of dissent (Scott 1990: 202). The expressions that Qadhafi directed 
towards his supporters, in his speech on 22 February, were parodied in revolutionary 
artwork: ‘onwards’ (ela al-amam),292 ‘march on’ (ezhafo),293 ‘we have not used force 
yet’ (nahno lam nastekhdem al-quwwa baad),294 ‘revolution revolution revolution’ 
(thawra thawra thawra),295 ‘I am staying here’ (ana ga’id hena),296 and most 
famously, ‘alleyway to alleyway’ (zenga zenga) which was swiftly transformed into 
one of the defining chants of the uprising: ‘alleyway by alleyway, room by room – 
																																																								
288 These appellations were integrated in one of the most popular anti-regime slogans in the uprising: 
‘Muammar, the one with frizzy hair: you’ll [finally] see who the Libyan people are’. Mayadeen 
compiled a list of this and other similar revolutionary slogans in an article titled “The use of humour 
against the regime”. 19 July 2011, Issue 10: 15. 
289 Appendix: Figure 3. Khadija Teri  
290 Usood al-Assema. “It’s Over, Shafshufa’ (Tammit ya shafshufa). 2011. Available at: 
https://goo.gl/mB2JEj  
291 Interview with Hamza, anti-regime demonstrator and civil society activist, 4 April 2015. London. 
292 Appendix: Figure 4. Khadija Teri.  
293 Appendix: Figure 5. Soumiea Abushagur. 
294 Appendix: Figure 6. Mark Kersten.  
295 Appendix: Figure 7. Mark Kersten.  
296 Appendix: Figure 3. Khadija Teri	
	 214	
Qadhafi, you’ve brought shame on us’ (zenga zenga dar dar, ya Qadhafi dert al-
aar).297  
Libyans’ engagement with, and satirical re-presentation of, Qadhafi’s discourse, 
reflects the way in which meaning making practices are an emergent, processual 
phenomenon. The ability to openly challenge Qadhafi’s authority was repeatedly 
presented in revolutionary rhetoric as an indication that there was no longer any 
‘barrier of fear’ preventing Libyans from criticising the Qadhafi regime.298 However, 
despite lampooning his words, activists also represented them as dangerous and 
credible threats against the Libyan people. Cultural productions were thus 
ambivalently caught between affirming the violence and brutality of the Qadhafi 
regime, and actively constructing its destructibility.  
In line with the former presentation, revolutionary artwork often literally 
depicted Qadhafi as the devil,299 brandishing or executing his victims and surrounded 
by bloodshed.300 Numerous illustrations abounded of Qadhafi bearing the Star of 
David, with slogans referring to Qadhafi as ‘Jewish’.301 These have been interpreted 
as an indication of troubling anti-Semitism within the opposition camp,302 but they 
can also be interpreted as referencing the common trope of Israel as a foreign agent 
and the enemy of Arabs. This image is deployed as a way of expressing fearful and 
clandestine perceptions of Qadhafi inside Libya: for instance, longstanding rumours 
that Qadhafi was an Israeli agent sent to damage Libya and Libyans (Cherstich 2014: 
																																																								
297 “Demonstration in Zintan, 11 March 2011”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/24i9zM  
298 Shaeb, Ashraf. “Ramadan with a different flavour” (Ramadan bi’taam mukhtalif). Al-Manarah. 22 
July 2011. Issue 5: 3.     
299 Appendix: Figure 18. Associated Press.  
300 Appendix: Figure 8. Rory Mulholland; Figure 9. C.J. Chivers; Figure 10. Khadija Teri. 
301 For illustrations, see Appendix: Figure 9 and Figure 11. C.J. Chivers; Figure 12. Mark Kersten. For 
slogans, see “Women’s movement protest in Jadu”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/FVxx3x, and 
the “Statement of Allegiance by Arada Youth”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/cqxhP6 
302 Chivers, C.J. “Libyan Street Art: Freedom, Defiance and Troubling Signs”. New York Times. 8 
August 2011. Available at: https://goo.gl/JJTkGd.		
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104), or that his Qadhafi’s brutality was evidence of his dubious Libyan heritage.303 
The common convergence of symbols such as the swastika and the Star of David in 
anti-regime artwork is less evidence of coherent political positions than it is an 
indiscriminate amalgamation of all things that the Jamahiriya had denounced as evil.  
This demonisation of Qadhafi existed alongside a popular trend of caricature 
that, despite the on-going warfare against the Qadhafi regime, actively imagined him 
as militarily and politically feeble: crushed and humiliated by the Libyan opposition, 
or cowering away from revolutionary symbols emblazoned with phrases such as ‘the 
will of the people’ (iradat al-sha’b).304 His paternalistic symbolism was rejected, and 
he was depicted as merely the father of his own, physical, ‘corrupt family’.305 As 
argued by Igor Cherstich (2014: 109), because ‘caricatures, more than any other form 
of representation, affirm flesh and identity…through visual reappropriation Gaddafi 
had gained a tangible subjectivity which was only once latent…the ghost could be 
hurt, touched, killed’. Artwork thus rearticulated the temporality of the Libyan 
political universe: it was retrospective, amplifying existent, subversive narratives 
about the Qadhafi regime; it was present-oriented, responding to unfolding political 
developments and statements by Qadhafi, and it was inventive, serving to concretise 
the opposition’s arduous military objectives. The act of repeatedly illustrating Qadhafi 
as powerless, even within regime-controlled cities such as Tripoli, imbued illustrators 
with a sense of ‘freedom’ from the regime that was subjectively powerful, 306 even if 
freedom from the regime hadn’t yet been fully attained in the political or military 
spheres.  
																																																								
303 “Interim Libyan government wins support”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/V3fKZi      
304 Appendix: Figure 13, 14 and 15. C.J. Chivers; Figure 8. Mark Kersten; Figure 13. Khadija Teri. 
305 Appendix: Figure 17. Mark Kersten. 
306 “Interview with Tareq Juma Abu Ayanna, ‘7iber’”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/hz1J1u		
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The representational significance of such cultural productions is partly derived 
from their subversive content, but also, I would argue, because they constituted a 
‘collective elaboration of meaning’ (Doerr et al 2015: 556). They emerged in a 
horizontal way, reflecting the diverse understandings and grievances of Libyans, and 
subsequently populated the visual and rhetorical landscape with grassroots meanings. 
Certain tropes were naturally popularised and re-adapted by Libyans across the 
country, such as the image of Qadhafi urging his supporters onwards while riding 
backwards on a donkey (Abushagur 2011). Other texts underwent creative, 
spontaneous shifts between genre, form and medium. For instance, the patriotic 
revolutionary anthem ‘Libya has Called’ (Leebya nadit) by Asma Saleem was 
frequently re-performed by groups of youth in opposition-controlled territories. In one 
variant in Benghazi, the tune was preserved but its lyrics were adapted to 
commemorate the Danish cartoon protests held at the Italian consulate in Benghazi in 
February 2006: ‘You can bring a plane, and you can bring tanks; from the days of the 
consulate, the Libyan people stopped being afraid’.307 Libyan street art ultimately 
proclaimed its capacity to speak for a ‘collective consciousness’ (Chaffee 1993: 15) in 
its juxtaposition of Qadhafi with images of the ‘the Libyan people’, who were at times 
depicted as triumphant, and at others as impoverished and subjugated.308 
Similarly, political slogans also underwent creative shifts and adaptations, 
depending on the context of their utterance. As argued by Colla (2012), ‘slogans are 
not literary texts’ but part of a broader contentious performance: ‘embodied actions 
taking place in particular situations’. Chants that originated on the streets, such as ‘the 
blood of the martyrs won’t go to waste’ (dam el-shuhada ma yim-sheeh haba) and 
																																																								
307 “Muammar you cockroach” (Muammar ya sarsoor). YouTube. Available at: 
https://goo.gl/1WQ3LG  
308 Appendix: Figures 9, 10 and 13. C.J. Chivers. Figure 12. Mark Kersten.		
	 217	
‘youth of the capital, we need a decisive night’ (ya shabab el-assema, nibbo layla 
hasema) were incorporated into the music of the uprising,309 replayed on military 
battlefronts,310 or simply reaffirmed in the video declarations (bayanat) of allegiance 
to the February 17 uprising that were issued across Libya.311 Anti-Qadhafi slogans 
were posted and shared on the Libyan opposition’s social media platforms, where 
they were collectively discussed and embellished.312 Video footage of demonstrations 
across Libya reveals the way in which the very act of sloganeering was a collaborative 
process: it would often be spearheaded by a central individual, but would also 
incorporate impromptu contributions from other participants. 
In such collective texts, the repudiation of the Jamahiriya’s symbolic order 
focused substantially on undermining the figure of Qadhafi, and has been analysed 
principally from this angle (Khatib 2013b; Cherstich 2014). Libyan street art, which 
largely lampooned Qadhafi, contrasts with the anti-capitalist and even hip-hop 
inspired graffiti in Tunisia and Egypt: a distinction that can be attributed to the 
centrality of Qadhafi within the country’s personalist political and symbolic 
structures. However, subversive rhetoric during the uprising also dismantled the 
Jamahiriya’s broader system of meaning. As argued in Chapter 5, engendering and 
preserving contradiction was a central dimension of the Jamahiriya’s institutional 
logic; in turn, the act of exposing contradiction within a symbolic order is a key aspect 
of the reinterpretation of prevailing institutional symbols and practices (Thornton and 
Ocasio 2008: 115). Revolutionary cultural productions subverted the Jamahiriya’s 
symbolism, not only by amplifying these tensions and contradictions, but also by 
																																																								
309 See “Only Libya” (leebya wa bas) by Salah Ghali and “Rise Up, Tripoli” (tarablus nudelah) by 
Shokri al-Aroosi. Both available at: https://goo.gl/mB2JEj 
310 Interview with Fawzi, revolutionary fighter in western Libya, 29 December 2015. Skype.  
311 “Statement by Free Women of Soug Al-Juma”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/faUv7G  
312 See the Facebook page “Slogans and Chants of the 17 February Revolution”, set up on 19 April 
2011. Available at: https://goo.gl/xqc29q	 
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representing this moment of disclosure as one that was transformative of the hitherto-
suppressed political subjectivities of Libyans.  
During the Libyan uprising, the disruption of the Jamahiriya’s broader 
symbolism evolved from acts of physical destruction – such as the mass burning of 
copies of The Green Book in Benghazi during the first week of protests - to a 
discursive refutation of its contradictory underpinnings. Central to the Jamahiriya’s 
institutional logic was the word ‘revolution’. The term had been deployed by the 
regime as a perennial justification for the instatement of ‘protective’ coercive bodies 
such as the revolutionary committees, and was central to the regime’s convenient 
bifurcation of formal and informal political authority.313 In the Jamahiriya, national 
belonging, and even dignity, were premised on the strength and degree of one’s 
commitment to Qadhafi’s on-going revolution.   
The music of the 17 February uprising occasionally addressed Qadhafi directly 
on this front, labelling the Jamahiriya’s revolution ‘obscene’,314 transforming the pro-
Qadhafi anthem ‘O’ Leader of Our Revolution’ into ‘O’ Betrayer of Our 
Revolution’,315 and refuting Qadhafi’s ideological doctrine of People Power (sultat 
ash-sha’ab): ‘When you first arrived, you told us it was a popular revolution; you 
called it a Jamahiriya, but it was a dictatorship’.316 Moreover, Libyans contested the 
proclaimed political, social and economic accomplishments that Qadhafi had 
attributed to his revolution. This was particularly evident in Libyan hip-hop, which 
deployed cutting lyricism, issued in a colloquial Libyan dialect, in its attacks on the 
regime. Qadhafi’s characterisation of Libya as a militarily empowered ‘armed nation’ 																																																								
313 Indeed, Qadhafi continued to sustain this incommensurability between rhetoric and practice in his 
address on 22 February 2011, arguing that he was no more than a revolutionary figurehead in Libya: ‘If 
I really had authority, and the power to rule, I would have thrown it in your faces’. Speech available at: 
https://goo.gl/Q7q8Fi  
314 “Eyes that Bleed”. Available at: https://goo.gl/mB2JEj 
315 “O Betrayer of Our Revolution” (ya khain thawretna). YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/fP3grr  
316 Shabab Tarablus. “I’m a Tripolitanian” (ana tarabulsi). Available at: https://goo.gl/mB2JEj	
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(al-sha’b al-musallah) was vilified as patently untrue in Ibn Thabit’s rap song 
‘Anthem for the Libyan Warrior’: ‘He speaks of the “armed nation”, go to hell you 
liar…This is real Libyan nationalism, so go learn the meaning of the phrase “the 
people’s revolution”’.317 Other songs criticise the dubious infrastructural 
achievements underpinning the regime’s claim to have fostered prosperity inside 
Libya: ‘A few roads and buildings…every year you inflate them and pretend that 
they’re great achievements’.318 
 The song ‘Lies and Pain’ by the rapper M.C. Swat also notes the failure of the 
Jamahiriya to live up to its self-aggrandising rhetoric, in this instance by emphasising 
the deficiencies in its education system. However, he also argues that the regime 
imbedded a much more nefarious societal distrust: ‘They made us live in hatred of 
others, they wiped my thinking. From the first day I was born, they started to destroy 
me’.319 The Jamahiriya is held accountable both for its material inadequacies and for 
inhibiting the emergence of autonomous political subjectivities. In this particular 
song, its material and symbolic practices of domination are condemned for what Scott 
(1990: 74) has described as the driving of personal aspiration into the realm of the 
impossible: ‘The future was never a word in my vocabulary’.320 
In undermining the regime’s system of meaning, Libyans channelled their 
institutionalised familiarity with the regime’s rhetorical universe. A statement in 
support of the uprising by a group of then-anonymous female activists in the Soug al-
Juma district of Tripoli quotes directly from The Green Book in order to affirm the 
insincerity of the regime’s claimed empowerment of women in Libya:  
 																																																								
317 Ibn Thabit. “Anthem for the Libyan Warrior” (nasheed lil-mujahid al-leebee). Available at: 
https://goo.gl/mB2JEj 
318 Usood al-Assema. “It’s Over, Shafshufa” (tammit ya shafshufa). Ibid.  
319 M.C. Swat. “Lies and Pain”. Ibid. 
320 Ibid.	
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We say to the tyrant that the ‘woman’ you’re speaking on behalf of has never 
supported you, and has always been against you…You have never given her any 
dignity. He said in his ‘Vile Book’ that ‘all societies look at the woman as a 
commodity, nothing more’. You are the only who brought mercenaries, and 
treated women as commodities and as slaves. In Chapter One of his Book, he 
refers to ‘The Solution to the Problem’. The only solution is that he leaves 
[Libya] with his sons. In Chapter Two, he refers to ‘The Economic Solution’. 
What economy and everything [in Libya] is in ruins?321 
 
The statement engages explicitly and methodically with The Green Book, refuting its 
discourse by amplifying both past and present political grievances. In doing so, it 
affirms a point that is often highlighted in cultural productions: the notion that 
Libyans had always questioned or disbelieved in the veracity of the Jamahiriya’s 
moral authority. Repeatedly, creative revolutionary texts point towards and celebrate 
the newfound capacity for the public articulation of concealed experiences: the notion 
that people ‘always wanted to talk about Gaddafi’s mistakes and crimes, but we never 
had the chance for free speech’.322 Libyans could ‘finally’ express their thoughts after 
decades of suppression.323 Making private experiences public, or the moment when 
‘an entire category of people suddenly finds its public voice is no longer stifled’ 
(Scott 1990: 66), is important, according to Pierre Borudieu (1979: 71), because it is a 
‘step on the road to officialization and legitimization’, enabling the populace to 
demand accountability and initiating the process of constructing an alternative system 
of meaning. It is also important, I would argue, because it enabled Libyans to re-
contextualise their formerly private experiences, and indeed, to reclaim their own 
																																																								
321 “Statement by Free Women of Soug Al-Juma”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/faUv7G 
322 Abbott, Sebastian. “Rap music inspires Libyan rebels to defeat Gaddafi”. Mail & Guardian. 26 
April 2011. Available at: https://goo.gl/k94JDW  
323 Teri, Khadija. “Libyan Street Art”. Available at: https://goo.gl/wEryL1	
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political agency: to position their grievances as stemming from longstanding, but 
suppressed, resentments.  
Lastly, symbolic contestation by Libyans subverted not only the content and 
contradictions of the Jamahiriya’s symbolic order, but the fearful discursive dynamics 
that it had engendered in the Libyan public sphere. The Benghazi-based blogger 
Haleema argued that it was fearless protesters who undertook the first wave of anti-
regime demonstrations, but that this further generated an unstoppable momentum of 
political expression: ‘people were writing and expressing their thoughts without being 
scared of the revolutionary committees or internal security’.324 According to the 
Zawiya-based lawyer Khaled, the largest demonstrations in the city were triggered 
principally by the humiliating political rhetoric and finger wagging directed at 
Libyans by Saif al-Islam Qadhafi, in his appearance on state television in February 
2011. Participating in those demonstrations generated a sense of ‘relief’ that was 
borne out of no longer having to tolerate the countless insults issued by Qadhafi 
towards the Libyan people.325  
As suggested by Lisa Wedeen (1999: 45), the subversion of an authoritarian 
regime’s perspective grammar can facilitate the emergence of  ‘people’s 
understandings of themselves as publically political persons’. By positioning 
emergent subjectivities as a central dimension of symbolic contestation, it is possible 
to offer a non-instrumental interpretation of the cultural productions that emerged 
throughout the uprising. For instance, Reem, a female activist residing in Tripoli, 
described the surreptitious means by which she and other women were able to stitch 
the tricolour revolutionary flag during the uprising, ‘making sure that we bought the 
green, red and black sewing thread from different shops so that no one would get 																																																								
324 Interview with Haleema, civil society activist in Benghazi, 29 March 2015. Tunisia.  
325 Interview with Khaled, pro-opposition lawyer in Zawiya, 26 March 2015. Tunisia.		
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suspicious’.326 Although they never attempted to publically display the flags on the 
streets of Tripoli, as other activists such as the Free Generation Movement did 
(Hilsum 2012: 221), the mere process of creating them was a sufficiently empowering 
form of self-expression. Similarly, Tareq Abu Ayanna, who produced anti-regime 
caricatures inside Tripoli from April 2011, also asserted that the very act of 
compulsively drawing the regime’s latest pronouncements diminished his own fear of 
the regime, despite the fact that he kept his artwork concealed while Qadhafi remain 
in control of the capital.327 
Libyan activists have emphasised that the subjective impact of open, political 
expression was particularly felt during the initial emergence of political activity in 
February 2011. When protests first broke out in Benghazi, according to Ahmed, the 
slogans issued by protesters deeply resonated with and unearthed a latent sense of 
dignity inside Libyans. Chants such as ‘rise up Benghazi, this is the day you’ve been 
waiting for’ and ‘Benghazi, why the humiliation? We need a solution tonight’ were 
simultaneously empowering at a personal level but also made it ‘impossible’ for 
people to stay inside their homes in good conscience.328 The matter of speaking up 
publically against the regime became intimately connected to ‘our personal pride…we 
can’t be the only country that doesn’t do this’.329 Consequently, as another activist 
explained, participation in the protests and in acts of creative expression unearthed a 
hitherto dormant ‘political’ personality: ‘maybe all along, I had been political without 
knowing it’.330 
 
																																																								
326 Interview with Reem, women’s rights activist in Tripoli, 15 March 2015. Skype. 
327 “Interview with Tareq Juma Abu Ayanna, ‘7iber’”. Available at: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x1sa6NNKpGY  
328 Interview with Ahmed, social media activist, 25 February 2015. London. 
329 Interview with Marwa, civil society activist in Benghazi, 23 January 2016. London.  
330 Interview with Najib, opposition medical doctor in western Libya, 30 December 2015. Skype.	
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This section has described the ways in which Libyans contested the Jamahiriya’s 
symbolic order through a myriad of expressive practices: from humorous slogans to 
satirical graffiti and anti-Jamahiriya hip-hop. It has been argued that the act of 
undercutting a dominant rhetoric is most powerful when it exposes the disconnect 
between what a prevailing system of practice claims to do, and what it achieves in 
reality (Howell 2012: 46). In this vein, symbolic representational practices 
represented ‘a dramatic contradiction of the smooth surface of euphemized power’ 
(Scott 1990: 56) by rupturing the routines of political compliance that had formerly 
sustained the Jamahiriya’s visible dominance over public space, and by indicating 
that such routines had, in fact, been disingenuous. Cultural productions were 
subversive in their contestation of the Jamahiriya’s prescriptive ideological and 
discursive norms, collective in their grassroots mode of emergence and development, 
and empowering in their transformation of activists’ own understandings of 
themselves as publically political persons. 
 
7.3 The 17 February Revolutionary Symbolic Order 	
 
The dismantling of well-established, seemingly permanent meanings (Hall 1985: 113) 
and the manipulation of symbols within an institutional context (Friedland and Alford 
1991: 25) are markers of political agency and important aspects of the struggle over 
classification. However, a transformation, rather than rejection, of a system of 
meaning must involve the active reinterpretation of symbols and the establishment of 
an alternative symbolic order. In the context of the Jamahiriya, the classificatory 
practices deployed by the regime were particularly imposing, substantially inhibiting 
the self-representational practices of the Libyan public. Libyan citizens were 
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presented as internalising the leader, partly as a result of what Wedeen (1999: 17) has 
described as the semiotic ‘narrowing of the gap’ between ruler and ruled in 
authoritarian regimes, and partly because Qadhafi’s rhetorical practices went even 
further, seeking the complete identification of ‘Libya’ with ‘Qadhafi’. Qadhafi 
asserted, in his speech on 22 February 2011, that: 
 
In the past, a Libyan had no identity. When you would say to someone ‘I’m a 
Libyan’, they would reply ‘Libya…Liberia? Lebanon?’ They didn’t know 
Libya. But today, when you say I’m a Libyan, they reply ‘Oh Libya, Qadhafi! 
Libya, the Revolution!331  
 
Libyan activists asserted that the imposition of this classificatory schema damaged 
their own sense of national identity. Mohammed Ismail argued that ‘you would never 
hear anything good about Libya. It was either the Lockerbie bombing, or Qadhafi did 
this, or he did that. And Qadhafi was always the face of Libya. That in itself 
diminished everyone’s identity of being a Libyan’.332 The Benghazi-based activist 
Layal distinguished between the powerful ‘love that Benghazi people have for their 
city’ and the absence of any affective sentiment for Libya as a country.333 The 
Jamahiriya’s exclusionary delimitation of Libyan identity was furthered in Saif al-
Islam Qadhafi’s characterisation of the 17 February protesters as manipulated youth 
and ‘drug addicts’, and in Qadhafi’s construction of a binary Libyan political identity 
comprised of ‘revolutionary Al-Fateh youth’ nobly struggling against ‘rats’ 
(jirdaan).334 This sweeping dismissal of the Libyan opposition led protesters to 
conceptualise an alternative political identity for the Libyan people that did not define 																																																								
331 “Muammar al-Qadhafi’s speech”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/Q7q8Fi 
332 Interview with Umar, journalist and photographer, 14 January 2016. Skype.  
333 Interview with Marwa, civil society activist in Benghazi, 23 January 2016. London.  
334 “Muammar al-Qadhafi’s speech”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/Q7q8Fi; “Saif al-Islam’s 
speech”. YouTube. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1J_oECAgEto		
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national worth or power through allegiance to the Jamahiriya, and that was in turn 
buttressed by an alternative set of political symbols.  
The definitional practices of the Libyan opposition during the uprising were 
underpinned by a renunciation of Qadhafi’s depiction of protesters as ‘rats’, and 
galvanised by the notorious moment in Qadhafi’s speech in which he demanded of the 
Libyan protesters: ‘Who are you?’ (‘man antum?’) This statement ushered in a 
multitude of responses – in the form of public speeches, poems, music and artwork - 
that attempted to define ‘who’ the Libyan people really were. The act of defining 
Libyan identity was a exercise in celebratory self-expression, often directed at 
approving anti-regime audiences in public spaces, but it was also dialogic, 
consciously addressed to Qadhafi and exposing the reality of the Jamahiriya in the 
process. The most famous variant of this response was in the form of a poem by Faraj 
al-Mismari: 
 
‘Who are you?’ Don’t you know who we are?  
The cause of you and your children’s suffering, 
You profligate. These are the children of Isa al-Wakwak 
Real men who appear in the time of difficulty.  
We’re the source of your stress, we’re the ones who 
Mopped up your blood…We are warriors, the cause  
Of your destruction, you coward. Brave men, we are not 
Rats, and woe betide you if your face us. We are 
The people of Barqa…the people of Misrata…the people 
Of Nalut…the people of Ar Rujban.335 
 
The poem continues to list different cities in Libya and to praise their resistance 
against Qadhafi in principally combative terms, concluding with ‘We will keep 																																																								
335 “Who are you?” (man antum). YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/zc16kp  
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fighting until you flee with your children, and we are freed from your tyranny’. This 
particular poem is only one of many definitional performances during the uprising, 
but it embodies the two central tenets underpinning the cultural representation of 
Libyan revolutionary identity in 2011: the unassailable solidarity and unanimity of the 
Libyan nation, and the pre-eminence of revolutionary warriors (thuwwar) within the 
Libyan political landscape. Although the poem makes reference to the bravery of 
broader acts of anti-regime defiance, such as public protests, it ultimately elevates a 
gendered, military connotation of revolutionaries as ‘real men’ (etrees) on the 
battlefield, whose deaths for the opposition’s cause rendered them martyrs (shuhada). 
As indicated in the reference to Isa al-Wakwak, a fighter against the Italian 
colonisation of Libya, this identity is also presented as historically emergent. 
The military struggle against the Qadhafi regime was waged simultaneously 
across different Libyan cities and regions from March to August 2011; in turn, the 
exaltation of anti-regime fighters was a recurrent and persistent trope in revolutionary 
definitional practices. Other ‘Who are you?’ poems draw extensively on the military 
strength, bravery and tenacity of Libyan fighters,336 while revolutionary music, in 
both Arabic and in English, praises Libyan warriors for having ‘weapons at the 
ready’, for their willingness to die in combat, and for being ‘heroes, who left a life of 
humiliation…lions in the battlefield…facing mortar guns with bare chests’.337 The 
song ‘The Men of Kikla’, sang from the perspective of fighters on the frontline, 
distinguishes between ‘free Libyans’ (ahraar)– a general term encompassing the anti-
																																																								
336 See a written English-language version of this poem by Housam Najjair (2013: 139), and an Arabic-
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Qadhafi popular collective   and brave ‘revolutionaries’ (thuwwar).338 A famous song 
by Asma Saleem, sang from the perspective of civilian bystanders, explicitly equates 
revolutionary identity with the act of military combat: ‘You revolutionary hero, the 
one who is standing firm on the frontlines’.339 The praise of combatants remains 
consistent regardless of whether song lyrics are addressed towards fighters or issued 
by them.  
The elevation of thuwwar centred, not only on their military bravery, but also on 
their identity as ‘martyrs’ (shuhada) in death. As the uprising transitioned into a 
violent conflict, and the success of the revolutionary project hinged on victory on the 
battlefield (rather than on any other form of civil disobedience), the two labels were 
increasingly conflated: thuwwar were martyrs and martyrs were assumed to be 
fighters.340 However, as a marker of identity, ‘martyrdom’ was a much broader term, 
encompassing all those killed by regime forces. One of the most popular slogans, 
lyrics and public pronouncements, which emerged at an early stage in the uprising, 
was ‘the blood of the martyrs won’t go to waste’ (dam el-shuhada ma yim-sheeh 
haba). The Libyan activists I interviewed argued for the significance of the slogan, 
particularly as it was deployed in the initial weeks of protest. It encapsulated the 
bravery and self-sacrifice of those who first defied the regime in February 2011: 
individuals such as Mehdi Zeyo, who used his car to blow up a military base in 
Benghazi on 20 February 2011, and in doing so ‘transformed’ the course of the 
uprising, and Mohammed Nabbous, a civilian journalist who closely corresponded 
with Libyan activists in the diaspora, and who was killed by regime security forces on 
																																																								
338 “The Men of Kikla” (rijalat Kikla). Available at: https://goo.gl/uL2i44  
339 Asma Saleem. “You Revolutionary Hero” (ya thaa’ir ya batal). Ibid.  
340 During the military conflict, songs and slogans referring ‘martyrdom’ were increasingly addressed 
towards anti-regime fighters as an encouragement to continue military combat. See “The Blood of the 
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19 March 2011.341 The slogan also reminded Libyans of the need to honour the dead 
by continuing their inspirational struggles for dignity and freedom.342 
The elevation of martyrdom, as a marker of national heroism, was a consistent 
feature of Libyan revolutionary rhetoric. On Libya Al-Ahrar television channel, 
presenters and guests alike often commenced their on-air dialogue with a brief 
statement either ‘praying for mercy on our martyrs’ or ‘greeting the martyrs of the 
glorious 17 February revolution’: a trend that was reflected consistently in the 
declarations (bayanat) that were issued in support of the uprising by tribes and 
opposition groups across Libya.343 The term was also wrapped in highly affective 
vocabulary and symbolic imagery. The music of the uprising made reference to the 
tears of ‘the martyr’s mother’ (umm al-shahid),344 and Libya Al-Ahrar dedicated its 
first episode on the programme Libya’s People (Libya al-naas) to the ‘martyrs of the 
glorious 17 February revolution’, displaying photographs of young men killed by 
regime forces, and broadcasting phone calls and contributions from their family 
members.345 Short video clips showing funerals of those killed by the regime were 
overlaid with emotive music and used as promos on Libya Al-Ahrar.346 
The revolutionary symbolic order, by elevating the identities of ‘martyrs’, was 
able to position new symbols and sources of collective identity in Libya. In 
opposition-controlled territories, the images, names and ages of those killed in support 
of the uprising became familiar to onlookers, populating the streets and revolutionary 
public spaces, such as media centres, and replacing the former iconography of 																																																								
341 Interview with Hamza, anti-regime demonstrator and civil society activist, 4 April 2015. London. 
342 Interview with Maryam, social media activist, 3 February 2015. Skype. 
343 “17 February working committee in Tripoli”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/dHS7Rd; 
“Statement of allegiance by youth of Arada”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/yAtk2s  
344 Asma Saleem. “Libya Has Called” (Leebya naadit). Available at: https://goo.gl/mB2JEj 
345 “Martyrs of Freedom” (shuhada al-hurriya). YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/UkJ4hK  
346 “Promo: In Sacrifice of the Nation” (fedaa’an lil-watan). YouTube. Available at: 
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Qadhafi himself.347 The pervasive presence of such images indicates ‘a significant 
shift in traditional martyrs’ mythologies: from state or elite constructed national 
heroes to rather mundane figures, created by popular narratives, who have sacrificed 
their life for a greater good’ (Zakarevičiūtė 2015: 213). Some of the images were also 
accompanied by a ‘martyr’s bequest’ (wasiyyat shahid): often a line of counsel from 
the deceased, or a brief statement of their personal hopes and aspirations for Libya. 
Such bequests were often general in their content, calling for values such as 
‘freedom’, or cautioning against disunity in Libya.348 However, they served as a 
symbolic reminder of the tangible sacrifices made by ordinary Libyans, and of the 
dignified qualities that such individuals epitomised.  
The new Libyan, symbolic order thus constructed and valorised a new, national-
revolutionary identity in a number of ways. In cultural productions, plaudits such as 
bravery, strength, and integrity were applied to all ‘free Libyans’ (ahraar) in general. 
However, martyrs (shuhada), occupied a particularly pre-eminent position within this 
collective unit. In the song ‘No More Lies’, Libya is referred to as ‘the land of 
martyrs, the land of freedom, of Islam, of all Libyans’.349 Beyond this, cultural 
productions further demarcated an exclusive category of Libyan revolutionaries 
(thuwwar) whose struggle was defined as military in form and as religiously-
legitimate in nature. In practice, there were frequent slippages in this classificatory 
schema, but the category of thuwwar was a particularly distinctive and prominent part 
of the new revolutionary aesthetic.  
The characterisation of Libya as comprised of a free populace and of national 
heroes - martyrs and fighters - was further bolstered by the reclamation of Libyan 
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narratives of anti-colonial resistance. As argued by Davis (1987: 248), 
‘revolutionaries in particular tend to invoke the tradition of glorious revolution, claim 
to repeat history’. There is always a relevant past for progressive movements to draw 
upon, even if that past may be cut off at a certain date (Hobsbawm 1988: 1-2). Libyan 
revolutionaries embarked on a similar undertaking, but only after bypassing the four 
decades of Qadhafi’s self-styled revolution entirely, although it was saturated with 
proclamations and narratives of resistance and jihad.350 Instead, they presented Libyan 
fighters as heirs to the struggle of Omar al-Mukhtar, the leader of the resistance to 
Italian colonisation. Libya is referred to as ‘the land of might, the land of Omar al-
Mukhtar’,351 and protesters were repeatedly referred to and illustrated as ‘the 
grandchildren of Omar al-Mukhtar’ and as ‘lions of the desert’.352 Mukhtar’s famous 
cry ‘We do not surrender, we win or we die’ (naho la nastaslem nantassir aw namut) 
was swiftly transformed into a revolutionary slogan and song in honour of those killed 
by regime forces.353 Concurrently, Libyans were also presented as the heirs of local, 
anti-colonial fighters. Isa al-Wakwak, who is mentioned in the poem by Faraj al-
Mismari, was one such figure, but Suleyman al-Baruni, a leader of the resistance in 
western Tripolitania, and Ramadan al-Suwayhli, in Misurata and eastern Tripolitania, 
were also praised in revolutionary music.354 
Libyans thus contested Qadhafi’s depiction of anti-regime protesters and 
fighters as ‘rats’ by historicising the 17 February uprising, using anti-colonial 
narratives. This frame of reference partly resonated with Qadhafi’s own definition and 																																																								
350 In Qadhafi’s speech on 22 February, he continued to characterise himself as ‘a Bedouin fighter’ and 
as a mujahid. 
351 FB17. “No More Lies”. Available at: https://goo.gl/uL2i44 
352 For examples of this in music, see “Libya Has Called” (Leebya naadit) by Asma Saleem and ‘My 
Country is Calling You’ (blaadee tnaa deekom) by Shabab Al-Assema. Both available at: 
https://goo.gl/uL2i44. For examples in street art, see Appendix: Figure 14. Soumiea Abushagur 
353 Fitzgerald, Mary. “We win or we die”. Irish Times. 19 March 2011. Available at: 
https://goo.gl/U2WExP  
354 Shukri al-Aroosi, ‘Oh Libya’ (ah ya leebya). Available at: https://goo.gl/dJvQmy		
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classification of revolutionary worth, but it challenged Qadhafi’s ideological 
appropriation of anti-colonial narratives. In essence, the opposition’s rhetoric claimed 
ownership over the same symbolic terrain occupied by the regime in its construction 
of an alternative system of revolutionary meaning and value. Thus, while concurring 
with the argument made by Lisa Wedeen (1999: 12) that authoritarian symbols do not 
generate ‘belief’ in the symbols themselves, I would argue that the historical and 
material referents that Qadhafi’s symbols evoked – for instance, that Libya’s 
anticolonial past was imbued with the pursuit of dignity, freedom and revolutionary 
spirit – were indeed embraced as ‘the natural and received shape of the world’ in 
revolutionary texts. 
Libyan political identity was thus constructed as historically emergent, and as 
predicated on strong moral and religious principles. In addition to this, it was also 
represented as nationalistic in spirit. Through their cultural productions, Libyans 
signalled their disavowal of the Jamahiriya, and proclaimed their political allegiance 
towards ‘Libya’ as a national entity. As argued by the journalist Intissar Burawi, 
‘despite their simplicity, many revolutionary songs have become popular, and have 
entered people’s hearts, because they explicitly reference ‘Libya’”.355 Contrary to the 
dominant mode of artistic expression in the Jamahiriya, the revolutionary songs of 
2011 do not couch or preface their loyalty to ‘Libya’ by first professing allegiance to 
Qadhafi.  
Descriptions of ‘Libya’ in revolutionary texts tend to deploy a near utopian 
language and imagery. Libya is comprised of ‘the best people’ and is the ‘richest 
nation’,356 a soon to be ‘leader among other countries, where no one is deprived of 
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goodness’.357 Songs make reference to the incomparable beauty of Libya’s geography, 
‘its precious soil’ and natural landscape.358 They also articulate and celebrate a Libyan 
identity that is at once established, with Libyans portrayed as a devout and 
professional people, ‘memorisers of the Qur’an…doctors and engineers’,359 and as 
emergent, with Libyans eager to work towards ‘building Libya’.360 This rhetorical 
construction of a prosperous, cohesive Libyan nation is depicted as hinging only on 
the fulfilment of the central objective of the uprising: ‘The Libyan people are one 
hundred percent for brotherhood…let’s get rid of Muammar and everything will be as 
smooth as honey’.361 Underpinning this vision is an alternative understanding of civic 
belonging: one in which Libyans can be productive contributors to their country 
because they are finally represented and invested in its historical narratives: ‘record, 
history of my country – a Libyan will never agree to humiliation’.362   
By foregrounding a dignified, productive Libyan identity, nationalism was 
constructed as emerging out of a sense of loyalty to the 17 February uprising, and to 
the collective sacrifices that it had entailed. Although representations of Libyan 
nationhood were connected to historical episodes of anti-colonial resistance, the 
revolutionary rejection of Qadhafi was ultimately constructed as the watershed point 
of emergence for this new collective identity: ‘We are a nation that is born again…We 
see in your [Qadhafi’s] death the beginning of a beginning;363 ‘Tripoli has changed, 
																																																								
357 “Children of Freedom” (atfal al-hurriya). Arist unknown. YouTube. Available at: 
https://goo.gl/GssXKb  
358 Baset El-Hassy. “Oh Benghazi” (ya benghazi). YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/AjPJWR  
359 Shabab al-Assema. “My Country is Calling You” (blaadee tnaa deekom). Available at: 
https://goo.gl/uL2i44 
360 See the songs “Freedom” (al-hurriya) by Shabab al-Assema and “We Have Liberated Libya” 
(harrernaha Leebya) by Mohammed Lowsheesh. Ibid.  
361 Ibn Thabit. “Anthem for the Libyan Warrior” (nasheed lil-mujahid al-leebee). Ibid. 
362 “Long Live Benghazi and Beida” (ashat benghazi wil-beida). Artist unknown. YouTube. Available 
at: https://goo.gl/cb3jzB  
363 “Finally, the Word No” (akheeran kalimat la). Artist unknown. Available at: https://goo.gl/uL2i44	
	 233	
it’s no longer like before’;364 ‘I’ve lived in Soug al-Jumua since ages, I never thought 
people could turn the pages’.365 The terms of national membership were thus defined 
as ‘revolutionary’ in nature. The television channel Libya Al-Ahrar, which was 
presented by its founder Mahmud Shammam as Libya’s principal national 
broadcaster, defined itself as a ‘channel for all free people’,366 where ‘free people’ 
were those who had renounced the Qadhafi regime, and thereby participated in or 
supported the uprising. Within revolutionary music and poetry, ‘Libya’ as a national 
entity was directly implied and rhetorically assembled through the listing of the anti-
Qadhafi heroics and military exploits of different cities and territories inside Libya.367 
In constructing Libyan nationalism as grounded in a collective opposition to the 
Qadhafi regime, cultural productions evoke what has been described as the ‘palpable, 
but ideologically nimble’ (Hassan and Staggenborg 2015: 346) notion of ‘the people’ 
(al-sha’b). The song ‘We are Libyans’ by a group of Benghazi youth amalgamates the 
identities of the singers with ‘you, and all the millions [in Libya]’, emphasising their 
shared revolutionary status.368 A song by the female artist Asma Saleem bolsters this 
commonality with reference to the homogeneity of Libya’s demographic composition, 
arguing that in Libya there are ‘No Amazigh, and no Arabs…we are all Muslims, 
under a wise leadership’.369 In the song ‘Long Live Benghazi and Beida’ (aashat 
Benghazi wil-Beida), the artist celebrates the notion that Libyans are ‘one family, one 
voice, one religion - no “religions”’.370 The song ‘Libya Has Called’ (‘Leebya nadit’) 
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has the chorus: ‘There is neither East, nor West: the Libyan people are all brothers’.371 
National unity is thus constructed on the basis of revolutionary homogeneity: a 
sentiment that pervaded the Libyan opposition’s political discourse in 2011.372  
This Libyan uprising’s alternative classificatory practices were accompanied by 
a set of historical symbols that again circumvented the Jamahiriya, reaching this time 
for the monarchical period from 1951 to 1969. The 1951 Libyan independence flag 
permeated the revolutionary public sphere: it was ubiquitous in street graffiti and 
artwork, was displayed during public demonstrations and protests, and was even worn 
as a disguise by anti-regime activists in their video statements of solidarity with the 
uprising. Inside Libya, the presence of the flag’s colours on the outskirts of a city 
served as a physical marker of its revolutionary allegiance.373 In Tripoli, covert rebel 
groups such as the Free Generation Movement sprayed cats with red, black and green 
dye in order to signal the presence of a revolutionary resistance movement inside the 
city (Hilsum 2012: 221). In diaspora communities, fundraising organisations such as 
Hope Relief created their own ‘Libya gear’ – clothing items and accessories 
embroidered with the 1951 flag – thereby raising money by fulfilling a growing 
demand for revolutionary merchandise.374 The Libyan-American activist Sara argued 
that in the east of Libya, where the affiliation with the Senussi monarchy was 
strongest, the 1951 flag was immensely significant: older generations of Libyans such 
as her father had retained the flag but kept it concealed in their own homes for 
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decades.375 LYM’s Ahmed, however, argued that the compulsive display of the flag 
was less about what it stood for than it was a statement about the symbol it replaced:  
 
Carrying the new flag meant this new thing that I don’t think we ever had 
before. It meant finally being Libyan. Holding the green flag was 
representing Qadhafi. Talk about Libya meant talking about Qadhafi…We 
never really had the chance to bond with our nation or feel love for it. The 
revolution changed that.376 
 
In this understanding, the Libyan flag was a powerful symbol because it represented a 
severance from the imposition of Qadhafi’s identity onto Libya. Where the green flag 
was intimately associated with the Jamahiriya (and indeed, was often treated as 
source of mockery by outsiders),377 the new flag was free of such associations. The 
Benghazi activist Haleema argued that the flag was in some ways a strange choice for 
reflecting revolutionary consensus: despite the fact that it was jubilantly celebrated, 
and ‘even sometimes abused by Libyans who painted it on inappropriate places like 
historic monuments…not everyone agreed with what it stood for politically. A lot of 
people didn’t actually like the monarchy, or didn’t want it to return’.378 I would argue 
that the new revolutionary aesthetic reconciled this tension by freeing the flag of its 
tangible monarchical connotations, drawing instead on its polysemy as a symbol of 
Islam by referring to it as ‘the star and crescent’ (najma wa hilal), and deploying it as 
a symbol of Libya’s proclamation of independence in 1951. Such sentiments are 
explicitly linked in the revolutionary anthem ‘Raise up the Star and Crescent’ (ta’alla 
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bil najma wa hilal), where the act of raising the flag signifies, not commitment to the 
monarchy, but ‘repeating the happiness of our independence’.379 
Similarly, poetry that was dedicated to praising the ‘star and crescent’ did not 
allude to the monarchy or to King Idris I but focused on the sacrifices that 
underpinned the raising of the flag: the flag was only held up ‘thanks to the men 
whose blood was spilt’.380 This ambivalence was echoed in the broader political 
rhetoric of the Libyan opposition, in which mentions of the Kingdom of Libya were 
restricted to praise of its provision of social welfare, and were qualified by the 
recognition that ‘it wasn’t a perfect system by any means’.381 The 1951 flag, and the 
rhetoric of independence that it evoked, thus easily accompanied a revolutionary-
centric system of meaning that emphasised ideals such as freedom, but without 
directly implying the polarising political history of the monarchy. For similar reasons, 
the 1951 national anthem, which was simultaneously devoid of institutionally political 
meaning and inclusive of broad political aspirations such as ‘freedom’, served as a 
useful signifier in revolutionary cultural productions. Its words, which were sang in 
demonstrations and painted in street art, resonated strongly with the Libyan uprising’s 
revolutionary aspirations: ‘We will never return to the chains, we have freed ourselves 
and freed our land’.382  
Thus far, I have argued that the new system of revolutionary meaning valorised 
the identities of free Libyans (ahraar), martyrs (shuhada) and revolutionary fighters 
(thuwwar) above all, and emphasised that the new revolutionary collective was 
politically homogenous and civically conscientious. This is not to suggest that there 
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were no alternative conceptualisations of Libyan political identity in the revolutionary 
cultural sphere. For instance, some cultural productions can be read as the expression 
of a female gendered publically political self. A poem that was publically performed 
at the Benghazi courthouse by the female activist Gadria al-Shehebi, from the city of 
Derna, drew particular emphasis to the role of women in the uprising: ‘free, young 
and old, protecting the revolution by protesting in the squares’.383 A women’s 
demonstration in Benghazi on 27 March 2011 in solidarity with Iman Obeidi, a 
Libyan lawyer from the city who publically accused Qadhafi’s militias of rape and 
assault, was populated with a slogan that had hitherto been associated with male-led 
demonstrations: ‘With our souls and blood, we will sacrifice for you, Iman’.384 This 
sentiment was also mirrored in the statement of revolutionary allegiance issued by a 
group of female activists inside Tripoli, which begins by addressing itself to ‘the 
women who were raped by the regime’s forces’, and apologises ‘because we haven’t 
been able to avenge them’. 385 The ‘we’ here refers to the women themselves, and not 
to the male revolutionaries customarily entrusted with that task. 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that even gendered discourses re-inscribe the 
revolutionary system of meaning outline above. They do this partly by affirming the 
Libyan collective as overwhelmingly homogenous in its revolutionary composition, 
but also by continuing to assert the pre-eminence of male combatants in the new 
Libyan nation. For instance, al-Shehebi introduces herself as the ‘free daughter and 
sister of thuwwar’, and the group of Tripoli women describe their statement of 
allegiance as issued by ‘free women’, and as signifying a ‘humble effort in support of 
the thuwwar on the frontlines’. Revolutionary songs that centre on women 
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characterise their worth in terms of their relationship to male fighters: ‘Be proud to be 
a Libyan woman; you have young brothers who fear neither death nor torture’.386 The 
slogans issued by demonstrators in women-only demonstrations in the city of Jadu 
invoke the uprising’s overarching definition of pride and freedom as dependent on 
allegiance to the uprising, but they similarly indicate the distinction between different 
forms of contentious activism: ‘We are free Libyan women, hand in hand with the 
thuwwar’; ‘tell Muammar and his children, there are men in Jadu’.387  
 
7.4 Material Manifestations of the 17 February Symbolic Order  	
 
New symbolic systems of meaning are politically transformative, and speak more to 
agency, when they are grounded in tangible restructurings of the material sphere 
(Friedland and Alford 1991). Although the symbolism of the uprising was tinged with 
utopian imagery and rhetoric, the notion that the revolutionary moment had created 
something novel – empowering collectivities, organisational networks and ultimately, 
a new mode of civic belonging – continues to be asserted by a wide range of activists 
who participated within it. In particular, in characterising what made the uprising a 
radical, euphoric moment, activists reference the emergence of a sense of collective 
social responsibility. The UK-based activist and doctor Najib argued that it was the 
‘display of initiative’ – evident not only in the first demonstrations, but also in the 
establishment of fundraising organisations, the supply of hospital equipment and 
medication, and the travel of diaspora doctors to the country – that suggested that 
Libyans had ‘changed their mentality’ of non-productivity, and abandoned their 																																																								
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former political suspicions of each other. Abdullah, an activist based in the city of 
Zawiya, elaborated upon this point: 
 
Those were the days of real community. The liberation of Zawiya in August 
was an incredible event. I headed the Relief Committee during the month of 
Ramadan at Abu Huraira Mosque, and people just opened their doors to the 
thuwwar, helping with food and provisions, giving whatever they could 
give. We raised 3000 dinars in half an hour, 25,000 dinars within one week. 
Youth from Zawiya just came and helped, with no incentives and interests 
other than helping their city. That sense of community was what got us 
through the difficult month of Ramadan.388 
 
Radical revolutionary moments, according to Tarrow (1993: 302), demonstrate and 
engender both ‘utopian dreams’ and ‘intoxicating solidarity’ among participants. In 
the Libyan uprising, the solidarity that was felt by activists emerged from palpable 
instances of collective generosity, selflessness and sacrifice. Tareq witnessed this both 
in the diaspora and inside Libya. Among online activist communities, there was ‘a 
real sense of camaraderie…and there was emotional and spiritual support’, based on 
the shared experience of being invested in the uprising while observing it from the 
outside. In Libya, he experienced a relentless spirit of assistance between 
revolutionary fighters, activists, and journalists. He first experienced the latter upon 
immediately arriving at Tunisia in July 2011, when his group was driven 200km 
across the border by two Libyan strangers, simply so that they could be seen safely 
inside opposition-controlled territory.389  
The NTC coordinator Yahya argued that the principal ‘good’ that came out of 
the uprising was largely of a social nature: ‘families came together, communities 																																																								
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came together. Everyone was cooperating. There was a lot of positivity’.390 Inside 
regime-controlled Tripoli, the shared experience of surveillance, imprisonment and 
violence led to the creation of ‘extraordinary’ revolutionary bonds among fighters in 
the city.391 The president of the New Libya Foundation (NLF) Rihab Elhaj argued that 
these acts of assistance created a ‘new and special bond between Libyans’, and were 
one indication of the way in which ‘the revolution gave birth to Libyan civil society’ 
(Rajabany and Shitrit 2014: 84). This spirit of social camaraderie and civic 
responsibility was particularly amplified in Benghazi, which saw the emergence of an 
extensive civil society sphere from March 2011 onwards (ibid: 95). The journalist and 
activist Dania describes this locus of activity as centred in and around the Benghazi 
Courthouse, which was comprised of a highly productive network of people:  
 
Everyone there that I met was so focused on working together to achieve 
something. And seeing these young men who were going to the frontlines, 
and all these people who were volunteering to take food…it was just an 
incredible energy and excitement, and a real sense of ‘we can do anything 
now’. It was amazing, the best time ever. I saw the best in people; I saw the 
best of Libya.392 
 
 
In Benghazi, this productive capacity was displayed in the kinds of generous acts that 
were performed by Libyans throughout the country: ‘people were doing things off 
their own backs; people were selfless. Bakeries were opening and bread was being 
given for free, people were printing things for free’.393 However, civic activism was 
particularly powerful in Benghazi because it occurred within a relatively intimate, 																																																								
390 Interview with Yahya, activist and NTC coordinator, 29 November 2016. Skype. 
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392 Interview with Dania, Benghazi-based journalist and campaigner, 27 August 2015. London.	
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highly symbolic site of protest that was the origin of the first protests on 15 February: 
the Benghazi Courthouse. After the fall of the regime’s Al-Fadeel battalion on 20 
February, the Courthouse became a hub of civic and political activity. During the 
daytime, the area surrounding the Courthouse was teeming with groups of youth 
organising social action campaigns, ‘sending positive messages on how to improve 
Benghazi together…they were out on the streets, picking up garbage and handing out 
flyers, telling people to look after the cleanliness of the city, because it now belonged 
to us’.394  
Different organisations also established their own private tents around the 
Courthouse, in which they sought to disseminate what they felt to be key 
revolutionary messages and new modes of civic existence within Libya. The Libyan 
police force had a tent manned by activists, in which ‘they tried to break the barrier in 
people’s minds, that the police are linked to the regime’, and to replace it with the 
new notion that the police were now an instrument for the protection of the people.395 
The Department of Law at the University of Benghazi established a tent in which 
members of the faculty gave daily lectures on the subject of civil society within a 
democratic society.396 This new mode of activism was not only voluntary and 
collaborative, but was also premised on the reconfiguration of established 
understandings of citizenship within Libyan society.   
Across Libya, civic activism also involved the transformation of spaces that 
were deliberately neglected or appropriated by the Qadhafi regime (Al-Turk 2011: 
120). In Benghazi, activists took over the once-feared ‘congregation spaces’ 
(mathabat) used by Qadhafi’s revolutionary committees, transforming them into 
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communal spaces, largely for women, that were used for a diverse array of cultural 
activities, from spiritual gatherings to the teaching of the English language (formerly 
demonized by Qadhafi for its association with the West).397 In other opposition-
controlled towns such as Shahhat, street clean-up operations took the form of well-
organised campaigns that emphasised the cultural, archaeological and aesthetic 
preservation of the city’s Greek ruins for future tourism purposes: again, something 
that Qadhafi had actively discouraged.398 In Tripoli, social action projects emerged 
immediately following the liberation of the city, with clean-up campaigns, the 
distribution of water, the formation of organic committees to mediate disputes, and 
initiatives by emerging civil society groups to stop gunmen from firing into the air 
(El-Khawas 2013: 76).  
The transformation of public spaces has been described as an important, 
symbolic form of open resistance: because such spaces customarily serve as ‘the 
repositories and the projections of power’, re-appropriation severs the populace’s 
former compliance with the many regularities and terms that had governed their lives 
(Tripp 2013: 73). Going beyond this interpretation, and in line with an institutional 
perspective, the practical reconstruction of the relationship between citizens and their 
external environment also strengthens the salience of the new systems of meaning that 
emerge during open resistance. If the ‘categorical reconstruction’ of meanings can 
facilitate changes in practice, then changes in practice can also strengthen a system of 
meaning (Friedland and Alford 1991: 246). Jessica Winegar (2016: 610-611) has 
argued that such ‘acts of aesthetic ordering’ enabled people to model the kind of state 
they wanted: ‘a modern-socialist ideal of a state that takes care of all its citizens and 
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provides public amenities’. In line with this view, such acts of aesthetic ordering 
during the Libyan uprising served both as a denunciation of the Jamahiriya’s failure 
to provide high standards of social living, and an early demonstration of a utopian 
vision of the Libyan state, in which Libyans would never again be deprived of 
material prosperity. The beautification of public spaces reflects the historicised 
cleavage between the political past and present of the Libyan nation: instructions to 
remove garbage, using slogans such as ‘keep your city clean,’ accompanied artistic 
depictions of Qadhafi being consigned to the ‘garbage of history’ (Joffe 2016: 134).  
In addition to modelling an ideal state, the regulation of public spaces and 
behaviours also enacts the revolutionary idealisation of Libyan society as empowered, 
productive and socially conscientious. In this vein, Khalil (2014: 102) has 
characterised the reclamation of public spaces as one part of the process of ‘self-
governance’ that was a common trait among the political crowds of 2011. Practical 
attempts at ‘self-governance’, such as the organisation of neighbourhood security, 
street cleaning and medical care, affirm the claim that the popular voice of Arab 
crowds has now become a potent source of political authority, but also the notion that 
responsibility and accountability accompany power.   
The celebrated ethos of social responsibility underpinning these acts is 
problematised by Winegar (2016: 616), who argues that, in the case of Egypt, such 
civilising discourses and regulatory behaviours were condescending towards the poor 
and working classes: for instance, in propounding ‘the notion that one should actually 
do work for the pittance of a government salary’. However, such behaviours must also 
be understood as a commentary on the social relations established by authoritarian 
regimes: in this instance, on the way in which the Jamahiriya engendered popular 
complicity in its coercive apparatus, and implicated the populace in its public 
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institutions. The emphasis on individual and collective responsibility can be seen as 
an attempt to assert agency over one’s own environment, but also to assert a sense of 
self-worth that had been undermined due to participation in the Jamahiriya’s 
disorderly and duplicitous public sphere. One activist emphasised that ‘Qadhafi’s 
mentality’ had formerly governed public life, referencing the well-known 
revolutionary saying that Libyans must ‘get rid of the small Qadhafi inside of them’ 
as the first step to social change.399 The popular claim that revolutionary social change 
will only occur if people ‘begin with’ themselves (Winegar 2016: 616) is thus a 
reflection of the way in which self-understandings are intimately connected to the 
regulatory practices of authoritarian regimes.  
The transformation of public spaces, and the reconfiguration of the behaviours 
that formerly populated them, was an effort that was undertaken at both an individual 
and a collective level. Where organised revolutionary bodies established street clean-
up operations, other activists sought to quietly implement more ‘personal 
convictions’, such as a refusal to continue finding employment using nepotism or 
‘connections’ (‘wasta’) instead of through one’s own professional merits.400 Such acts 
were fuelled by a sense of new national belonging that was bound, in particular, by 
the revolutionary discourse of sacrifice: ‘Libya wasn’t something owned by Qadhafi 
anymore. People died for it, so we needed to be responsible for it’.401 Above all, they 
represented attempts to put into practice the uprising’s symbolic order, with its 
suggestion of a unified and productive revolutionary collective, and a correspondingly 
beneficent Libyan state. In celebrating the progress of civil society during the 
uprising, a column in Al-Manārah newspaper compares the way in which ‘we were in 																																																								
399 Interview with Aisha, women’s rights activist, 6 April 2016. Skype.  
400 Interview with Mohammed, revolutionary fighter and civil society activist in Tripoli, 23 March 
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the past stripped of our will’ with ‘what our revolution has now achieved’.402 The 
emergence of agency is here explicitly connected to Libyans’ palpable transformation 
of their material landscape.  
 
7.5 Dynamics of Domination in the Revolutionary Symbolic Order  	
 
Hitherto, this chapter has argued that revolutionary cultural productions and practices 
contested the Jamahiriya’s symbolic order and attempted to establish alternative 
notions of being, belonging and behaving in a post-Qadhafi Libya. To some extent, 
there was a degree of discursive overlap between existent authoritarian and new 
revolutionary vocabularies: for instance, both relied extensively on concepts such as 
freedom, martyrdom and prosperity, and laid claim to similar historical narratives of 
anti-colonial struggle. This can be partly attributed to the polysemy of culturally 
resonant symbols, which are always subject to competing interpretations (Wedeen 
1999: 10). However, oppositional discourses can risk mirroring, not only the 
vocabularies of power, but also the very structures of dominance that underpin them. 
As argued by Tripp (2013: 12), ‘resistance, in shadowing power, also takes on some 
of its qualities, similarly dividing the world into binary opposites’. The following 
discussion will outline how and why binary divisions emerged within the 
revolutionary symbolic order, and will explore the implications of such divisions for 
the transformation of the Jamahiriya’s system of meaning, and for the emergence of 
political agency during the uprising more generally.  
The symbolic order of the 17 February uprising, in common with the 
institutional system of meaning it sought to depose, symbolically constituted and 																																																								
402 al-Ajnaf, Alaa. “A letter to the dear reader” (resala li azizi al-qari). Al-Manarah. 5 August 2011. 
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defended an alternative definition of power and interest in the new Libya. This is 
implicit in the discussion within the previous section, which drew attention to the way 
in which revolutionary rhetoric elevated free Libyans, martyrs and anti-regime 
fighters in the revolutionary aesthetic. The counterpart to this affirmative definition of 
value and power is the symbolic exclusion of non-revolutionaries – who were 
represented as Qadhafi supporters - from the new Libyan collective. Rap songs such 
as ‘I’m a Tripolitanian’ (ana tarabulsi) attack not only the fighters who aligned with 
Qadhafi, but also those who sided with him politically, dismissing the claim that they 
acquiesced out of fear: ‘look at those hypocrites, those traitors, those cowards: the 
Libyan people have called them “climbers.”’403 In ‘I won’t forgive’ (mish han-sameh) 
by Shukri al-Aroosi, the lyrics also attack the ‘climbers’ (mutasaleqeen) who will 
attempt to enter the revolutionary fold after the toppling of the regime: ‘the nation 
isn’t gullible, and won’t forget your treachery’.404 Another song by the same singer 
displays contempt for the dubious religious morals of those who ‘sold you, my 
country, for a cheap price, and bought a life of shame with Muammar’.405 
The conversational rhetoric that emerged during the uprising bolstered this 
distinction between pro and anti-regime Libyans. It constructed an identity, not only 
for ‘revolutionaries’, but also for Qadhafi’s swarm of green supporters, who were 
referred to ‘algae’ (tahalib, singular tuhloob). This pejorative term was vague and 
indiscriminate in its use, referring variously to pro-Qadhafi fighters, civilians 
supportive of his rule and even those sceptical of the NATO military intervention. The 
Tripoli-based activist Osamaargued that, for all its comic undertones, the term was 
used in an attacking way:  
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At the start I supported the calls for political reform, but I was against the 
military aspect of the revolution, and then I was against the NATO 
intervention…I didn’t trust the return of political exiles…Of course, people 
called me a tuhloob, as though I was chanting and dancing for Qadhafi 
outside Bab al-Aziziyah! During and after the revolution, being labelled a 
tuhloob was a serious accusation.406 
 
The binary distinction between Qadhafi supporters and revolutionaries was bolstered 
by the kind of collectivist revolutionary rhetoric delineated in the previous section, 
which suggested that ‘during the revolution, all of Libyan society, except for 
Qaddafi’s few supporters, came together to overthrow the dictator’ (Khalil 2014: 
117). At the time, and for activists present on social media in particular, the 
distinction between revolutionaries and non-revolutionaries was not problematic 
precisely because the latter were viewed as insubstantial in number. Activists denied 
that the uprising was a ‘civil war’.407 Mezran and Knecht (2015: 98) contest this 
presentation of the uprising, arguing that ‘the opposition’s propaganda concealed the 
fact that the revolution was indeed a “civil war”: Libyans fought against Libyans’. For 
Housam, the ceaseless repetition and celebration of the term thuwwar within Libyan 
cultural productions meant that many Libyans failed to grasp the complicated political 
reality of the war in Libya in 2011, which did involve conflicts between pro and anti-
Qadhafi people.408 Similarly, the exiled dissident Fayez criticised the notion that the 
uprising was a unified, mass movement with only a smattering of pro-Qadhafi 
supporters, arguing for the need to break down the ‘revolution’ into concrete figures:  
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The revolution in Libya was carried out by 50 to 60 thousand people, at most. 
The people who were killed were between 25 and 30 thousand. Fighters in 
Benghazi succeeded only because of air cover. Inside Tripoli, there were 
pockets of resistance and fighting, but most people actually just watched to see 
what would happen.409 
 
The inadequacy of terms such as ‘revolution’ (thawra) and ‘revolutionaries’ 
(thuwwar) in capturing the political and military reality of Libya suggests, similarly, 
the inability of such terms to be inclusive of a substantial proportion of the Libyan 
populace. According to the activist Reem, who was present in Tripoli during the 
uprising, such terms proliferated because it was all too easy to assume that all Libyans 
privately supported the uprising if one was confined to ‘revolutionary bubbles’ and 
enclosed social circles. In reality, people held a range of positions in relation to the 
uprising, from complete support to complete rejection, even within her own 
neighbourhood. Peaceful coexistence within their community was only possible when 
they ignored the political binary established by both the regime and the opposition.410 
It has been argued that revolutionary discourses exclude as well as emphasise, 
and that this might mean ‘the sidelining, if not outright prevention, of certain ways of 
defining a revolution or continuing political action’ (Winegar 2016: 617). The 
revolutionary system of meaning actively excluded, not only by supplying sweeping 
labels for, and condemnations of, those who did not support the revolution, but also 
by failing to acknowledge the presence of different ways of defining opposition to the 
Qadhafi regime. As argued by Valocchi (2005b: 752), ‘categories exert power over 
individuals, especially for those who do not fit neatly within their normative 
alignments’. Revolutionary meaning was strikingly uniform and normative in the way 
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in which it associated freedom with support for the NATO-backed military struggle 
against the regime. The Libyan activist Mohammed Ismail argued that this had an 
alienating effect on some activists:  
 
Once NATO got involved, even some people who were anti-Qadhafi sat on 
the fence…they changed their stance because they didn’t want a foreign 
nation bombing their country. But they were always brutally shut down, or 
accused of being against the revolution. I for one faced that.411 
 
On a similar note, Salem, who demonstrated against the regime in Tripoli, argued that 
after the first few days of protests in the city, some of the youth reconsidered their 
support for the uprising because of what they felt to be an exaggerated media drive 
towards toppling the regime, led in particular by external political actors. This retreat 
from the uprising escalated following the widespread calls for international 
intervention: ‘some young guys started to turn against the revolution completely at 
that point, saying things like “it’s not about Muammar, put him to one side, he’s just a 
symbol: it’s about protecting Libya.”’412 However, they were in turn categorised as 
tahalib during the months of conflict: a label that persisted following the collapse of 
the Qadhafi regime. The Zawiya-based lawyer Khaled argued that the rhetoric of 
jihad against Qadhafi also failed to take into account the fact that many of those who 
were fighting for the regime were forced to do so against their will.413 By failing to 
accommodate or even acknowledge alternative perspectives on the military conflict in 
Libya, the revolutionary aesthetic oversimplified political agency, presenting support 
for the uprising as politically self-evident and fundamentally uncomplicated.  																																																								
411 Interview with Umar, journalist and photographer, 14 January 2016. Skype.  
412 Interview with Salem, former economic analyst and anti-regime demonstrator, 10 December 2016. 
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The Libyan uprising’s dichotomy between regime loyalists and free 
revolutionaries led to the detraction of the voices and identities of those who did not 
share in its narrative of freedom, in terms that closely mirrored the very institutional 
order it set out to subvert. Bushra, a member of the human-rights organisation 
Lawyers for Justice in Libya (LFJL), argued that the condemnation of Qadhafi 
supporters, and acts of reprisal against them, were based not only on crimes 
committed, but also on opinions held.414 The policing of Libyans’ political opinions 
began during the revolutionary period itself, and was initially evident in reactions to 
people’s embrace (or rejection) of the symbolism of 17 February. In cities that were 
controlled by the opposition, shop shutters that remained painted green – in 
accordance with former Jamahiriya law – were often vandalised or scrawled with 
graffiti instructing the owners to ‘change the colour’.415 In Tripoli, some storeowners 
used portraits of Qadhafi as doormats (the act of showing one’s feet is considered an 
offensive gesture in the Middle East). As a result, the symbolic rejection of Qadhafi, 
by stepping on his image, became a precondition for those seeking to undertake social 
and material transactions, and led to the severance of social ties among neighbours 
who had been accustomed to entering each others’ stores for many years.416 
Mohammed-Hejajy, a training coordinator at the Libya Youth Centre (LYC) in 
Tripoli, which was established towards the end of 2011, argued that being branded a 
Qadhafi supporter diminished one’s own standing in society. As a result, the Centre’s 
social entrepreneurship programmes for young people hinged on breaking down the 
assumption that thuwwar intrinsically had a superior status to those who did not 
participate in the uprising. In order to destabilise this hierarchy, the Centre dispensed 
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with the term ‘revolution’ altogether, replacing it instead with more politically 
impartial and inclusive terminology such as ‘the period of war’ (fatrat al-harb) or ‘the 
events’ (al-ahdath), and first constructing a sense of social belonging around the LYC 
itself before moving onto more contentious subjects such as ‘the nation’.417 The 
neutralising rhetoric of the LYC suggests the way in which revolutionary 
categorisations did not inscribe, but instead actively undercut, the utopian discourse of 
national unity that was celebrated by revolutionary cultural productions.  
The exclusionary dimensions of the revolutionary symbolic order also suggest 
the need to recognise the way in which distinction-making practices are not 
collectively empowering or counter-hegemonic in and of themselves, but ultimately 
reflect and exemplify the interests of those undertaking them. This is visible, not only 
in the content of the 17 February symbolic order, but also in the way in which its 
classificatory practices shaped the material sphere in 2011. As noted in the previous 
section, the way in which power is materially structured is intimately connected to the 
way in which power is defined; in turn, symbolism engenders specific material 
practices by creating a ‘highly contingent set of social norms’ that delineates and 
sanctions appropriate modes of action (Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 106). Although the 
symbolism of the uprising attempted to sanction a new model of citizenship based on 
values such as productivity, individual responsibility and social altruism, it also 
engendered hierarchical modes of action that were closely connected to the exaltation 
of thuwwar in the new revolutionary collective.  
The categorisation of thuwwar as religious combatants and martyrs was a 
definition that led to the practical marginalisation of those who were killed or went 
missing while supporting the Qadhafi regime, or even those whose allegiance to the 																																																								
417 Interview with Mohammed, revolutionary fighter and civil society activist in Tripoli, 23 March 
2015. Tunisia. 
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17 February uprising was unknown. Libya’s defence minister, Abdul Fattah Younes, 
supported the excommunication of pro-Qadhafi fighters, describing them as 
‘unbelievers who killed women and children and men, and destroyed cities and 
agriculture…because of this, they are apostates…and for this reason, this is a battle 
for martyrdom’.418 Popular protest slogans and dictums such as ‘the blood of the 
martyrs will not go to waste’ indicated a classificatory monopoly to determine whose 
deaths were significant and worthy of being dignified with recognition. Consequently, 
the concept of ‘martyrdom’ foregrounded a particular type of dignity that was 
contingent on political beliefs and actions, rather than on what has been described as 
the Arab Spring’s expression of a ‘more global culture of emotion, arising from “basal 
emotions” relating to human value and worth’ (Fierke 2015: 45). According to the 
Libyan lawyer Bushra Saudi, this definitional practice was accompanied by 
significant social, political and legal ramifications: 
 
In 2011, the very first understanding of revolution was spontaneous and 
empowering, but that changed…the revolution became problematic for the 
voice of the other in Libya, whatever that “other” might be. The idea of 
revolutionary legitimacy was soon hijacked in Libya in 2011, meaning that if 
you were with us, you were with us, and if you weren’t with us, you were either 
quiet or you were dead.419 
 
In practice, the notion of revolutionary legitimacy paved the way for the 
transformation of ‘martyrdom’ into a legal category, which in turn served as a 
prohibitive barrier to social reconciliation and to the implementation of any serious 
form of transitional justice. Humanitarian organisations that emerged in different 
cities during and after the uprising, such as ministries for the ‘Martyrs and Missing’, 																																																								
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would only concern themselves with pro-revolutionary casualties. Because the 
individual rights of Libyans were not tied to the legality of their actions, but to their 
position within the revolutionary binary, the deaths and disappearances of suspected 
pro-Qadhafi supporters were not worthy of investigation. The Tripoli-based women’s 
activist Sahar al-Naas argued that the opposite was also true: violations committed by 
thuwwar were deemed inconsequential because anti-Qadhafi fighters were the rightful 
power-holders in the 17 February uprising. Thus, organisations that were established 
in the immediate aftermath of the uprising, such as ‘The Alliance of Loyalty to Blood 
of the Martyrs’ (kutlat al-wafa le-dam al-shuhada) both absolved thuwwar of any 
crimes committed against pro-Qadhafi forces, and suggested that thuwwar (including 
individuals who were imprisoned for many years under Qadhafi) were those most fit 
to lead in Libya, irrespective of their capacity of their do so.420  
In an article on ‘martyrdom’ as an actively performed rhetorical position in the 
Egyptian uprising, Walter Armbrust (2013) emphasises its capacity for enabling the 
expression of radical revolutionary meanings, such as the rethinking of the place of 
women in society. In the Libyan uprising, the rhetoric of martyrdom was radical in 
that it enabled protesters to demand accountability and dignity for those whom 
Qadhafi had dehumanised and labelled as inconsequential ‘rats’. However, it also 
helped to re-establish a symbolic hierarchy that shaped the way in which political and 
material interests were systematically pursued in Libya, even at the expense of 
broader revolutionary ideas such as justice and human dignity. Mohammed-Hejjajy, 
who travelled from Tripoli to fight in both Misrata and Sirte, argued that many 
fighters clung on to their identity as thuwwar because it gave them a stake in post-
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Qadhafi Libya. This was most noticeable in their physical, and even emotional 
attachment to their weapons: 
 
From the youth that I knew, I was one of the very few who actually gave my 
weapon after the fighting stopped, and that took a very long time. But you 
have to understand why a lot of youth didn’t want to give up their weapons. 
Jobs just don’t provide enough money in Libya. For the young men I knew, 
being a fighter meant power, it gave you opportunities.421  
 
The ‘power’ that came with being a fighter was symbolically defined and defended in 
the rhetoric of the uprising, and consequently led to the instatement of a dangerous, 
potentially unchecked source of coercive authority. Dirk Vandewalle has argued that 
the emphasis on revolutionary legitimacy fuelled a rhetoric of ‘retribution’ against 
non-thuwwar which could in fact be used to target ‘virtually everyone’ depending on 
the way in which association with Qadhafi was defined, because of the fact that most 
people were variously implicated within the Jamahiriya’s political, institutional 
system.422 This point was underscored by the Tripoli-based activist Osama, who 
argued that, immediately after the routing of Qadhafi from the capital, identifying as 
one of the thuwwar (and having the ability to label others tahalib) was a marker of 
social and political status that could subsequently be used to settle private quarrels, 
and was even deployed for personal gain, in a reversal of the way in which reporting 
others for being ‘rats’ during the Jamahiriya was notoriously deployed for retributory 
purposes.423 This suggests that what have been described as ‘the rules of the game, the 
means-ends relationships by which power and status are gained, maintained and lost’ 																																																								
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(Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 112) in the Jamahiriya were, through the emergence of 
this particular mode of action, reversed rather than overturned.  
The uprising’s reification of the thuwwar was also concomitant with an absence 
of accountability for revolutionary fighters, and a willingness to overlook human 
rights violations conducted by anti-regime forces during the military conflict in 2011. 
After a two-day battle on 10-11 August, military forces from the city of Misurata 
occupied the pro-Qadhafi town of Tawergha and began expelling its 20,000, mainly 
black inhabitants. They defended the expulsion principally with reference to the large 
number of rapes committed by loyalist units in Misurata (Tabib 2014: 4), or what one 
prominent social media activist described as ‘intensely pro-Gaddafi fighters who 
raped, kidnapped & murdered Misuratans’.424 Houses, shops and the local hospital 
were vandalised, looted and set on fire, and Tawerghans continued to be detained by 
fighters at checkpoints, hospitals and on the streets in the following weeks.425 Having 
undertaken what they described as the liberation (tahreer) of the town on 11 
August,426 Misuratan military commanders declared that ‘Tawergha no longer exists’ 
and insisted that Tawerghans would never be permitted to return to the town.427 
The political violence and ethnic cleansing that occurred in Tawergha was 
largely explained away or ignored during the uprising. The expulsion of the Tawergha 
was recognised as a point of ‘discomfort’ for many activists, but one that couldn’t be 
adequately addressed in the revolutionary media because of the moral authority that 
Misuratan fighters had earned after months of struggle against the regime.428 
Consequently, and because ‘the deployment of material resources not only involves 																																																								
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425 Gilligan, Andrew. “Gaddafi’s ghost town after the loyalists retreat”. The Telegraph. 11 September 
2011. Available at: https://goo.gl/unNTT9  
426 “The Battle for the Liberation of Tawergha”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/C3xGey  
427 Gilligan, Andrew. “Gaddafi’s ghost town after the loyalists retreat”. The Telegraph. 11 September 
2011. Available at: https://goo.gl/unNTT9	
428 Interview with Tareq, social media activist and translator, 14 February 2015. Oxford. 
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real material relations; it also communicates meanings’ (Friedland and Alford 1991: 
246), unchecked military violations by opposition fighters further reinforced the 
symbolic authority of the thuwwar in the revolutionary aesthetic. A report by the 
television channel Libya Al-Ahrar on the Tawergha situation on 17 August 2011 did 
not attempt to grapple with the violence committed against Tawergha, and presented 
only an image of revolutionary benevolence: 
 
This is the city of Tawergha, which Qadhafi had invaded with his brigades 
and mercenaries, and turned into a military town that was used to shell 
civilians in Misurata…Misuratan revolutionaries went into Tawergha to 
liberate it, and to free its imprisoned residents, supply them what they need 
and host them kindly.429 
 
Similarly, the prerogative of the Misuratan thuwwar was not challenged in the 
political sphere, as NTC officials remained largely silent on the subject altogether. 
Following the displacement of the Tawerghans, the Prime Minister Mahmoud Jibril 
stated that ‘regarding Tawergha, my own viewpoint is that nobody has the right to 
interfere in this matter except the people of Misurata…this is a uniquely Misuratan 
issue’.430 This response has been ascribed to the NTC’s military unimportance in 
comparison to organised military battalions, and its subsequent inability ‘to prevent 
the realization’ of the Misuratan agenda (Sawani 2013: 67). Moreover, the 
unchallenged authority of Misuratan fighters can be attributed to other factors, such as 
the way in which the no-fly zone in Libya enabled the emergence of local power 
structures and militias whose were not part of an overarching military command-and-
control structure (Pack 2013b: 8). Such dynamics undoubtedly shaped the material 																																																								
429 “Report on Tawergha after its liberation”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/kyLMYu		
430 “Mahmoud Jibril on Misurata”. YouTube. Available at: https://goo.gl/LkRsmu  
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power of militias during the uprising, but this power was also – I would argue – 
bolstered by the symbolic construction of the thuwwar as blameless actors and 
prestigious power holders in Libya. This symbolic construction arguably undermines 
the emergence of political agency, particularly when agency has been conceptualised 
as resting, in part, on the ability to actively demand political accountability and 
responsibility from a dominant power (Scott 1990: 51). 
Some of the Libyan activists I interviewed actively evaluated the label of 
thuwwar, in light of the refusal of many militias to disband and hand in their weapons 
to the state following the ouster of Qadhafi: a trend which has since generated a show 
of opposition to armed militias by Libyan citizens across the country (Khalil 2014: 
116). In examining the emergence of the thuwwar as a powerful entity in 2011, 
activists often distinguished between those whom they termed ‘real revolutionaries’ 
(al-thuwwar al-haqeeqeyon) and opportunists or free riders. The lawyer Khaled 
argued that those who fought against Qadhafi could be split into three ranks: the ‘real 
thuwwar’ who were selfless and nationalistic (wataney’een), a secondary rank of 
individuals who did not fight themselves, but who protected the fighters, and finally, 
‘a group of thieves who used religious phrases like “we’ve said God’s name on it [this 
object]” to steal cars and weapons’, and who ultimately assimilated among the real 
thuwwar when the fighting concluded.431 
 The classification of the thuwwar into factions was issued by different activists 
who travelled to or were present in conflict areas, often with slight variations on the 
composition of fighters’ ranks. According to the activist Mohammed Ismail, there 
were ‘people on the front lines who cared about nothing else than freeing Libya and 
making sure Libya is the best country it can be…and other people discussing how to 
																																																								
431 Interview with Khaled, pro-opposition lawyer in Zawiya, 26 March 2015. Tunisia. 
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divide up the booty’.432 Alternately, it has been argued the ‘real thuwwar’ in 2011 
were easy to identify: they were the ones who were either killed in combat, or who 
immediately gave up their weapons and returned to their former employment after 
Qadhafi was toppled.433 The NTC’s Hussein looked to the post-revolutionary period, 
arguing that the thuwwar first became a problem in Libya when the interim 
transitional government of 2012 decided to pay salaries to fighters, at which point 
their number increased from 25,000 to 250,000, most of whom were falsely claiming 
to be opposition fighters.434  
These arguments demonstrate the ways in which the reified category of 
thuwwar has been problematised following the conclusion of fighting in 2011, but 
they also attest to an attempt to safeguard the integrity of a core ‘revolutionary’ group 
of fighters in 2011. I would argue that Libya’s thuwwar are not simply problematic 
because of isolated revolutionary abuses or post-revolutionary opportunism. Winegar 
(2016: 614-615) has explored the way in which the embodied practices that take place 
during revolutionary moments expose the underlying tensions, contradictions and 
ingrained hierarchies behind any purportedly radical and inclusive rhetoric. In this 
vein, the very creation of ‘revolutionaries’ and ‘martyrs’ as categories of power 
undermined the collectivist rhetoric of the uprising, and legitimised a hierarchical 
symbolic and material order that began to emerge during the revolutionary period 
itself.  
It is important to note that, in the Libyan uprising, what Winegar has termed the 
‘radical and inclusive rhetoric’ of revolutionary moments did not simply valorise the 
thuwwar and exclude non-revolutionaries, but encompassed broader representations 
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and celebrations of liberty, justice and collective identity in post-Qadhafi Libya. Why 
then, did such egalitarian understandings not entirely offset the revolution’s more 
hierarchical symbolic practices? Friedland and Alford (1991: 246) have argued that 
‘categorical structures only make “sense” when they organize our lives’. In turn, it 
could be argued that this rhetoric, which was often utopian in tone, did not sufficiently 
shape, or indeed reflect, the material reality of the political environment during the 
Libyan uprising. A member of the Benghazi RYC, Mansour, argued that the 
entrepreneurial and cultural activities occurring in and around the Benghazi 
Courthouse, as productive and inspiring as they were, ultimately failed to address 
‘real problems’ in the revolutionary order: for instance, the increased autonomy of 
miltiias, and the NTC’s failure to consult with civil society groups (as formerly 
promised) prior to issuing the TCD in August 2011. As a result, the Benghazi 
Courthouse gradually lost its revolutionary appeal: 
 
We just kept hearing the same phrases every night at the Courthouse, 
whenever speeches would take place. ‘Libya was destroyed in 42 years, we 
will rebuild it in 42 days’. ‘What is coming is better’. ‘We will soon become 
like Dubai’. Slogans that meant nothing.435 
 
In this view, the Courthouse transitioned from representing the radical demands of 
protestors in February 2011, to becoming a site for the repetition of tidy aphorisms 
and revolutionary clichés that were no longer adequate as statements of political 
intent. This was fuelled, Mansour argued, by an increasingly pervasive, religious 
rhetoric that proscribed dissent and disagreement within the opposition’s ranks for the 
purpose of preserving national unity. Ahmed from the Libyan Youth Movement also 
																																																								
435 Interview with Mansour, demonstrator and civil society activist, 20 April 2016. Skype.  
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expressed frustration with the Benghazi Courthouse, arguing that because of the 
celebratory atmosphere, ‘all singing and dancing and Libyan music…there was so 
much love that we were blinded from all the problems we had’.436 The symbolic 
saturation of the Benghazi Courthouse prevented the emergence of a critical discourse 
about the utopian revolutionary aesthetic. In turn, the utopian revolutionary aesthetic 
did not adequately capture or acknowledge discord in the opposition’s ranks, such as 
conflicts over the role of Islam in Libya’s new political order, and local fears over the 
marginalisation (tahmeesh) of certain cities, regions and identities in Libya (Sawani 
and Pack 2013). 
This interpretation necessitates that we question the claim that revolutionary 
spaces invite audiences to perpetually address, question and change the status quo 
(Wahdan 2014: 55), and enable activists to defy the re-imposition of the political and 
social familiar by cultivating fluidity and contingency (Sabea 2013). Indeed, the RYC 
argued that the Courthouse had become such a stagnant symbolic space, thoroughly 
accepting of the new revolutionary consensus surrounding the NTC, that from August 
2011 they decided to protest for greater political transparency in front of the NTC 
headquarters instead. Even then, they argued: 
 
Events like the liberation of Tripoli discomposed us. People kept on saying 
‘Why are you protesting against the NTC when everyone is happy with the 
liberation?’ We suspended demonstrations temporarily, but after that there was 
no longer the engagement we wanted.437  
 
Within Benghazi, the RYC’s attempts to foster a radical political dialogue were 
hampered by a nationalist utopian vision that subsumed conflict and contradiction in 																																																								
436 Interview with Ahmed, social media activist, 25 February 2015. London 
437 Interview with Mansour, demonstrator and civil society activist, 20 April 2016. Skype. 
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Libya into a homogenous narrative of collectivity. Similarly, and outside the 
Benghazi Courthouse, other activists argued that the nationalist language of the 
uprising was ‘not fake, but over simplistic’ in its celebration of revolutionary 
collectivity.438 The fighter Fawzi pointed out the presence of conflicts that were ethnic 
in nature, such as those between Berber and Zintan fighters, when he travelled to the 
West of Libya in 2011.439 Similarly, the activist Tareq argued that there were multiple 
‘political and military disagreements’ amongst armed anti-Qadhafi factions, with 
particular frustrations directed against one battalion, the Tripoli Revolutionary 
Brigade, for avoiding battles while other groups did the fighting.440 All of those 
tensions were concealed in cultural productions that affirmed unity and brotherhood 
among the thuwwar. Ahmed argued that the celebratory rhetoric ultimately led to a 
glossing over the ‘fault lines that started to appear during the stalemate’: 
 
I believe that we shouldn’t have tried to romanticise things, because it got us 
into problems. When we said things like “No East, no West”… there was an 
East, there was a West. We needed to sort it out’.441 
 
 
7.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter has sought to examine the emergence of political agency in the Libyan 
uprising as an articulated practice that contested the dominant symbolic order of 
Qadhafi’s Jamahiriya. It has been argued within the resistance literature that, during 
radical events, actors manifest agency in the ‘capacity to reinterpret and mobilize an 																																																								
438 Interview with Marwa, civil society activist in Benghazi, 23 January 2016. London. 
439 Interview with Fawzi, revolutionary fighter in western Libya, 29 December 2015. Skype. 
440 Interview with Tareq, social media activist and translator, 14 February 2015. Oxford.	
441 Interview with Ahmed, social media activist, 25 February 2015. London 
	 262	
array of resources in terms of cultural schemas other than those that initially 
constituted the array’ (Sewell 1992: 19). In particular, it has been argued that the 
removal of authoritarian constraints in Libya meant that, in artistic terms, the 
individual was ‘free to renegotiate her relationship to the social space in which she 
was previously dominated’ (Caster 2011).  
The preceding discussion has explored this ‘renegotiated’ relationship by 
examining both the subversive and transformational dimensions of symbolic 
resistance in the Libyan uprising. It has argued that, through openly contentious 
articulation, Libyans dismantled the Jamahiriya’s idealised and unaccountable self-
presentation, and in doing so publically proclaimed their own identities as 
autonomous agents, and as unwilling and unbelieving participants in the Jamahiriya’s 
institutional logic. They attempted to renegotiate their relationship to public space 
through the instatement of new social relations and organisational behaviours, 
underpinned by a conceptualisation of citizenship and national belonging that 
celebrated individual and collective responsibility.  
However, in reflecting on the new hierarchies created within the uprising’s 
alternative symbolic order, the chapter problematises the claim that revolutionary 
cultural productions signify a radical articulation of ‘diversity and defiance’ (Wahdan 
2014: 64). Thus, it has been argued that ‘utopian schemes are always exclusionary’ 
(Winegar 2016: 620) because they stem from, and reflect, the particular aspirations, 
interests and contradictions of those performing them. Libyans transformed the 
content of the ‘cultural schemas’ deployed by the Qadhafi regime, but not necessarily 
the way in which those schemas structured and defended power and interest in Libya. 
The uprising’s practices of categorisation led to the creation of a ‘legitimate vision of 
the social world’ (Bourdieu 1991: 20) that centred on the reification of the 17 
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February 2011 uprising itself, in place of Qadhafi’s 1969 coup and the Jamahiriya, 
and that foregrounded a notion of revolutionary belonging and status that was 
dependent on the political allegiances and beliefs of Libyans, and that struggled to 
genuinely accommodate diversity despite its proclaimed egalitarian aesthetic. 
 In presenting this argument, I go beyond the idea that solidarities only 
disintegrate after radical events, ‘once the common enemy is gone’ (Gamson 2011: 
468). Instead, the agentive, emancipatory symbolic interactions that occur in the most 
radical of spaces and moments, are themselves circumscribed by, reveal and engender 
social inequalities and material interests. 
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8 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
 
8.1 Introduction 
 
 
In the aftermath of the ‘Arab Spring’, political agency emerged as a focal point of 
enquiry in the Middle East politics literature. It was argued that the advent of highly 
visible acts of popular contestation, from December 2010, signified that the Arab 
people had shrugged off or defied the mantle of political apathy (Pollack 2011a; 
Cavatorta and Pace 2012; Dabashi 2012; Ramadan 2012; Achcar 2013; Dawisha 
2013), and in doing so, had successfully undermined dominant authoritarian structures 
of rule. When it became evident that mass protests had failed to produce democracy, 
except in Tunisia, the Arab uprisings were said to have yielded a ‘depressingly 
modest harvest’ (Brownlee et al 2015: 5). However, the thesis revisits and attempts to 
make sense of the new mode of ‘political actorness’ (Marchetti 2013: 1) that the Arab 
uprisings had purportedly engendered. This orientation aligns with a longstanding, 
scholarly tradition of investigating political engagement in the Middle East outside of 
formal political contexts, and beyond the authoritarianism-democratisation binary 
(Singerman 1995; Alhamad 2008; Bayat 2010; Beinin and Vairel 2011; Khatib 
2013b; Tripp 2013; Chalcraft 2016).  
This thesis positions itself within the nexus of the literatures on Middle East 
authoritarianism, social movement theory and resistance. It sets out to understand the 
way in which political agency emerged in the form of discursive claims making 
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practices during the Arab uprisings. It also seeks to situate this contentious activity in 
relation to existent authoritarian structures of power and meaning. The overarching 
research question is:   
 
How, and to what extent, did open insubordination in the Arab Spring 
transform authoritarian structures of domination and generate new 
political subjectivities? 
 
The thesis investigates this query in relation to the understudied case of Libya: a 
country that experienced a particularly repressive form of authoritarian rule under 
Muammar al-Qadhafi’s Jamahiriya (‘State of the Masses’), but which also witnessed 
mass public demonstrations and a militarised struggle against the regime in 2011, in 
what was popularly labelled the 17 February Revolution. This research question, 
which posits a need to understand both structure and agency, is lent clarity through a 
theoretical framework that integrates an institutional understanding of political power 
with a conceptualisation of agency as a strategic and symbolic representational 
practice. In turn, this framework is operationalised by an interpretive methodology 
that examines Qadhafi’s Jamahiriya as an institution, and analyses the strategic and 
symbolic discourses of Libyans in 2011 as a contentious response to the Jamahiriya’s 
institutional logic.   
The thesis develops two interrelated arguments. Firstly, it argues that 
representational practices in the Libyan uprising challenged the cultural schemas and 
the terms of discursive engagement established by the Jamahiriya. Strategic meaning 
making practices, exemplified in the creation of collective action frames, sought to 
mobilise opposition to the Qadhafi regime, selectively resonating with particular 
meanings in the Jamahiriya’s institutional logic in order to do so. Expressive meaning 
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making practices subverted the Qadhafi regime’s symbolic order and constructed 
alternative understandings of Libyan political identity, collectivity and citizenship. 
Through their representational practices, Libyans attempted to actively redefine the 
way in which power and interest operated in Libya. Political agency thus shifted from 
being an ‘embedded’ or ‘partial’ form of autonomy (Thornton and Ocasio 2008: 104), 
in which Libyan citizens were complicit in reproducing the Jamahiriya’s symbolic 
and material dominance, to an openly, contentious mode of activity, in which the 
Jamahiriya’s monopoly over meaning, and its exclusionary definition of national 
membership, was actively subverted. 
However, the thesis also argues that the practice of contentious articulation 
remained bound up with the logics and imperatives of collective action, and with the 
structural configurations of the Jamahiriya’s institutional order, if not with its 
symbolic content. Strategic meaning making practices rested upon the obfuscation 
and deferral of differences, problematic understandings and tensions within the 
revolutionary narrative for the pursuit of short-term political objectives. In turn, 
symbolic contestation saw the propounding of a utopian nationalistic narrative that 
proclaimed inclusivity, but in fact created a hierarchy of power and prestige that 
rested on participation in and loyalty to the 17 February uprising, instead of allegiance 
to the Jamahiriya and to Qadhafi’s 1969 revolution. Meaning making practices thus 
engaged with, challenged and even reversed the Jamahiriya’s symbolic order, but did 
not entirely transform it. Articulation was not boundless, involving a Libyan people 
‘saying what it wants, whenever it wants’ within a radical revolutionary space (Bell 
2013), but empirically constrained and revealing of new systemic inequalities.  
This problematised understanding of political agency is partly foregrounded by 
the theoretical framework of the thesis. In line with critical perspectives on resistance, 
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I do not take for granted that meaning making practices are necessarily transformative 
of power paradigms. Instead, in Chapter 7, I actively demarcate the inextricable 
‘entanglements’ (Sharp et al 2000) of resistance and power in the Libyan uprising. In 
addition, the thesis also amplifies latent tensions within constructivist social 
movement theory: namely, the ambiguity over the extent to which the strategic 
imperatives of collective action can undermine meaning making processes. This 
tension partly arises due to the very nature of strategic framing, which involves what 
has been described as a ‘cynical’ or ‘marketing orientation’ (Noakes and Johnston 
2005: 13), in which political actors choose what to exclude, as well as include, in 
order to maximise the instrumental impact of their narratives. During the Libyan 
uprising, this practice engendered a simplified and authoritative presentation of reality 
that undercut the radical multiplicity of revolutionary meanings. In addition, the 
thesis’ effort to understand framing as a ‘processual phenomenon’ (Benford and Snow 
2000: 614) entailed a recognition that cynical framing activities, and the long-term 
trajectories of contentious action, shape actors’ retrospective assessments of their own 
political agency.  
The thesis also positions this problematised understanding of agency in light of 
the symbolic legacy of Qadhafi’s Jamahiriya. Prior to and throughout the Libyan 
uprising, the Qadhafi regime continued to construct a binary and incommensurate 
vision of political reality in Libya: one in which Libyans were the sole decision-
makers in a purportedly egalitarian political system, and in which the opposition 
movement’s ranks consisted of manipulated youth, Islamist terrorists and self-
interested political dissidents. Libyan activists thus responded to the Qadhafi regime’s 
rhetoric by contradicting its allegations outright. Qadhafi and his immediate circle 
were framed as the only accountable political actors in Libya, thereby hindering the 
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emergence of a more challenging narrative of the way in which the Jamahiriya’s 
institutional-administrative system had engendered complicity and propagated social 
injustices. In turn, Libyan activists also knowingly denied or sidelined the presence of 
extreme elements among the ranks of revolutionary fighters, and asserted that – 
contrary to Qadhafi’s attempts to instigate division (fitna) - the Libyan nation was 
fully unified and even homogenous in its political and social outlook. Moreover, the 
system of meaning developed by Libyans was particularly bound up with the Qadhafi 
regime’s well-established rhetoric of ‘revolution’, participating in its terms and 
concepts, and reversing its binary political categorisation of Libyan society. As a 
result, the ‘event’ (Sewell 1996) of radical, open contestation in Libya did not 
generate unfettered representational practices, but meanings that were constrained by 
the semiotic, political and contentious contexts in which they emerged.  
This final chapter will revisit the theoretical and empirical contributions made 
by each respective chapter in the process of furthering the above conclusion. It will 
then outline the implications of the conclusion for the bodies of literature with which 
this thesis engages: principally, the Middle East politics literature and social 
movement theory. Finally, it will delineate the limitations of the study and indicate 
promising avenues of research that can build on its strengths and address some of its 
shortcomings.  
 
8.2 Core Arguments  
 
 
The Introduction posited that the unfolding politics of the Middle East, following the 
‘Arab Spring’, present a challenging juncture for understanding political agency in the 
region. The Arab uprisings appeared to signal the emergence of new models of 
political actorness, but subsequent ‘authoritarian retrenchment’ (Lynch 2014: 314) has 
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rendered it difficult to offer a coherent appraisal of contentious politics in the region, 
particularly through the use of democratisation frameworks. In addition, the 
unforeseen instability wrought by the Arab uprisings has drawn attention to the 
shortage of scholarship on contentious activism in Middle East countries: a deficiency 
that is particularly magnified in a formerly closed, authoritarian country such as 
Libya. 
Following the 17 February uprising, there has been a great deal of scholarly 
engagement with the politics of Libya, much of which has sought to analyse the 
process of post-Qadhafi state building, and to account for the new dynamics of elite 
competition, tribal factionalism and military unrest (Lacher 2013a; Pack 2013a; 
Sawani 2013; Sawani and Pack 2013; Varvelli 2013; Sawani 2014; Cole and 
McQuinn 2015; Randall 2015; Strakes 2017; Willcoxon 2017). This approach is 
valuable in its contextualisation of the Libyan uprising, and of the cleavages 
generated by the civil war, but it does not actively address or unpack the popular, 
discursive claims making practices that emerged during the uprising. The thesis 
returns to the radical moment of open contestation itself, in order to understand the 
way in which contentious representational practices emerged, engaged with and 
potentially transformed authoritarianism and political agency in what was formerly 
described as a ‘depoliticized’ society (Vandewalle 2006: 71). 
Chapter 2 reviews the way in which the Middle East politics literature has 
examined the relationship between political agency and authoritarianism, and 
positions the thesis’ research question within its extant gaps. The literature prior to the 
Arab uprisings is theoretically diverse. Studies on authoritarian resilience examined 
the behaviour of ruling elites and their use of conflict management instruments in 
order to sustain their rule (Gershenson and Grossman 2001; Bellin 2004; Gandhi and 
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Przeworski 2006; Gandhi 2008; Svolik 2009), while a parallel literature on Middle 
East politics focused on informal, everyday acts of political participation (Singerman 
1995; Hoodfar 1997; Bayat 2010; Beinin and Vairel 2011). Both literatures ultimately 
circumscribe the agency of political actors, viewing such agency as shaped and even 
determined by authoritarian structures. The Arab uprisings shifted the terms of debate, 
suggesting that Arab publics had engaged in a radical, collective and articulated mode 
of contestation, and had thereby succeeded in challenging the hegemony of 
authoritarianism (Affaya 2011; Brynen et al 2012; Bell 2013; Dawisha 2013; Tripp 
2013). The chapter identifies two central gaps in this literature: the need for a more 
direct engagement with the way in which authoritarian regimes structure meanings 
and are constitutive of popular agency, and the need to understand the extent to which 
this dynamic is transformed during moments of open contestation, and through the 
emergence of meaning making practices in particular.  
Chapter 3 engages critically with theories that have attempted to understand the 
relationship between structures of power and contentious political agency and 
resistance, before ultimately outlining a theoretical framework that draws these 
complementary approaches together. Using multi-institutional politics theory 
(Armstrong and Bernstein 2008), it understands dominant configurations of power as 
‘institutions’ that are comprised of a system of meaning and a material ordering of 
reality, or an ‘institutional logic’ (Friedland and Alford 1991; Thornton and Ocasio 
2008). This logic is constitutive of the publically political subjectivities of social 
actors. In turn, it draws on social movement and resistance theories in order to 
understand the emergence of political agency in moments of open contestation as an 
instrumental and symbolic representational practice that undertakes the alteration of 
this dominant institutional configuration.  
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Chapter 4 outlines the methodological premises underpinning the 
operationalisation of the research question. It emphasises the relevance of Qadhafi’s 
Jamahiriya as a case study for understanding institutional domination and change. It 
then goes on to outline the triangulated research methods that enabled the study of 
strategic and symbolic meaning making practices during the Libyan uprising. It also 
presents the interpretive methodology through which such practices were read as 
expressions of a contentious, representational form of political agency.  
The thesis is comprised of three empirical chapters, each of which develops an 
individual sub-argument that contributes to the overarching conclusion made by the 
thesis. The central contribution of Chapter 5 is in taking Qadhafi’s Jamahiriya 
seriously as an ‘institution’ that was constitutive of publically political agency in 
Libya, as opposed to analysing the Jamahiriya as a de-institutionalised ‘sultanistic 
regime’ (Chehabi and Linz 1998) or as an increasingly ‘liberalized autocracy’ 
(Brumberg 2002). It argues that Qadhafi’s Jamahiriya structured material and 
symbolic reality in Libya through an ‘institutional logic’ that mandated the popular 
performance of contradiction in the pursuit of individual and collective interests, and 
that was reproduced across a set of coercive, political and symbolic practices. There 
were multiple contradictions sustained within and by the Jamahiriya: in particular, the 
tension between its promotion of popular self-representation through a system of 
congresses and committees, and its refusal to permit such representational practices 
the capacity to shape the material reality of Libyan society. In addition, the 
Jamahiriya’s valorised self-presentation was perpetuated and sustained through the 
public re-performance of its symbolism, despite a widespread recognition of its 
material failings. This institutional logic ultimately delimited political agency: firstly, 
by engendering complicity in the Jamahiriya’s coercive and institutional-
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administrative system, and secondly, by preventing the emergence of authentic, 
publically political subjectivities.  
Chapters 6 and 7 of the thesis address the strategic and semiotic components of 
meaning making in the Libyan uprising. They do this by delineating the way in which 
political actors generated representations of reality that responded to the Jamahiriya’s 
institutional logic and to the imperatives of contentious collective action. Chapter 6 
outlines the ‘collective action framing’ of the Libyan uprising. It describes the actors 
and networks responsible for disseminating authoritative understandings of the 
revolutionary moment, as well as the discursive content of their frames. In turn, it 
argues that the rhetorical emphasis on Qadhafi’s culpability, appeals for the necessity 
of a no-fly zone, and religious vocabularies of struggle, together constituted powerful 
diagnostic, prognostic and motivational frames for collective mobilisation. However, 
it also argues that these widely disseminated frames were articulated despite the 
presence of palpable differences and divergent views of the revolutionary narrative. 
As a result, the framing process rested as much on the obfuscation of meanings and 
interpretations as it did on their clarification and refinement. This conclusion 
problematises the emergence of political agency in the Libyan uprising, by 
challenging the assumed complementary between strategic, contentious action and the 
social construction of reality.  
Chapter 7 unpacks the symbolic, representational practices that emerged during 
the Libyan uprising, particularly in the burgeoning sphere of cultural production. It 
argues that through such cultural productions – from revolutionary sloganeering to 
music, poetry and artwork - political actors displayed agency through subversive 
resistance: they contested Qadhafi’s monopoly over meaning and over public space 
by dismantling the Jamahiriya’s idealised self-presentation, and by enacting a 
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revolutionary aesthetic that positioned Libyans as productive citizens and self-
determining agents. However, in the process of contesting the Jamahiriya’s symbolic 
order, Libyan propounded a utopian nationalist rhetoric that redrew fresh boundaries 
of exclusion, and they constructed new symbolic and material hierarchies that centred 
on commitment to, and involvement in, the 17 February uprising. As a result, their 
representational practices struggled to transform the Jamahiriya’s dominant symbolic 
classifications of the social world.  
 
8.3 Implications for Middle East Politics  
 
 
This thesis, in emphasising an institutional understanding of authoritarian regimes, 
has implications for the way in which political agency and authoritarianism are 
studied in Middle East politics. As argued in Chapters 2 and 5, the ‘institutions’ that 
are judged to be relevant in authoritarian regimes are those such as legislatures, 
political parties and security apparatuses, which are deemed significant primarily 
because they act as pseudo-democratic instruments, used by dictators for co-optation 
and control (Gandhi 2008). In contrast, this thesis suggests that an institutional 
conceptualisation of authoritarian regimes is useful for understanding, both the way in 
which structural power operates, and the way in which it shapes the political agency 
of citizens.  
In the former sense, authoritarian domination can be understood as comprised of 
material and symbolic practices that are closely interrelated: definitions, 
categorisations and visual enactments of power and interest are bolstered by, and 
further entrench, dominant material practices. This interplay between classificatory 
systems and material practices creates a logic of practice, or a culture of domination, 
that is ‘formidably powerful’ (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008: 83), but one that can 
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only be delineated if this interrelationship is grasped. A recent contribution to 
understanding the symbolic mechanisms of authoritarian regimes is offered by Joseph 
Sassoon (2016), but this disaggregates and studies authoritarian regimes as comprised 
of separate ‘institutional’ and ‘cult of personality’ elements: the former dictate norms 
of political, organisational and social behaviour, and the latter construct symbols and 
systems of meaning centred on a particular leader. By understanding meaning as 
constitutive of structure, we can broaden the way in which classificatory systems are 
analysed in authoritarian regimes, going beyond the notion of a ‘cult of personality’, 
and examining the way in which regimes define power and interest in general. In turn, 
we can analyse moments of contentious action, such as the Arab uprisings, as 
attempts at institutional transformation. In doing so, challenges to material structures 
of domination can be viewed as most radical when they are accompanied by changes 
to a dominant system of meaning.  
In addition, an institutional approach to authoritarianism can enable a more 
nuanced conceptualisation of the way in which dominant representational practices 
subsequently inform the behaviours, patterns of social conduct and subjectivities of 
citizens. In Chapter 2, this is identified as a gap in the literature on Middle East 
politics, which has largely grappled with authoritarian systems of meaning by 
invoking concepts such as  ‘legitimation’ (Gerschewski 2013; Kailitiz 2013), or by 
seeing discursive structures as determinant and constitutive of political agents 
(Mitchell 1988; Massad 2001; El Shakry 2007). There is a need to build more 
substantively on the work of Wedeen (1999) by investigating the way in which 
authoritarian regimes regulate symbols while never fully claiming ownership of their 
meanings, or indeed, of the popular political subjectivities that reproduce such 
meanings through acts of dissimulation. In this view, dominant systems of meaning 
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are not entirely constitutive of political agents, but create what has been described as 
an embedded form of agency that publically reproduces domination while remaining 
detached from its legitimising narratives. 
In seeking to understand the way in which regimes shape publically political 
subjectivities, the thesis has also drawn attention to the concept of ‘complicity’. 
Wedeen (1999: 6) has argued that authoritarian system induce complicity by creating 
practices in which citizens themselves uphold the symbolic norms constitutive of 
domination. In Chapter 5, the thesis suggests that complicity did not simply emerge 
due to the re-enactment of symbolic domination in Libya, but also as a result of 
popular participation in Libya’s ineffectual, unscrupulous and distributive public 
institutions. In the Middle East literature, this understanding of complicity is alluded 
to in the argument that wealth distribution schemes in the Arab world – particularly in 
so-called ‘rentier states’ - create powerful vested interests in society (Hertog 2016), 
leading to an acceptance of the misuse of public funds (Hafez 2009: 467), 
‘internalised corruption’ (Jabbra 1989: 4), and ultimately, in the case of Libya, to a 
devastating ‘culture of entitlement’ (St. John 2013: 94). The emergent conclusion 
from such observations is that Arab countries are in need of a new ‘social contract’, or 
a ‘new institutional framework where the role of the state and its relationship with 
society is entirely revamped’ (Rother and Devarajan 2015: 38).  
This is a promising line of research, but it has been noted that discussions of 
what such a social contract would involve remain vague and, as yet, underdeveloped 
(Hertog 2016). Moreover, the central concept of ‘complicity’ can be usefully 
extended to include the way in which routinised, exploitable systems of material gain 
shape the political subjectivities of those who participate within them. As argued in 
Chapters 6 and 7, the Jamahiriya’s representation of citizens as ‘accomplices’ shaped 
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the attributional rhetoric of Libyans during moments of open contestation, rendering it 
difficult for Libyans to acknowledge and disentangle their own agency from the 
greater accountability of dominant authoritarian structures.  
Lastly, the conclusion of the thesis challenges the prevailing analysis of cultural 
production in the Middle East as an empowering and agentive activity (Armbrust 
2013; Khatib 2013a; Sabea 2013, 2014; Wahdan 2014), and as part of a radical 
politics of resistance that, during the Arab uprisings, opened up ‘a space for the 
possibility of debate and critical engagement with power’ (Tripp 2013: 308). Indeed, 
this binary between power and resistance is mirrored in actor-centric accounts of post-
Arab uprising politics that go beyond cultural production: for instance, in the neat 
contrast between ‘civil resistance’ and ‘oppression and autocracy’ (Roberts 2016: 
271), and in the argument that contentious publics in Arab Spring countries couldn’t 
change ‘political culture’ principally because of the ‘exclusionary attitudes and 
confrontational strategies’ of old and new political elites (Asseburg and Wimmen 
2016: 16). Jessica Winegar (2016) has argued convincingly for the need to grasp the 
way in which revolutionary actions, such as collective acts of ‘aesthetic ordering’ and 
the reclamation of formerly threatening public spaces, reveal contradictions at the 
heart of utopian revolutionary narratives and further inscribe the interests of those 
who perform them. Chapter 7 builds on this view of power and resistance by 
connecting material acts of aesthetic ordering in the Libyan uprising with the 
definitional aesthetics of protest, instead of viewing them, as Winegar does, as 
separate spheres of discourse and practice. Foregrounding this understanding of 
collective political action also means going beyond the argument that activism is 
informed by changing political contexts (Khatib and Lust 2014), and examining the 
way in which it is informed by dominant semiotic contexts also.  
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8.4 Implications for Social Movement Theory  
 
 
This thesis deploys the conceptual tools of constructivist social movement theory in 
order to advance its analysis of political agency as a strategic, articulated practice. 
The concept of collective action framing has provided a useful, structured template 
for unpacking the components of discursive mobilisation during contentious action. 
However, the deployment of social movement theory has revealed some difficulties in 
the way it permits – or does not permit – us to understand political agency and 
symbolic contestation in authoritarian contexts, partly stemming from the fact it 
remains ‘necessarily drawn from the experience of particular social movements in 
particular places’ (Foweraker 1997: 64). 
The concept of ‘frame resonance’ (Snow and Benford 1986) is particularly 
problematic as a tool for analysing the way in which meaning making practices 
should both affirm and contest dominant cultural norms. As outlined in Chapter 3, 
frame resonance refers to the notion that the understandings disseminated by social 
movement actors must connect with wider societal values and beliefs in order to be 
sufficiently persuasive. The argument that culture is a beneficial ‘resource’ for 
political activists (Johnston 2009: 6) implicitly presumes that cultures are undergirded 
by democratic and progressive beliefs that social movements should simply unearth, 
amplify and make relevant once more to societies that hold them in high regard. 
However, if democratic understandings are not pre-existent within society, or at the 
very least, do not proliferate at a widespread level, then on what basis can social 
movement activists construct both politically progressive and socially resonant frames 
of meaning? Chapter 6 argues that ‘democracy’ was framed as a malleable signifier in 
the Libyan uprising, and suggests that frame resonance with the Jamahiriya’s 
meanings was problematic. Framing theory is premised on the notion that social 
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movements generate support by continually articulating, clarifying and fine-tuning 
their perspectives. In contrast, this thesis suggests the need to consider what is left 
purposefully unarticulated and unspoken by political actors in their attempt to 
advance their political objectives.  
One way of stepping beyond this authoritarian impasse is to circumscribe the 
empirical reach of frame resonance. Conceptions of frame resonance are targeted 
towards understanding ‘societal values’ in a broad sense, and generalising those 
values across social movement participants, audiences and bystanders. Instead, it may 
be more fruitful to investigate, from the outset, the values and beliefs that are resonant 
within particular institutional contexts. This thesis focuses on authoritarian 
institutional contexts of meaning, but it is also possible to examine frame resonance as 
occurring, to varying degrees, within the myriad of overlapping ‘institutions’ that 
exist within a particular social context. ‘Societal understandings’ can thus be 
disaggregated and analysed according to the meanings that they contain, before 
investigating the way in which such understandings are unearthed and amplified in 
movement discourses.  
The thesis has also drawn attention to the way in which the semiotic tools of 
social movement theory remain particularly underdeveloped: a limitation that 
necessitated the use of resistance theory as a complementary conceptual framework. 
Prominent voices in the field of contentious politics, such as Sidney Tarrow (1993a: 
286) have spoken of the way in which protest events produce ‘new or transformed 
symbols, frames of meaning, and ideologies’. Attention to the transformation of 
symbols has been depicted as one of the distinguishing characteristics of framing 
theory, setting it apart from structuralist understandings of collective action (McAdam 
et al 1996). However, framing analysis is not designed for the investigation of 
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‘symbols’ as semiotic practices. Instead, symbols are often conflated with cognitive 
collective action frames, and ultimately disaggregated as a means to an end: the 
justification and mobilisation of collective action. Symbols thus remain 
epiphenomenal to the applied practice of framing research, despite constituting part of 
its underlying theoretical approach.  
The relative neglect of symbols is visible in the conflict between the stated 
objective and rationale of framing analysis, and the presentation of framing outcomes. 
Constructivist social movement theory argues that political actors can engender 
interpretive shifts in the perceptions, values and beliefs of society through their 
framing practices (Snow and Benford 1986; Benford and Snow 2000). However, the 
findings of frame analysis are often presented through the lens of mobilisation: frame 
alignment processes are judged successful based on whether or not they succeed in 
getting people to mobilise, not on whether they have actually succeeded in aligning, 
extending or transforming the self-understandings of participants (Snow and Benford 
1988; Zald 1996; Johnston 2002; Noakes and Johnston 2005; Westby 2005; Doerr et 
al 2015; Polletta and Gardner 2015). Thus, despite its constructivist underpinnings, 
frame analysis tends to adopt a stance of positivistic impact, presenting causal 
findings about the way in which framing processes shape social movement outcomes.  
To offer one example, the concept of ‘frame bridging’ (Snow et al 1986: 467) 
reveals the limitation of understanding the social construction of reality principally as 
a means to mobilisation. Frame bridging processes purportedly incentivise bystanders 
to participate in social movements by creating parallel, appealing benefits that exist 
outside of the core objectives of the movement, but which chime with the interests of 
individuals. These benefits serve to ‘hook’ individuals into a social movement 
environment, and to gradually mobilise them into action once their interest is retained. 
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And yet, it is not at all self-evident that this bridging process will ultimately 
contribute to the alignment of the individual with the core values and beliefs of the 
social movement. In fact, the presentation of tailored incentives may keep actors 
tangentially aligned with a movement, without necessitating that they embrace its 
holistic objectives and goals. Thus, Chapter 6 of the thesis argues that what has been 
described as social movement ‘cynicism’ may be an asset for drawing in participants, 
but it can also undermine the heterogeneity and multiplicity of representational 
practices  – the very foundation on which agency rests – and create a fragile 
consensus that ultimately undercuts the collectivist ambitions of a social movement. 
As a whole, there could be a theoretical consideration of the way in which framing 
processes can increasingly distort the central veracity of a movement’s self-
understandings, drawing it further away from its core values in the pursuit of its 
mobilising objectives.  
The purpose of this discussion has not been to suggest that framing theory 
abandon its mobilising dimensions altogether. On the contrary, this dimension of 
framing theory has proven useful in unpacking the strategic component of rhetorical 
contestation in the Libyan uprising. However, it does suggest a need for framing 
theory to focus on the interpretive component of framing processes, and to develop its 
own ‘in-house’ mechanisms for gauging the transformative, semiotic impact of frame 
alignment. This would bolster framing theory’s stated commitment towards advancing 
a constructivist and agency-centric understanding of social movements.  
 
8.5 Limitations and Suggestions for Further Research  
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The subject of political agency under authoritarianism is vast, and cannot be 
comprehensively addressed in a research project of this scale. The thesis attempted to 
delimit a specific, discursive understanding of political agency that could be 
investigated within a relatively self-contained moment of contentious political 
activism. However, this decision to narrow the scope of research has undoubtedly led 
to limitations in the empirical content of the study, and in its temporal scope. It has 
been a particular frustration of this research project that I was unable to travel to 
Libya to conduct fieldwork, due to the deteriorating security situation from August 
2014 onwards. For instance, a more spontaneous approach to interviewing - one that 
would have emerged organically from being located inside Libya - would have greatly 
enriched the empirical content of the thesis, particularly in unpacking the 
Jamahiriya’s institutional logic. Symbolic meanings are not only gleaned through 
spoken and written discourses (although these are undoubtedly valuable resources), 
but are actively constructed and negotiated through conversational interactions and 
rituals within a particular social context.  
Moreover, the thesis focuses only one type of institutional structure, but it also 
recognises that there is a multiplicity of institutions that could have been examined in 
tandem: for instance, family, religion, and tribalism. A focus on representational 
practices within tribal systems of meaning, for instance, may have generated a 
different conclusion regarding the way in which the Libyan uprising fostered 
primordial identities or empowered actors within local, rather than national, contexts. 
Moreover, in solely examining the Jamahiriya as an institution, the thesis confines 
itself to examining intra-institutional tensions and contradictions within its logic of 
practice. However, Friedland and Alford (1991: 255) argue that ‘the sources of 
change and resistance within institutions are just as likely to be found in the 
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contradictions between them’, and that people can ‘export the symbols and practices 
of one institution in order to transform another’. The presence of inter-institutional 
contradiction in the Libyan uprising remains an untapped avenue of research, but one 
that would have involved unpacking the semiotic content and material practices of 
other, concomitant institutions in Libya before tracing the extent to which their 
meanings resurfaced through contentious framing practices.  
In terms of its temporal scope, the thesis consciously restricts itself to 
examining the contentious period of the 2011 Libyan uprising, stemming from the 
theoretical emphasis on historical ‘events’ as unprecedented moments of political 
activity (Sewell 1996). However, a consequence of this choice is that it has been 
difficult to speak authoritatively about the degree of institutional transformation 
engendered by the uprising, if transformation is understood as the extent to which 
individuals create ‘new truths, new models by which to understand themselves and 
their societies, as well as new forms of behaviour and material practices’ (Friedland 
and Alford 1991: 254).  
For instance, although Chapter 7 indicated that the revolutionary period did not 
entirely transform the Jamahiriya’s material practices, and may in fact have 
engendered further systemic inequalities, this phenomenon arguably became most 
evident following the removal of the Qadhafi regime. Interim transitional 
governments in Libya perpetuated the Qadhafi regime’s distributive proclivities 
through cash giveaways and state subsidies, particularly to revolutionary fighters 
(thuwwar) and to the families of fighters who were killed or missing in action (St. 
John 2015: 125). In May 2012, the NTC also passed legislation punishing anyone 
harming ‘the 17 February revolution’ or engaging in the ‘glorification’ of Qadhafi, 
while granting amnesty to thuwwar for ‘any acts made necessary by the 17 February 
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revolution’ (LFJL 2012; Kersten 2016). Such practices entrenched the interests and 
powers of thuwwar in post-uprising Libya, and institutionalised an exclusionary 
understanding of the 17 February uprising that undercut multiplicity and did not 
tolerate dissent. Although the thesis does not investigate the post-2011 period of 
political transition, such a focus would have undoubtedly enabled a richer discussion 
of institutional change and continuity in Libya.  
Finally, the thesis suggests a need to examine, in more depth, the shifting 
narrations and reinterpretations of contentious activism in Libya. As indicated above, 
such reinterpretations occur at a subjective level, as Libyans continue to reassess the 
impact and significance of their involvement in the 2011 uprising based on the 
intensification of political divisions, continuing insecurity and the deterioration of 
infrastructure in the country. In the East of Libya there have been successive killings 
of high profile activists, lawyers and political figures; throughout the country, the 
ongoing conflict has been accompanied by inflation, rising food prices, water 
shortages and endemic electricity cuts. Chapter 6 briefly indicated the way in which 
these deleterious outcomes have begun to spawn a trend of revolutionary disavowal 
and the emergence of conspiratorial readings of 17 February that stress the preeminent 
role of foreign interests and political elites, as opposed to the empowering vision of 
collective political agency generated during the revolutionary period. However, there 
is scope to extend this discussion more substantively, in order to understand the way 
in which the contextual trajectories of social movements shape the persistence and 
transformation of personal political involvement.  
These mutable conceptualisations of the Libyan uprising are important, partly 
for what they tell us about individual subjectivities, but also for the way in which they 
represent a broader struggle for the categorisation and delimitation of the 
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revolutionary experience as a whole. This phenomenon can be witnessed within the 
broader Arab Spring landscape, in conflicting accounts of whether or not the 
revolutions ‘achieved anything’. In Libya, this interpretive process can be studied as a 
symptom of the divergent local and regional experiences of the ongoing civil conflict. 
The 17 February revolutionary narrative, which has constituted the subject of this 
thesis, has to some extent been jettisoned in favour of alternative histories of struggle 
that are now equally if not more salient to their participants. The battles between 
‘Karama’ (Operation Dignity) in the East of Libya, and the ‘Fajr’ (Dawn of Libya) 
coalition in the West, from 2014, have generated new symbols, values and martyrs for 
an increasingly fragmented revolutionary cause. Within the policy literature, this 
conflict is wrapped within a language of ‘Islamism’ vs. ‘secularism’, when in reality it 
reflects the breakdown of authority in the periphery of the Libyan state. Building on 
the constructivist orientation of this thesis, it would be fruitful to research the ongoing 
Libyan conflict, not simply as a battle between militias, tribes and political bodies, but 
as a heterogeneous process of historical revision and re-interpretation, embodied in 
the competing local, regional and national narratives that are being disseminated 
across Libyan society, and which continue the practice of defining Libyan identity 
anew.   
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Appendix II List of Interviews 
 
 Name  Date Interviewed Location 
1 Maryam   03/02/2015 Skype 
2 Munir 08/02/2015 Skype 
3 Ali 09/02/2015 Skype 
4 Tareq 14/02/2015 Oxford 
5 Ahmed  25/02/2015 London 
6 Mustafa  04/03/2015 London 
7 Bushra 04/03/2015 London 
8 Yasmin 11/03/2015 Exeter 
9 Reem  15/03/2015 Skype 
10 Mohammed 23/03/2015 Tunisia 
11 Sara 24/03/2015 Tunisia 
12 Khaled 26/03/2015 Tunisia 
13 Abdullah 28/03/2015 Tunisia 
14 Haleema 29/03/2015 Tunisia 
15 Hamza  04/04/2015 London 
16 Muna  20/08/2015 Bristol 
17 Dania  27/08/2015 London 
18 Fawzi 29/12/2015 Skype 
19 Najib 30/12/2015 Skype 
20 Osama  30/12/2015 Skype 
21 Umar  14/01/2016 Skype 
22 Marwa 23/01/2016 London 
23 Fayez 27/01/2016 London 
24 Isa 25/01/2016 Skype 
25 Aisha 06/04/2016 Skype 
26 Mansour 20/04/2016 Skype 
27 Huda  09/06/2016 Skype 
28 Hussein 07/11/2016 Milton 
29 Yahya 29/11/2016 Skype 
30 Hisham  05/12/2016 Skype 
31 Salem  10/12/2016 Birmingham 
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